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Abstract 
 
Following deregulation of the UK inter-city coach market through the 1980 
Transport Act the network is now dominated by two firms giving cause to question 
the success of the policy and the processes enabling competitive freedom. A 
policy cornerstone was contestability, and though market entry by small and 
medium sized coach firms in the UK has not been sustained in large quantities, 
deregulation has arguably been successful in maintaining low prices and 
stimulating innovation and quality improvements. The research examines 
potential reasons for the lack of multiple firm activity in the UK given the freedoms 
afforded by the market structure and tracks changes in the market. Consolidating 
early academic work and filling knowledge gaps with non-academic and trade 
press data, the research also outlines economic market structures that 
characterise the market across the research period and which have influenced 
the success of deregulation. The research compares subsequently liberalised 
European markets with the UK, examining factors that have stimulated and 
suppressed market entry. The conclusions focus on factors that are critical to 
market success, such as: the requirement for a comprehensive network to 
maximise efficiency and reach; strong demand in both service directions; brand 
awareness (local level and/or nationwide); e-commerce platforms, and financial 
resources to mitigate losses while building market share. The research finds that 
entry by small and medium sized firms can only be sustained if at least one of 
these factors are present. In parallel the research demonstrates movement 
through several economic structures by each market, in-part meeting objectives 
set by Governments, and results in a cyclical model to show the likely lifecycle of 
a liberalised inter-city coach market. The research finds that settled state 
structures have provided such freedom that large firms may now more easily 
compete (retaliate) or change business models (switching the main role of 
competition away from the open market to new monopsonistic sub-markets) with 
monopoly control remaining in the open market - a policy failure perhaps but 
maintaining the mode as a viable competitor in the public transport mix. The main 
research finding is how e-commerce has shaped liberalisation, shortening early 
competitive phases, altering travel behaviour, and raising customer expectations 
– all creating new barriers for smaller firms but seeing an increase in use, reach 
and coverage for large firms and new opportunities for 'virtual' providers. 
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Introduction 
 
The liberalisation of inter-city coach services across Europe has been 
continuously evolving over a period of 35 years. Applied to successive European 
markets, it has often followed periods of state control and policies designed to 
protect passenger railways. In most cases, liberalisation reverses this protection 
opening direct inter-modal competition as an eventual, if not immediate, outcome. 
Furthermore, governments have long seen liberalisation as an approach to 
reinvigorating ailing markets; achieving economic efficiency through free-market 
economics; moving costs away from the state, and; enabling private 
entrepreneurship to make investments in equipment and technology that may not 
otherwise be made. The cornerstone of each government's approach has been 
contestable market theory. This is a process used to help the market regulate 
itself through competitive threat, facilitating competition to ensure that social 
welfare will be maximised, and profits not rise above normal levels.  
 
Based on the UK experience, and more recent liberalisations across, the 
research has focused on one core hypothesis; 
 
 Given the freedoms allowed for market entry and exit through the 1980 
Transport Act why is there little or no activity within the UK inter-city coach 
market by small and medium sized coach operators? 
 
Work to answer this has seen additional sub-hypothesis emerge as follows;  
 Is the current UK market a demonstrable success of contestable market 
theory (CMT) but a failing of Government objectives related to choice and 
quantity? 
 Has the resultant UK market structure led to an internal monopsonistic 
market structure within a wider external monopoly or oligopoly market 
structure? 
 What critical factors are required prior to or post liberalisation to enable 
long-term competition to occur? 
 Following examination of sequential liberalisations across Europe what 
similarities exist and what lessons can be drawn from each process?  
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In Europe, the UK was the first country to pass legislation to deregulate the inter-
city coach market, doing so in 1980 and therefore seeing the operation of 
deregulated long-distance coach alongside state operated railways until 
privatisation in 1997. Notably however, the coach network prior to deregulation 
had already moved through several market structures, including nationalisation. 
Due to several policy and law changes determining the operation of domestic 
road public transport a static network of coach services giving extensive UK wide 
coverage existed by 1980. These were protected by quantity restrictions and 
licensing requirements on each long-distance route. This was overseen by a 
public body and many of such routes were operated by the nationalised (state) 
operation. 
 
In 1980 the situation changed with the Transport Act opening the market to 
competition in one step, allowing supply and demand to be self-balancing through 
free-market forces. The planned benefits of this policy were to: create a platform 
which stimulated entrepreneurial activity; widen public choice; keep prices low 
(in-check through competition), and; ensure profits were limited in the long-run to 
normal levels through contestability. Upon deregulation the static nature of the 
network changed overnight (for at least the short-term). A diversion of resources 
to core corridors by the incumbent, National Express, prior to divestment from 
state ownership saw a consequential shrinking of network coverage. This was 
coupled with unrestricted changes to schedules, routes, and fares prompted by 
direct competition from individual firms on single routes and a consortium offering 
a limited competing network based heavily on fares competition over service 
frequency. 
 
Initial competition subsided within five years of deregulation with much single 
route competition fading away earlier through competitive attrition or mergers with 
National Express - these competitors being mainly small to medium sized firms. 
The consortium, British Coachways, who competed at a strategic network level 
also ceased after three years following aggressive competition from National 
Express and to a lesser extent British Rail.  
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From the late 1980s through to the early 2000s National Express' position 
remained largely unchallenged. Although contestable, the UK market was, and 
remains, characterised by a highly price-elastic passenger market. This has 
provided little encouragement for new competition at the smaller firm level due to 
low returns compared to the costs of entry - demonstrated by the lack of activity 
when National Express fares rose, and ridership declined in the 1990s.  
 
More recently advances in digital technology and e-commerce have allowed new 
competition at the strategic level with Megabus entering the market in 2003, but 
only able to do so with hefty financial support from its parent firm and global 
transport provider Stagecoach Group plc. Indeed, e-commerce has gone a long 
way to removing residual deregulation barriers for all potential entrants and 
further advances are now prompting a new wave of 'virtual' providers to enter the 
market at low cost but with a continued focus on fares competition against major 
operators in the current oligopoly market. However, with dominant firms and low 
financial returns persisting it is arguable that few incentives or opportunities for 
small and medium sized firms acting in their own right exist in the UK market, and 
indeed anywhere where similar pre and post deregulation conditions exist.  
 
However, in support of the process and current market in the UK are: dominant 
firm growth; rail competition (rising standards and lowering fares); product and 
service innovation (all modes); dynamic pricing; retention of good profit margins 
by established major firms across the deregulated period (pointing to a healthy 
market with continued loyalty); some ongoing niche market successes by smaller 
firms in the face of competitive headwinds, and; adoption of emerging 
technologies enabling greater cost efficiencies. These are evident in the UK, and 
other studied markets, and for the UK point towards a well-functioning market in 
line with original Government policy aims in 1980. With this experience in mind 
the research seeks to identify the role of the smaller firm in the domestic inter-city 
coach market. It looks to identify their future as markets move forward and 
comment on the success of policies designed to reinvigorate markets by 
comparing pre and post deregulation situations in the UK and Europe. 
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Successive European liberalisations have arguably learnt from the UK. In part 
responding to localised funding and ownership pressures, these markets have 
often been liberalised over more stages. Similarly, to the UK each has been 
ahead of rail privatisation and unlike the UK most remain fully or partially in state 
control, creating difficulties between private and State funded competition which 
has not been fully addressed in any market - even within the UK where rail 
privatisation has progressed the most. 
 
Observations of competitive processes in the UK and Europe show that most new 
entrants use 'home' market knowledge to try and find a foothold on volume 
corridors, believing there to be room for multiple firms. However, contestability, 
allows existing firms in the market to react to new entry, forcing new entrants to 
exit the market early through predatory pricing, sometimes at the expense of 
short-term losses. This is a weakness of the competitive process that is 
exacerbated for smaller firms by their lack of penetration into the outbound market 
(e.g. from London in the UK market) where this market is not their 'home' market. 
In these cases, the firm is an unknown brand with too few resources to ensure 
perfect knowledge for consumers at both ends of the route and as such failing to 
meet the perfectly competitive market conditions policies strive for. A 
juxtaposition therefore exists which creates the argument for further study of the 
market regarding market structure theory. Contestability is a process and seen 
as an alternative to static theories that assume competition. Instead it facilitates 
competition, opening the market to the opportunity for free-market activity and 
balancing supply and demand by the threat of competition. This is designed to 
ensure normal profit levels and easy market movement, but when the former fails 
due to incumbent complacency 'hit and run' competition by new entrants can 
occur - the benefit being long-term balancing of the market to normal levels of 
price and profit after a short period of turbulent market operation. As this 
approach is risky and often short-term the majority of smaller firms that may 
perform this are deterred from actual market entry leaving incumbents to instead 
carefully strengthen their position.  
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In addressing the resultant role of the smaller firm research examines economic 
market states and the development of exemplar markets to understand if the lack 
of small and medium sized firm activity is; 
 
(a) simply symptomatic of the strength of incumbents to lever price-based 
market power supported by the freedoms of contestability, or; 
 
(b) a wider failing of deregulation and the rules for inter-city coach 
operation that may be remedied by learning lessons from 
subsequently liberalised markets and seeking further changes to 
operating conditions.  
 
In answer to this a review of market structure movement between exemplar 
countries has created a set of critical factors that when exhibited facilitate a 
healthy and competitive market. This is relevant for markets that are yet to 
liberalise and for emerging technologies and policy updates in already liberalised 
markets, where the original process may now be stagnating, or possibly failing. 
 
The timing of the question regarding market entry is also pertinent. Currently the 
European market is undergoing significant change following the widespread 
introduction of e-commerce but seen in the UK from the early 2000s. The use of 
e-commerce has provided a viable and cheap platform for firms to sell their 
product to vast groups of customers. It can be categorised into two forms; 'actual' 
and 'virtual' with examples being the rapid expansion of new market entrant 
FlixBus across Europe as an 'actual supplier', and the emergence of next 
generation 'virtual' service providers, such as Sn-ap (pairing public demand to 
viable coach paths) and Zeelo (a crowd sourcing app currently for corporate 
customers) in the UK.  
 
Research shows that in each category small and medium sized firms play a sub-
contractors role. While keeping these firms gainfully employed and utilising their 
skills and capacity, this does prevent them from directly competing for passenger 
traffic by keeping them at arms-length from the detailed mechanisms of dynamic 
service management. While this outcome realises some aims of deregulation it 
does fail to achieve direct independent competition at a multi-operator level.  
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The emergence of e-commerce has forced established firms to overhaul their 
business models - to drive forward innovation and improve the customer's digital 
access to the network while maintaining low prices but resulting in lower direct 
competition due to the power this tool gives to larger firms who are sufficiently 
resourced to employ it. 
 
As each market has liberalised notable lessons have been learnt; emergence of 
e-commerce-based competition has forced quicker market consolidation; 
continued emphasis on brand has been supported more effectively by digital 
innovation, and; the ‘reach’ of the coach mode (knowledge of its presence, 
network, and brand) has increased significantly. However, this has also created 
new barriers for firms - the free-market approach accommodating development 
but still potentially hindering complete access freedom. 
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Research Definitions 
 
The following section outlines briefly several important definitions that relate 
directly to the research undertaken. These are designed to assist the reader in 
understanding the author's intentions and rationale throughout the research 
document.   
 
i. The research defines 'market entry' as supplying all elements of inter-city 
coach operation that a passenger requires across a journey. This includes 
vehicle and crew resources, booking and ticket sales facilities, and 
marketing and public awareness. 
 
ii. Small firms are defined as those up to 10 vehicles and medium as those 
over 10 (but less than 25). Firms with over 25 coaches are large in the UK 
context.  
 
iii. An express or long-distance scheduled coach service is one which carries 
passengers at separate fares and across longer distances than local or 
commuter buses. Each country may define the conditions for an express 
service with different figures and metrics but in all cases stop to stop 
distances are a typical classification. 
 
iv. Long-distance road transport passenger trips are academically defined as 
journeys over 50 miles / c80km (Dargay, 2010) with this definition drawn 
from the National Travel Survey (NTS). However, under The Act (UK) the 
distance that determines an express service is a minimum distance 
between stops of 30 miles. Each studied market has differing distance 
rules, and these are shown in Chapter 8 Figure 23. 
 
v. A coach is a vehicle across two or three axles of up to 12 metres built for 
the carriage of passengers over longer distances with high capacity for 
people and luggage (this being stored under the floor and/or at the rear) 
but carrying no standing passengers. They can be double-deck or 
articulated and up to 15 metres under EU regulations. 
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vi. Short term in the context of the research period is deemed to be the first 
ten years after any deregulation event. Medium term is a further ten-year 
period after this, and long-term is any period thereafter. 
 
vii. Within the research document the terms 'inter-city' and 'express' are 
interchangeable for all modes and describe non-stop or limited stop long-
distance services. 
 
viii. Within the research document the terms 'deregulation' and 'liberalisation' 
are interchangeable, and both describe the same relaxing of market 
conditions and the promotion of a free-market economic state focused on 
a contestable environment.  
 
ix. Within the context of the UK, NBC refers to the National Bus Company 
covering England and Wales, with the SBG being the Scottish Bus Group. 
 
x. All markets are described and compared in their domestic form, meaning 
only services operating within national borders. International services are 
not considered. 
 
xi. The 1980 Transport Act is referred to as The Act periodically through the 
research document. 
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Methodology 
 
With deregulation of the UK inter-city coach market occurring over 35 years ago 
there is a significant period from which to collect secondary level data. It should 
be noted that throughout the research the terms 'deregulation' and 'liberalisation' 
are interchangeable. However, although a large level of research was conducted 
in the years immediately following the 1980 Transport Act focusing on the 
immediate effects of the policy change and free-market environment, little 
continued in following the years. This information gap was further exacerbated 
with the cessation of specific express coach data collection by the Department 
for Transport (DfT) by the early 1980s. From this period all non-local bus data 
was consolidated into a single category (also including contract services, 
excursions, and tours) making continued tracking of scheduled 'express' miles 
and ridership difficult without access to data provided by the companies 
themselves. 
 
More recent market liberalisations in Europe have stimulated new academic 
research following the developments of each market post-liberalisation and, in 
some cases, this has referenced the UK and its changing market structures and 
performance as comparators to newly emerging situations in each European 
example. 
 
Significant issues in undertaking this research have centred on the availability of 
data. This has been in regard to identifying trends in operated miles and 
passengers carried since each deregulation event, with data most difficult to 
produce for the UK. In each market, data is commercially sensitive as the market 
is subject to competition. While data is available for operations prior to 
liberalisation, the period following the change in conditions is very turbulent, 
subject to far fewer requirements for operational information (save for France), 
and dynamic in terms of pricing. With all data being secondary, it has been a 
requirement of this research to carefully review and combine information gained 
from industry and academic work to form a composite picture of each market. 
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To answer the research hypothesis (and sub-hypothesis) the work has followed 
three approaches;  
 
1. A review of written materials relating to the UK market at two levels; 
i. A review of academic materials produced before and after deregulation 
of the domestic inter-city coach market in the UK to bring information 
on this market up to date and within one place. This was important 
given the lack of analysis conducted after the 1980s save for periodic 
market updates by Robbins and White in (1986 and 2011), Robbins 
(2007), and White (1995). 
ii. A review of non-academic books, articles, and internet information. 
This was important to provide a historic context to the academic work 
and to fill knowledge gaps in market structure and performance from 
the 1990s. Using these sources, it has been possible to record 
developments over time in the UK market - from the first scheduled 
coach service in 1925 by Bristol Greyhound (Bristol to London via 
scheduled intermediary cities and towns) through to present day 
networks operated by major firms - mapping this against market 
structure theory (their development, conditions, and change process). 
2. To allow analysis of market developments in the UK (and selected 
European cases) the second approach is a review and application of 
economic market theory. This focuses on the raison-d'etre of the 1980 
Transport Act in the UK to use contestability to achieve a free-market 
outcome for inter-city coach services. This also tests policy changes 
regarding the removal of quantity restrictions and protection of the 
railways. The process of contestability is examined and found not to be a 
static long-term market state but an 'enabling process', helping markets 
move through traditional structures that define industry. Each traditional 
market structure is examined; its conditions outlined; its use in industry 
(and within road transport) documented, and a critique completed. Other 
less traditional concepts are also examined where the research has 
identified these. The result has been to understand the level of economic 
structure change within the market and evidence unique structures such 
as monopsony and variations to traditional oligopoly. 
17 
 
3. Using case study material from liberalised markets across Europe to 
understand how time and external market developments have affected 
market change and structures. The purpose is two-fold; (a) to compare 
and contrast the markets with the UK, and (b) to identify common lessons. 
Results may then inform liberalised markets as they develop further and, 
still-to-liberalise markets as they consider this policy. Markets were 
selected to represent a span of liberalised markets over time following the 
UK and were chosen where information concerning the process and 
outcomes was available to ensure that enough contextual and numeric 
data was available. Sweden and Norway were early markets to liberalise 
- representing the 1990s - 2000s. Following a gap in activity, Germany and 
France liberalised at similar times, but in differing ways (2013 and 2015), 
demonstrating lessons learnt from historical processes. In all cases rail, its 
ownership and operation prior to and after inter-city coach liberalisation, 
was outlined. Rail is the main competitor in all cases to coach but operates 
across varying terrains and network complexities and was a useful 
comparator - also pointing to potential reasons for success or failure in 
each market. 
In all approaches there are limitations to the data. The process of liberalisation 
creates a competitive market place and, therefore sensitive data. With no primary 
data collection undertaken in testing the original hypothesis, such as interviews 
with industry managers or passenger surveys, the data and information used has 
been secondary, The main reason for the use of this data has been the 
completion of the work at MPhil Stage; during the research there has been a 
switch in emphasis away from understanding the continued lack of market entry 
by smaller firms due to issues of commercial sensitivity and the author's role 
within National Express, compromising primary data validity. Instead, a 
retrospective market review and commentary on the UK deregulation process 
compared with later market liberalisations has been conducted using published 
information to remove sensitivity barriers. 
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To conclude on each market and the comparisons between them, secondary data 
has been worked into a composite format with variances noted. Data for 
patronage has been gleaned predominantly through academic work and the trade 
press. However, company profitability has not been used as a proxy to success 
given the often multi-disciplinary nature of the main firms within the market and 
limitations in sectioning purely inter-city operational data from annual company 
reports.  
 
Whilst some firms, such as National Express, provide annual reports by 
operational division: most recently, in 2017, the UK express coach business 
made a £34.2m profit on revenue of £287.7m, a margin of 11.9% (National 
Express Annual Financial Statement, March 2018). Other firms are not so 
specific, with the activities of Megabus (National Express's main competitor in the 
UK) having its accounts consolidated within its wider Stagecoach UK parent 
business. Therefore, comparisons between firms' success based on profitability 
are difficult assess and the research has instead used proportional market share 
(driven by passenger journey information) to comment on the performance of the 
market and firms within it. 
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Chapter 1 – Perfect Competition and Contestability 
 
1.1 Overview 
 
Express coach services are defined as operating an advertised route with 
passengers paying separate fares and services operating to defined times, 
journey lengths, and geographic paths. Freedom to enter this market by any firm 
has been in place in the UK since 1980 and more recently in several mainland 
European countries. However, the research seeks to understand why, given 
these freedoms, little market entry has occurred in recent years (in the UK) and, 
at deregulation, few new services were sustained by small and medium sized 
coach firms. 
 
Freedom for market entry and exit was provided through the process of 
deregulation. Seen as providing stimulus for increased competitive activity 
amongst private companies, deregulation is defined as; 
 
“The removal of controls over economic activity which have been 
imposed by the government or some other regulatory body” (Pass, 
1993, p125).  
 
This differs subtly from contestability, which is a tool that facilitates a change in 
market state usually requiring a change or removal of market rules to make entry 
and exit significantly easier. 
 
Through the 1980 Transport Act (the Act) the government aimed to use 
deregulation to create increased competition, social welfare (through greater 
passenger choice), and efficiency by creating a contestable environment 
(Robbins and White, 1986). This would see the removal of certain barriers to entry 
and exit for market actors, the easing of operating restrictions for new and existing 
firms to meet travel demand, and through this process, allowance of the supplier 
and consumer to place the market in equilibrium in terms of price and quantity 
through ‘trial and error’ market entry and product differentiation; achieving long-
term sustainability of supply. 
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The process of using contestability to aid deregulation provides the opportunity 
to allow the market to get as close as possible to the utopian concept of perfect 
competition. In this way, the market will move to a long-term structure which is 
‘free-market’ in nature, but which allows for some conditions to remain that may 
not otherwise be able to be removed, for example non-homogenous products. 
 
The central hypothesis to the research seeks to understand the lack of 
observable sustained activity by small and medium sized coach operators in the 
scheduled express coach market following the freedoms afforded through 
deregulation of the market and the change in entry and exit conditions allowed 
through the application of contestability over 35 years ago.  
 
It is important to understand the market conditions and health at the time of 
deregulation and the economic concepts and potential outcomes which prompted 
policy makers in the late 1970s to alter the market operating conditions for long 
distance coach travel and create the significantly more relaxed market structure 
that continues to exist in the UK. 
 
Considering the neoclassical theories of industrial organisation and applying 
these to the various stages of UK express coach market development; early 
market operation, through nationalisation, deregulation, and finally the current 
day market, it is possible to conclude on the success of deregulation policy and 
comment on synergies with comparable markets.  
 
This chapter focuses on the main deliverables promoted by the 1980 Transport 
Act; deregulation and contestability within the market place and assesses the 
prerequisites and suitability for their application to the express coach market in 
the face of the utopian market theory position of a perfectly competitive market.  
 
1.2 The market structure limits of the Act 
 
The aim of the 1980 Act was to experiment with the application of free-market 
economics in the public transport industry. The Act focused on opening the 
scheduled express coach market, at that time regulated, to competition - moving 
the market structure as far across the market theory spectrum as possible. 
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Figure 1 below compares neoclassical market structures in terms of the buyer to 
seller ratio, allowing comparisons to be made. In simplistic terms, the process of 
deregulation seeks to take a monopoly (right) as far towards perfect competition 
(left) as possible with movement through structures stimulating competition, 
product innovation, choice, and price efficiency for the consumer. Through the 
Act it was desirable to have a structure that allowed demand to create allocative 
and productive efficiencies for the supplier with this facilitated through a 
contestable market place - attracting new market entrants and allowing 
incumbent firms to react to entry and competitive opportunity more easily 
(Robbins and White, 1986). 
 
Figure 1: Buyer to Seller Market Structure Spectrum 
 
 
 
In Figure 1 contestable market theory arguably sits anywhere from 9:10 to 2:10 
in the ‘seller-to-buyer’ ratio. It is a mechanism to facilitate the development of a 
market through the actions of buyers and sellers. It allows each market and sub-
market to settle in equilibrium at any point in time by reducing the barriers to 
market entry and exit and seeking to minimise sunk costs - those costs that are 
non-recoverable because of market entry activity (e.g. promotional information 
costs). 
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The key question remains as to how purely contestable market theory was 
applied through the 1980 Transport Act, how time and technology have overcome 
previously unremoved barriers, and if the market for express coach travel can 
truly find equilibrium and allow wholly uninhibited actions of both sellers and 
buyers – therefore how much requirement remains for some level of structure 
within the market. 
 
1.3 Perfect Competition – conditions 
 
The structure of a perfectly competitive market is arguably an idealised situation 
which is rarely observed in the real world. Its primary function within economic 
research is its use in benchmarking real-world markets against a situation in 
which, through the application of very stringent conditions, social welfare is 
maximised, and the market performs at its most efficient level - termed Pareto 
Efficiency. 
 
Pareto Efficiency (Pareto Optimality) has three criteria which must be met; 
efficiency in production, efficiency in exchange, and efficient output mix 
(Hardwick 1994). It is; 
 
“Where the outcome of a market is such that it is not possible for 
someone to be made better off without making someone else worse off, 
even after any possible compensation has been made. In this way, total 
welfare or satisfaction in the market is maximised” (Mallard and Glaister, 
2008, p29).  
 
An example in early UK deregulation may be the move by National Express to 
trunk links and the abandoning of some cross-country routes through resource 
reallocation to maximise profit – meaning a change in welfare for both sets of 
potential passengers. 
 
Perfect competition theory’s most practical application to real-world markets is 
the productive use of any information gleaned from a benchmarking exercise in 
stimulating change in the studied market through a range of identified measures, 
such as policy amendments, legal changes, or market accessibility modifications.  
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The result from these changes should be a market that benefits from improved 
performance and better social equity. This will occur if there is a change in market 
operating conditions designed to move the market closer to, or equal to a 
perfectly competitive structure. To create the architecture for movement towards 
this position, quite stringent conditions are set:  
 
 There are many buyers and many sellers and no one buyer or seller can 
influence the level of production or price. This will be due to their size 
being small in terms of the market. Instead, price is determined by the 
large number of buyers acting independently and consuming all product;  
 
 All products are completely identical, both physically and aesthetically, 
and are deemed ‘homogenous’. Each unit of output is a perfect substitute 
for another regardless of the origin of the product; 
 
 The market will operate at a completely elastic demand level; if one firm 
increases its price all buyers will immediately source their product 
elsewhere within the market – meaning the demand curve for a perfectly 
competitive market is horizontal (Pass, 1993) at the market price 
determined by buyers within the market if rules to protect the achievement 
of normal profits are not broken. In this structure, the market is completely 
elastic in terms of users switching between providers. An overall elasticity 
may nonetheless apply for the market as a whole - an example being for 
overall coach use; 
 
 The market will not preclude entry or exit and there is a ‘nil penalty’ (no 
sunk costs or cost penalties) to a firm when entering or exiting the market; 
as such any firm, can enter or exit the market freely and simply; 
 
 All buyers and sellers within the market have perfect knowledge. This 
extends to all parts of production and includes price and availability; and,  
 
 All factors of production within the market are perfectly mobile; production 
can be switched immediately and without penalty (at ‘zero transaction 
costs’ for buyers and sellers) to a new location or production line.  
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In addition to the above conditions, the structure assumes all output of the 
homogenous product will be consumed and no wastage will occur during any 
production process or at the output level. This requirement makes the state very 
difficult to apply within the transport market as typically waste occurs through the 
inability to store product that is bound by ‘timed’ use through scheduled 
behaviour. 
 
Equally, a perfect market will demonstrate non-increasing returns to scale - a 
situation in which the quantity of output generated is proportional to the factor 
inputs applied, such that if the latter were doubled then the output would also 
double. This differs from economies of ‘increasing returns to scale’ (described as 
markets where economies of scale exist) and defined as output increasing more 
than proportionately to the factor inputs employed to generate the output. In the 
transport market, it is more likely that economies of scale (or at least ‘advantages’ 
of scale) exist – for example using larger capacity coaches on routes may have 
a lower unit cost per seat-mile for largely similar operating resources as costs are 
spread wider. In a perfect state, non-increasing returns to scale will ensure a 
sufficiently high number of firms are retained within the market with each seeing 
no advantage by increasing production, seeking market domination, or by finding 
efficiency in production – maintaining multiple suppliers at a normal profit level.   
 
If all conditions are met social welfare is maximised to uphold the Pareto 
Efficiency rule and the model represents a utopian state for any market seeking 
complete efficiency and welfare maximisation. The success of activities in the 
real world to positively impact, or shift, existing market structures are gauged by 
the resultant new market structure and operation to the proximity to this utopian 
state. Equally, the success of policies designed to allow free-market economies, 
where market forces rather than regulation can shape the productive outcome, 
can be assessed through comparison of these markets with the model. 
Traditionally this is used to understand if by allowing a free-market state; supply 
and demand is balanced correctly for the market (buyers and sellers) in question. 
To understand the success of this balance the level of social welfare 
demonstrated within the market can be the only substantive measure for a free-
market economy. Douglas (1987) studied in detail the social welfare effects of 
express coach deregulation in the UK. 
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1.4 Perfect Competition – critique 
 
As a structure, perfect competition simplifies the market. The most notable 
benefits are no monopoly power, no over pricing, no abnormal profits, and 
complete freedom for market entry and exit. To achieve this, the structure relies 
on there being no sunk costs for market entry or exit, and no advertising due to 
perfect market knowledge and identical (homogenous) products. Furthermore, no 
advantages can be gained by sellers refining the productive process as buyers 
are rational and perfectly mobile with no brand loyalty. 
 
The agriculture sector is the closest approximation to a perfectly competitive 
market due to the simplicity of the products, their homogeneity and ability for 
substitution between sellers, and the effects of buyers, such as wholesalers, 
supermarkets and food manufacturers being well documented price makers. 
Within the transport market some of the closest approximations to a perfectly 
competitive market structure may be found within the shipping market where bulk 
services meet many of the criteria (Mallard and Glaister, 2008), and in the UK 
road haulage sector (Nash, 1982). 
 
Perfect competition, as a model of total efficiency and social welfare maximisation 
may, however, has difficulties in its application to many real-world markets, 
including the passenger transport market. Although held up as the benchmark for 
efficiency and welfare maximisation there are arguments against the benefits that 
the stringent conditions of perfect competition are perceived to generate.  
 
With freedom comes a stifling of other business practices. The structure allows 
no scope for entrepreneurial activity due to all the above factors which ensures 
that the buyer decides the price. This ensures normal profits are maintained in 
the long-run and any occurring short-run abnormal profits can be removed by ‘hit 
and run’ entry in the short term (Hibbs, 2003) – these profits either being rebuffed 
or forcing the market to re-adjust to meet the new entrant’s conditions. This form 
of entry and competition can be counterproductive to the stability and 
sustainability of the market and the welfare of buyers within the market. 
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A further concern regards profit and market operation; should the motivation to 
either enter or be an ongoing actor within the market be questioned if only normal 
profits can be earned, and therefore, is a perfectly competitive market a relevant 
structure to consider? If this was the aim of Government legislation through 
deregulation of the lack of opportunity to make above normal profits if the market 
became perfectly competitive would have deterred new entry and choice within 
the market. As the market could not become perfect this issue failed to arise and 
abnormal profit levels were observed. 
 
The structure supposes that having a large quantity of small firms acting in the 
market place, all producing identical goods, will not allow any firm to attempt to 
influence the market by being able to raise the price of the product being sold. In 
this sense, each firm is too small to have any influence on the direction of price 
or supply and buyers of the product are price makers.  
 
Whilst for some markets where the resultant outputs being produced and 
consumed are very simplified this may be advantageous. However, for the road 
passenger transport market there is evidence to suggest that a smaller number 
of suppliers may be able to offer the same, and perhaps higher, level of efficiency 
and social welfare through the use of economic tools like economies of scale 
(achieving advantages through scale) and product differentiation – this is the case 
for services that operate as a network, but in other areas of the industry, such as 
the taxi market, there are many small firms supplying the market with a near 
homogenous product and a regulated tariff meaning identical pricing and 
therefore closer proximity to perfect conditions. 
 
The structure also requires buyer power to dictate price. In markets where the 
product is identical and produced by many sellers, evidence of buyer power in 
determining unit prices for products is found, for example the milk market. 
However, in the road passenger transport market costs are often divided across 
fixed and variable headings. From these the cost of production and therefore the 
price required to either achieve normal or abnormal profits is determined. Within 
the coach market the use of fixed and variable costs to define the final production 
(selling) price makes these firms the price makers. 
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However, advances in information technology now create the potential for a 
power shift from seller to buyer in relation to ‘price maker’. The growing use of 
yield management for fares and capacity, pioneered by low cost airlines in the 
United States of America (USA) and Europe as well as significant use of internet-
based ticket sales across all long-distance public transport modes does have the 
potential to move power back towards the buyer, with fare levels tracked against 
demand to vary price according to available space on each departure.  
 
To some extent, the buyer of transport services does play a role in the dynamic 
management of the price at which travel is sold benefiting from the rule that in 
economic terms the transport product cannot be stored - leading to the premise 
that any revenue is ultimately better than no revenue for each scheduled 
departure (Nash, 1982). However, yield management also results in price 
competition as fare prices fluctuate and vary between suppliers for competitive 
gain, further breaking the conditions of perfect competition market theory, though 
beneficially in social welfare terms. 
 
Turning now to the social welfare angle, do non-increasing returns to scale, and 
the failure of one or more sellers to capture benefits in productive scale that may 
potentially be passed onto the seller, accrue to a maximisation of social welfare? 
The proposed juxtaposition between non-increasing returns to scale and social 
welfare may be one flaw with perfect competition. Logically, social welfare should 
be maximised when the market can produce at its most efficient level, it may 
follow that this can occur in a situation where increasing returns to scale are 
exhibited and more output can be achieved disproportionately to input levels by 
one or more sellers in a manner to better maximise wider social welfare.  
 
If, however, as the theory requires outputs remain perfectly proportional to inputs 
then there is no incentive for any firm to expand beyond that which they are 
comfortable to operate, and no opportunity to exercise market power over rival 
firms either through more efficient operation, price control, or take-over and 
acquisition. This is a healthy market to work within only if there is no evidence to 
suggest that price reductions can be passed on to buyers when non-increasing 
returns to scale can occur. In transport they can, so perfect competition is not an 
ideal structure. 
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By contrast, the other side of this argument may be stimulation of monopoly or 
collusion through allowance of non-increasing returns to scale and the potential 
that not all efficiencies found translate into the maximisation of social welfare 
through costs or production output levels, for example the growth of abnormal or 
‘super’ profits. The application of contestable market theory is more likely to 
provide the counter balance to resultant monopoly that may occur, with this 
strategy applied to discourage long-term super profits but allow non-increasing 
returns to scale to benefit buyer and seller alike.   
 
1.5 Perfect Competition – summary 
 
The structure of a perfectly competitive market is a reasonable benchmark to use 
when comparing the success of policies and mechanisms designed to change 
existing markets. It is a utopian state which is rarely reached, in the main due to 
the lack of homogeneity in most markets – with a free-market economy 
encouraging endeavours to improve efficiency, product form and function, and 
provide choice through price and product differentiation. However, the structure’s 
ideals to seeing removal of monopoly, a balancing of supply and demand, and 
buyer led price making points to a structure that generally delivers well against 
social welfare, more-so than that of businesses in the market, but which is only 
applicable when production output can be guaranteed as homogenous. 
 
The structure poses two ideals. Firstly, the most efficient and welfare maximising 
market will have many actors selling the homogenous product and that these 
‘sellers’ must be small and numerous enough to prevent any individual movement 
towards market power occurring. Secondly, that all such sellers will be satisfied 
with a normal profit return and will not seek to maximise profits by price control, 
contradicting the normally assumed position of any firm in a free-market as a 
profit maximiser – a policy makers ideal scenario. 
 
Do these ideals result in a difficulty for the perfectly competitive market to sustain 
the large number of sellers required for the structure conditions to be met, and 
furthermore, does this result in a level of apathy amongst suppliers who are 
unable to do any more than ‘just cover’ their costs? The structure makes broad 
and perhaps unrealistic assumptions about seller behaviour, as with buyers, 
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being assumed to be rational. However, many will look towards free-market 
principles (own-welfare and profit maximisation) to ensure individual gains that 
may arguably lead to buyer welfare as theorised by Adam Smith. If applied, the 
conditions of the market structure mean: 
 
 Sellers are content that prices cannot be raised for long periods of time 
unless factors affecting all sellers and buyers are consistent such that all 
sellers raise their price and all buyers accept this; 
 
 Abnormal profits cannot be sustained by a single seller without attracting 
new entrants or being forced to exit the market if remaining sellers keep 
their prices at the former level – sellers are content with normal profits; 
 
 Products cannot be differentiated to provide a market lead or loyal 
customer base and in overall terms innovation cannot therefore be 
considered for individual seller gain – in any event products are infinitely 
consumed; and, 
 
 Co-operative or cartel working are clinically eliminated, removing any 
concerns over sustaining large numbers of sellers - the market is therefore 
maintained by many small firms, content with normal profit levels and no 
market power. 
 
Perfect competition appears as an almost virtuous state; a ‘utopian’ situation for 
consumers, producers, and policy makers. The structural outcomes achieved by 
rigid application of the conditions are not without their misgivings. The resultant 
structural characteristics describe a market in which there can be no leader, no 
affiliation of buyers (or segment of buyers) to any producer, and where there is 
no identifiable way for innovation to be exhibited through the functioning of the 
market as normal profit levels provide no incentive or reward for innovation and 
the conditions allow no benefit to be made to any one seller to innovate. 
 
Despite these drawbacks, the market structure is still held up as one of the 
neoclassical economist’s benchmark extremes (Button, 1993) by which all other 
market structures should be judged. Its simplistic conditions are argued to 
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maximise social welfare and remove waste from the market process. However, if 
the pre-1930 Act market was as close to perfect as it got for coach services why 
did waste occur or become cited as the need for regulation? Many economists 
observe that markets tend to perform differently and are affected by factors 
outside of their control which damage the ability of the market to perform to its 
most efficient, and indeed even close to that of Pareto Efficiency as required by 
the perfectly competitive market structure.  
 
Therefore, the remit of appropriate and effective policies is to move a market 
towards the most desirable operational outcome, which may not be static, and 
which while tending towards perfection may only achieve some of the ideals the 
market structure promotes. 
 
1.6 Contestable Market Theory 
 
Contestable Market Theory (CMT) is an economic mechanism that can be 
applied to a market deemed to be in failure. It is driven by the notion that the 
threat of new market entry (competition) will stop the occurrence of abnormal 
profits, welfare degradation, and anti-competitive behaviour.  
 
Market failure may be in evidence through incumbent firms charging too higher 
prices and restricting supply (Monopoly), or, alternatively through incumbent firms 
losing touch with buyer market requirements and a resultant declining market, 
due in part to the rules governing the market.  
 
Market power or overly restrictive controls on supply are the main causes of 
market failure. Too much market power existed in many formerly regulated 
transport markets (Mallard and Glaister, 2008) stimulating several deregulation 
and liberalisation processes aimed at creating much higher levels of competition 
and ensuring the benefits that many economists argue competition can bring. 
CMT is a mechanism that can be used to reinvigorate and move a market back 
to equilibrium, where welfare and efficiency are maximised, by creating a 
movement between static structures. The process is referred to more commonly 
as ‘making a market contestable’ and is designed to allow competition, or at least 
the very threat of it through new market entry, to occur. 
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In this way, the theory relates to a market’s general openness (Hibbs, 2003) and 
outlines the conditions needed to stimulate movement between the static market 
structures, towards the idealised perfectly competitive market state. Developed 
initially in the 1970’s by the Chicago School of Economics (Stigler) as a 
development of the theory of industrial organisation, CMT was popularised by 
William Baumol in 1982. The theory seeks to remove the need for specific policies 
to dictate the progress to each ‘static’ market structure stage, and instead allows 
a fluidity to exist whereby the market settles through the free actions of buyers 
and sellers, as with Smith’s ‘invisible hand’ theory, brought about by a relaxation 
of operating conditions. This allows the market to re-settle at a new efficiency and 
welfare maximised position which due to the product’s nature may not, be 
perfectly competitive.  
 
Its principles are cited as the preferred outcome for the liberalisation of scheduled 
long-distance coach services in the UK through the 1980 Transport Act (Robbins 
and White, 1986) though at the time the Act was formulated Baumol had not 
published his defining work of 1982 regarding the theory, and principles were 
drawn from Stigler. 
 
The mechanism is applied to a market to allow the potential for change away from 
its current static state observed. Its conditions have advantages over more 
traditional static structures, such as perfect competition, in so far as it allows the 
seller more brevity in their approach to the market and activity within it. CMT 
allows non-homogenous goods and services and some abnormal profit levels, as 
well as firm size and quantity within the market to vary, suiting the market and 
buyer conditions. Furthermore, CMT encourages multi-product firms and allows 
for benefits brought by ‘network effects’ and advantages of scale, both of which 
can be argued to increase social welfare, price, and efficiency over the pure form 
of perfect competition. 
 
This modern approach challenges more established thinking. It is more easily 
applied to real world markets and offers suitable parallels to conditions enjoyed 
by theoretical perfectly competitive markets. Its advantage is that is enables some 
of the potential benefits of monopolistic market structures to function in an 
environment where competition is encouraged but not mandated.  
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Based on the premise that the ‘potential’ for market entry regulates actors already 
operating in the market, it is important to establish if the profit levels of these 
actors are normal or abnormal before making the market contestable through 
changes to its governing rules. The level of profit already being made will affect 
the level of pressure on potential entry (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994) and by 
default the success of any policy changes made to allow contestability and effect 
a change in the static market structure already in existence. 
 
If amending the governing rules to ensure the market is made contestable, the 
activities of firms will be regulated purely by the ‘threat of entry’ of new firms and 
therefore act in a way to discourage entry by satisfying market demands in the 
most efficient ways and at profit levels which are not seen to be ‘super’ or 
‘abnormal’ by firms not yet in the market. As soon as inefficiency or abnormal 
profits are observed new market entry is attracted and facilitated by the 
contestable environment created. 
 
The conditions for a contestable market (Baumol et al, 1982) state that it must be 
accessible to potential entrants, and meet the following conditions: 
 
 There must be no entry barriers, and potential market entrants must be 
able to serve the same market and use the same productive techniques 
as those already employed by incumbent firms to provide this service; 
 
 Any potential entrant must be able to enter the market accepting that the 
increase in supply will have the effect of lowering the price for the good or 
service, but that the price they will charge will allow all demand to be 
satisfied and provide the requisite return to make entry into the market 
viable. It is accepted that in most cases the new entrant will aim to price 
their good or service at a figure which undercuts the incumbent(s) current 
price structure (but not always, as seen by more sustainable ‘up-market’ 
entries to the UK market at deregulation e.g. Cotters); 
 
 It is also noted that on exiting a market, any firm will be able to recoup all 
capital costs, less depreciation (Pass, 1993). In this way, the market is 
both easy to enter and exit at any point and this condition has strong 
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parallels with perfectly competitive market structures and suited the 
private hire pool of operators being targeted by the Act. There must be 
minimal sunk costs for any market entrant – these being those costs which 
are non-recoverable following movement out of a market and which 
include any perishable items such as wages, advertising, utilities, and 
goodwill (Pass, 1993); and, 
 
 It must be established if the market demonstrates normal or abnormal 
profit levels prior to the application of CMT; only in the latter scenario is 
the threat of entry likely to be stronger and act as a market ‘self-regulator’ 
though only where a market is not in a controlled monopoly as was the 
case in the 1970s UK market. 
 
The potential for successful market entry and exit is essential for CMT to fully 
function. This entry and exit must be free from (or only suffer minimal) barriers to 
the movement of firms into and out of the market. Where present, these barriers 
may see larger costs incurred by the entrant than costs of operation for those 
currently in the market (Stigler, 1968), and may be symptomatic of protectionism 
of incumbents within the market (von Weizsacker, 1980).  
 
For example, the 1930 Act created barriers to entry including quantity of supply 
and protection for the rail market, and the 1980 Act, although removing most 
barriers, saw unavoidable sunk costs remain and protectionism achieved for 
incumbents through failures to ensure free access to main coach terminals across 
the UK. Therefore, barriers must be both without financial penalty over that which 
an incumbent market actor already faces and with minimal protection of 
incumbent actors through loyalty (social protection) and brand allegiance. 
 
The process of CMT is implemented to stimulate at the very least renewed 
interest in the market. With this process in mind it can be observed that the theory 
is not naturally occurring, and instead is largely applied as a political tool 
(encapsulating changes to regulations and legislation) to manipulate existing 
markets into more acceptable structures. This is exemplified by its numerous 
applications by governments to move regulated markets to a largely self-
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supporting liberalised state with minimal effort, but with maximised efficiency and 
social welfare benefits. 
 
CMT is a useful economic tool, particularly for Governments who have the power 
to change market entry conditions to aid the flow (potential) into the market. This 
is not regulated flow as seen through the 1930 Traffic Act, and therefore a 
controlled monopoly (Hibbs, 2003), but an ability for free flow which acts to 
regulate the market – keeping prices down. However, CMT is a tool to stimulate 
market structure change and to be successful two critical conditions (low sunk 
costs allowing low cost exit, and, widely available technical knowledge and 
production techniques) must be met (Hardwick, 1994).  
 
Regarding the transport market Mallard and Glaister (2008) note further 
observations and conditions that a market operating successfully in a contestable 
state should exhibit with these having relevance to the success of liberalised 
transport markets. Figure 2 summarises these conditions and applies them in the 
context of the UK express coach market prior to, and post, deregulation. 
 
Figure 2: Contestable Market Theory conditions applied to deregulation 
 
Condition Pre-1980 Act Post 1980 Act 
The number of actual actors in the 
market is unimportant. The theory 
requires only the threat of entry by 
other firms as its criterion for ensuring 
efficiencies (this is the main 
difference between contestability and 
perfect competition and mitigates the 
unrealistic notion of many firms being 
required to operate in the market to 
ensure efficiency). 
Many firms 
existed in the 
private and 
contract hire 
sector but 
quantity 
restrictions 
stopped entry 
Many firms 
existed in the 
private and 
contract hire 
market and had 
resources to 
deploy upon 
deregulation 
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Condition Pre-1980 Act Post 1980 Act 
Existing firms within the market must 
not have access to large levels of 
finance which can be used to deter a 
competitive incursion into the market 
by allowing the firm to instantly 
reduce its prices, in line or lower, than 
the new market entrant. Essentially 
cross-subsidisation from another part 
of the business (if multi-product) or 
from reserves held at a higher level 
(e.g. state funding) should not be 
allowed. 
Most services 
provided by the 
state ‘National’ 
network but 
notable 
independents 
protected by 
route licence 
monopolies under 
1930 Act 
regulations 
Protection from 
fare change 
freedoms 
removed but 
state still funded 
dominant firm so 
potential for 
financial support 
through capital at 
low interest levels 
– not subsidy as 
such 
Low levels of brand loyalty must be 
exhibited such that conditions of 
buyer movement typified by the 
perfectly competitive structure (i.e. to 
instantly move to an alternative and 
lower price product when one 
becomes available) are observed. 
This will encourage new market entry 
and should ensure that incumbent 
firms keep prices at levels where 
abnormal profits are not made. 
Pre-1970s no UK 
brand - in 1972 
the ‘National’ 
brand launched 
and became 
iconic as ‘the’ 
coach network – 
consuming other 
household names 
The National 
network stifled 
potential 
competition which 
was also not 
substantive 
enough to 
provide full 
substitution 
 
 
The applicability of CMT at the point of express coach deregulation in the UK was 
its function to encourage the act of entry to a market by a multi-product firm where 
a market is seen to be operating inefficiently. The aim of such entry is to cause a 
move toward Pareto Efficiency with the multi-product firm able to use synergies 
within its existing production process and other market exposures to benefit the 
new market being entered through production efficiencies. Examples abound of 
entry to the express coach market by existing private hire operators, with 
successful entrants combining their knowledge of local markets, new on-board 
facilities, and higher customer service standards to the scheduled coach market 
(such as Trathens). 
 
Creating a highly contestable market should also ensure that it tends towards a 
high level of allocative efficiency, with incumbent firms operating at levels where 
few abnormal profits are being made due to the threat of new entry – this was 
important to control fares and stop wasteful competition at the point of 
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deregulation under the 1980 Act. As noted for a perfectly competitive market, 
there also exists the opportunity for ‘hit and run’ competition (Hibbs, 2003) where 
a market is not operating at optimum efficiency. CMT makes this form of rapid 
market entry and exit easier to achieve; it may act to re-balance the market 
through long term sustainability and innovation or short-term market shock to 
reign in a monopolist.  
 
While contestability has wide ranging benefits as an economic tool bringing about 
positive change to a market structure, as with perfect competition, there are some 
potential problems with its application: 
 
 While it is logical to expect prices to rise as the number of sellers become 
concentrated, this will remain the case, regardless of contestability, so 
long as there remains a continued demand for the product and no 
alternative or substitutes at similar or lower price. In other words, even with 
contestability in place, there is no inclination for new market entrants to 
force a lowering of price through innovation, efficiencies, or lower cost 
base unless there is absolute evidence of abnormal profits;  
 
 Furthermore, a market may contract for many reasons regardless of the 
freedoms of entry or exit (contestability). Mergers and acquisitions may 
lower incumbent firm numbers with resultant organisations able to control 
more of the market and exercise higher levels of market power and 
advantages in scale (maybe even truly exploiting economies of scale in 
the right conditions). This is allowed under CMT but may make it 
unattractive for new firms to enter, even though entry (and exit) conditions 
have been eased; 
 
 If prices in a market continue to rise with concentration can it be described 
as contestable if this situation fails to stimulate new entry to stabilise the 
price? (Weiss, 1989). Surely, if prices rise unchallenged the theory has 
failed as the central concept is that the mere threat of entry will be enough 
to sustain prices such that profits are at or close to normal levels (however, 
it should be noted that prices may rise even when abnormal profits are not 
being made due to external factors - e.g. global fuel price increases); and, 
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 Contestability has synergies with Demsetz’s work (1973). This 
demonstrated that high profits may be less to do with market power and 
are more a sign of efficiency of the incumbent firm(s) in the market – in 
theory a scenario which should be encouraged if such efficiencies have 
some end-price benefit to buyers, even if all this benefit is not immediately 
transferred (Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994). For example, this may be 
evident by some profit made at this level being withheld to allow the seller 
to retain market position by investing in research and development 
(resulting in innovation). An example in the coach market is Stagecoach; 
with high profits, dominance in many local markets, and a 40% share of 
the UK express coach market, they continue to invest heavily to grow 
market share and profit through innovative service enhancements, often 
at a faster pace than competitors such as National Express who have 
historically been slow to respond to competition by innovation. 
 
If contestability allows for a situation where the market can be concentrated, but 
also where market power is not used to restrict production output then high profits 
may be allowable. While artificially high prices may be created to maximise 
profits, efficiency will deter market entry but not preclude it. Contestability will 
ensure that market firms are sufficiently pressured to make realistic profits but not 
so high or so inefficiently as to attract new market entry or exploit buyers. 
 
Regarding the role of innovation to stimulate market entry, as allowed through 
CMT, it has been stated that; 
 
“In fully contestable markets, imitation of a new product or process would 
be instantaneous and widespread. Innovation would therefore be 
irrational since the extra costs incurred in research and development 
would bring no prospect of enhanced profits.” (Ferguson and Ferguson, 
1994, p112).  
 
However, one of the freedoms of the mechanism, unlike perfect competition, is 
that innovation and entrepreneurship can facilitate successful market entry (e.g. 
Megabus). What has been seen in markets where contestability has allowed 
liberalisation is a combination of some like-for-like product entry and some 
innovative entry – in each case successful entrants have secured a niche market 
role for their product and it has been exogenous trends that have shaped the 
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long-term success of each product such as disposable income, competition from 
other modes, and information technology advances. This may, however, explain 
National Express’ lethargy in innovation through the 1980s and 90s as there was 
no real incentive to do so. 
 
1.7 Contestable Market Theory – summary 
 
The theory may be argued to create a hybrid of benefits which is more palatable 
and achievable, particularly by policy makers than more traditional market 
structures. Application allows a fluidity of market structure and operational 
approach to allow the principles of free-market economics to apply more readily 
to each market. 
 
CMT appears to allow a market to sit halfway between imperfect and perfect 
competition. It requires that entry barriers are sufficiently low to allow any firm to 
enter and exit the market at any point in time, and without losing any more than 
the low level sunk costs assumed. It also supposes that the productive techniques 
and technologies are immediately available to any new market entrant and it is 
probable that the theory better suits industries where entry is typified by 
investment in capital equipment and physical assets that can be easily disposed 
of either through the course of a successful business, as new equipment replaces 
older exhausted machinery, or if market entry is unsuccessful. 
 
Perhaps, then, these are the weaknesses. When applied to transport, market 
entry often needs considerable planning and may create considerable non-
returnable outlay in terms of product awareness, research and development, and 
goodwill, not to mention perishable items such as wages, fuel, utilities, 
insurances, and leases. CMT appears to be a policy maker’s tool and does not 
occur naturally, as might a monopoly or more rarely perfect competition. 
 
However, the observable benefits of CMT can be summarised as: 
 
 the creation of conditions to allow competition to occur and move an 
underperforming (failing) market from one static model towards a 
preferable structure; 
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 the allowance of incumbent monopolies to remain following policy and 
market entry/exit changes, meaning that pre-existing advantages of scale 
can remain, and new ones potentially created by entrepreneurial activity; 
 
 network operations remaining or developing and important within the 
transport market as these can be of significant social welfare benefit; 
 
 the threat of competition through market entry ensuring prices are kept to 
levels where abnormal profits are not common and, where they occur, are 
swiftly eliminated; 
 
 the allowance of innovation and product differentiation with incentives to 
create efficiencies, better products, choice, and long-run investment; and, 
 
 entrepreneurship and the opportunities to exploit gaps in the market. 
Where developed this will provide additional choice and quality of benefit 
to the market and may create new sub-markets for niche products - e.g. 
the premium level services (market segmentation) like those operated at 
deregulation by Trathens and Cotters, and more recent overnight sleeper 
services with unique vehicles built to meet this demand; e.g. Stagecoach 
Megabus Gold Anglo-Scottish overnight services operated until 2017). 
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Chapter 2 – Market theories enabling non-perfect competition  
 
2.1 Overview 
 
In establishing a mechanism to achieve a market structure there is an important 
decision to be made in deciding the acceptable level of social welfare loss or gain 
compared to the ability of the market to retain some incentive to drive the 
processes of market supply, technical innovation, and product differentiation.  
 
Of these elements, it may be that product differentiation, although causing some 
social welfare loss through reductions in productive and allocative efficiency, may 
ultimately be a virtuous circle for the consumer – and it is in this field that most 
sustained success in liberalised transport markets is found, for example Trathens 
and Cotters in the 1980s with on-board enhancements and Megabus in the 2000s 
with no-frill travel specification. Furthermore, where barriers to market entry by 
new firms are managed and reduced through policy tools, new ‘potential’ access 
to act as a balance against complete market power by incumbent firms ensuring 
social welfare in price and choice terms is maintained; this process is 
encapsulated by the popular CMT model which is a tool to help markets move 
between the neoclassical states now described. 
 
The neo-classical views of market structure categorise in a hard way each market 
based on the characteristics it portrays. These structures are said to be static and 
movement between them is often the result of a seismic change in market 
conditions – this may be a result of policy or regulatory change (such as an act 
to deregulate the market), or a direct result of external (exogenous) factors which 
have a significant impact on market operation – for example changes in 
production processes, technology, or supporting infrastructure (such as the 
development of motorways and the expansion of e-commerce). 
 
The following chapter outlines four classic market structure models that all have 
a place in the long-term development of the UK express coach market. Changes 
to regulation and policy together with exogenous factors have allowed the market 
to move between states in both directions and the inclusion of Monopsony, not 
typically associated with the passenger transport market, is due to the unique 
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contracting model developed by National Express following the 1985 Transport 
Act and privatisation of the firm in 1986. This saw the use of a business model 
creating a competitive market to supply the firm and discourage private entry into 
the market, making it more attractive for a smaller operator to act as a contractor 
to National Express without revenue risk, rather than competing with it directly. 
 
The market, prior to deregulation through to the present day has moved from a 
state of ‘controlled’ monopoly (Hibbs, 2003), through monopolistic competition, to 
a general state of oligopoly aided by the monopsony situation regarding the 
market to supply National Express. The removal of traditional entry barriers 
through application of e-commerce to allow a significant and sustained market 
entry that used ‘loss leading’ techniques and cross-subsidy funding through depth 
of financial resources to remain in the market today –Stagecoach Megabus - is 
also observed. 
 
While the primary neoclassical theories are outlined here with evidence of their 
existence highlighted through examples drawn from the UK market experience, 
further distillation of market structure is noted in Chapters 3 and 4 where the 
market is found to also be moving between the states of a dominant firm oligopoly 
and a non-coercive monopoly. 
 
2.2 Monopoly 
 
A market in monopoly condition is one in which a sole firm supplies the ‘entire’ 
output for the market concerned (Bain, 1959). One seller will be found to be acting 
in the market place and this seller will interact with a potentially large quantity of 
buyers, the precise number and nature of which being dependent on the market 
for the type of goods or services being sold. All buyers will continue to act 
independently of each other in this market structure as the neoclassical theory 
states that buyer collusion is not allowed, identical to that of perfect competition. 
 
This was not the case for the UK express coach market ahead of deregulation. 
Although the state owned National Express was the dominant market actor, other 
firms also provided express services. Instead, the market was described as a 
‘controlled monopoly’ (Hibbs, 2003), where a monopoly was placed on the 
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quantity supplied to the market – the controller in this case being government 
legislation and the restriction of Road Service Licences (RSL) for routes across 
the UK. 
 
For the more typical neoclassical monopoly structure, the criteria of being a sole 
supplier to the market is not simply enough on its own to constitute a dynamic 
monopolistic market structure with a profitable and growing long-run monopoly. 
Market power, the correlation between market concentration and profit, 
(Ferguson and Ferguson, 1994) is also required so the monopolist has complete 
control of the supply of goods and the prices at which they are sold; the 
monopolist will vary this ratio of output and price to maximise profits. From the 
buyer’s perspective, they must buy the goods or services produced at that level 
set by the monopolist firm who becomes the price maker and who maximises 
profits with the buyer being the price taker. 
 
Therefore, monopoly is at the opposite end of the buyer to seller spectrum to 
perfect competition in so far as excess profits may be made without loss of buyers 
and sometimes in return for welfare gain. A monopolist can exert a level of market 
power over price and supply – where its unique position allows it to make 
operational efficiencies it will produce additional output at marginal cost (MC) until 
it is equal to marginal revenue (MR). In general, a monopolist would not expand 
output beyond the optimal point (MR equal to MC) (Hardwick, 1994) and, due to 
this intersection lying to the left of the point where average revenue (AR) is equal 
to average cost (AC), it is lower than that under perfect competition. Where 
nothing is to be gained at marginal cost a monopolist could create further profits 
by restricting output, this being dependent on relative shapes of the MC and MR 
curves. This was seen in the late 1980s to early 1990s. National Express had. 
Consistently increased fares within a shrinking passenger journey market with 
revenue loss off-set by reductions in some services. The passenger market 
exhibited high short-run price elasticity and this sensitivity to price change should 
have stimulated new entry, even in a hit and run format. However, none occurred 
due to the high sunk costs of entry, continued price competition from rail, and the 
lower risk (monopsony) business model used by National Express and 
independent firms that may otherwise enter the market alone. Technology was 
not advanced enough at this stage to allow low-cost entry, unlike today. 
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However, a monopoly market may also become a deadweight loss if prices rise 
with falling output, creating a degradation of social welfare (Hardwick, 1994). This 
is arguably the result of fare increases during this period with revenue losses off-
set by a shrinking network. 
 
As the structure allows firms to be dynamic they may manipulate this situation; 
the benefits of a monopoly therefore being innovation and product differentiation 
in addition to; first, second, and third level price discrimination, and market 
stability (potentially important in transport modes). However, the two most 
important benefits of monopoly are economies of singe ownership, and technical 
progress (Hardwick, 1994). As technology has developed dominant (or 
monopoly) firms have been able to apply innovation in different ways. With many 
economic texts regarding monopoly pricing (such as Hardwick, 1994) being 
written before the current development of yield management pricing – now a 
common place innovation in the market from 2003 it is possible to speculate on 
its impact to dominant (or monopoly) market operation, as seen in Germany with 
FlixBus.  
 
Using yield management to change in real-time fare and capacity levels, a 
monopolist has the potential to extract greater profit by marking up fares at times 
of high demand (peak seasons or special events) immediately, and in a more 
selective manner than was possible under conventional pricing systems, such as 
the 1980s when information was only available in pre-printed format. E-
commerce and portable technology has created a seismic change in the way 
services are planned, marketed, managed and delivered, allowing market entry 
in new ways with companies no longer needing to be transport providers in the 
traditional sense. Instead virtual services can be marketed, and third-party 
transport organised – better matching demand, supply and price. This has 
allowed new-era giants such as FlixBus to run at 60% load factors profitably. 
 
In industries where constant yields cannot be guaranteed, such as transport, an 
element of overpricing of goods and services is acceptable and is often required 
to provide the service. This is due to escapable costs, as noted by Hibbs (2003), 
or costs more commonly termed as variable. Such costs are those that are 
incurred directly because of output created, but which would not exist if output 
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was stopped (fixed costs are the opposite and those which exist regardless of 
any output being produced). One area of weakness with liberalising markets is 
the inability for small and medium sized firms to enter new markets and finance 
additional variable costs to build market share in the short-run; aggressive 
competition from established incumbents often focuses on price to eliminate such 
entry. 
 
In some cases, regulatory control may be imposed on an industry that is a clear 
monopoly and this may not allow full dynamism. Regulation is likely to take the 
form of price control and, as noted by Hibbs (2003), some regulators may require 
a process known as internal cross-subsidy to take place so that firms are forced 
to support otherwise loss-making aspects of the market with those excessive 
revenues gained from other profit-making business areas to keep social welfare 
equitable. 
 
For monopoly to be maintained a strong barrier to entry, which is very difficult to 
overcome by any new market entrant, must be maintained (Mallard and Glaister, 
2008). Often, this situation is known as ‘blockaded entry’ (Pass, 1993) and may 
include more than one ‘barrier’ - these barriers can be either individually or a mix 
of; financial, bureaucratic, legal, anti-competitive (possibly regulatory), or loyalty 
based nature. One way to blockade entry is to try to achieve scale, to create 
advantages and even economies of scale. These are a benefit of the dynamic 
form of this structure and allows firms to innovate to maintain market position and 
develop production efficiencies to help economies of scale to materialise. This 
barrier is often one of the most noticeable as it relates to the sheer size of any 
incumbent firm or their production process, be it the production of goods or 
delivery of services.  
 
As an end-game concept, economies of scale occur when a firm uses larger 
capital resources or production techniques to produce an even greater (non-
linear) increase in output when compared to input effort (Pass, 1993). This 
increase may reduce the overall average price of the good or service produced, 
and it follows that the firm may then choose to pass on some or all the cost 
efficiency to its consumers, in turn enabling it to maintain and possibly grow 
market share to defend its monopolist position from new entrants.  
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For example, steadily increasing the frequency of a scheduled road transport 
service will typically see more than proportional growth in the use of that service 
due to the increased convenience that also occurs as frequency allows journeys 
to become unplanned. Prior to UK deregulation, National Express exploited the 
potential of economies of scale through the CoachMAP exercise, a process first 
used by the NBC for its local bus network. National Express re-drew its network, 
making increased use of the newly developed motorway network and moving 
resources onto trunk corridors to increase frequencies – creating a double-win 
through the shorter journey times. This in-directly enabled National Express to re-
position itself to compete more effectively at deregulation with new entry and with 
the growing InterCity rail network. In this way economies of scale where 
generated, using resources to increase more than linearly passenger use. 
 
Whilst economies of scale (or at least the advantages of scale) enable long-run 
costs to decrease at the same time as output increases, of equal importance for 
service industries such as scheduled transport, is the concept of economies of 
scope. This is the process of average cost declining as network size increases 
(Mallard and Glaister, 2008). This concept is aided by the development of hub 
and spoke networks whereby larger firms involved in the movement of goods or 
people use a tactic of breaking up loads at significant locations on the transport 
network and at these locations re-distributing the loads to new routes. This has 
the effect of better resource allocation as the size of the units of carriage can be 
varied across the route dependent on the likely loads to be expected, and as each 
unit of carriage is running across a shorter end to end distance it can be utilised 
across this shorter route more frequently, thus providing a higher level of choice 
for consumers with increased efficiencies and less wastage – outcomes not 
dissimilar to perfect competition.  
 
Regarding allocative efficiencies, one defect with monopolies argued for 
inefficiencies based on an inverse relationship between market power and 
welfare is that the more power (or monopoly) the worse the effect on social 
welfare. A common error is to only view allocative efficiencies and their benefits 
to welfare and then as such underestimate the welfare loses caused by increased 
market power of the monopolist over price and quality to the market (Motta, 
2007). 
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2.3 Oligopoly 
 
A market structured as an oligopoly sees several large firms dominate an entire 
industry, with domination being the measure in percentage terms of the industry 
output accounted for by the top firms. This may now be the situation with the 
scheduled express coach industry in the UK. Hardwick summarises that; 
 
“Many markets that at first sight appear to be monopolistically competitive 
are in reality dominated by a few major producers who each manufacture 
a large number of different brands. These markets can best be described 
as oligopolies.” (Hardwick, 1994, p177). 
 
There is no completely holistic theory for oligopoly due to a process known as 
oligopolistic interdependence. This is noted as being; 
 
“The recognition by an oligopolist that if it changes its price or non-price 
strategies, its rivals will react.” (Hardwick, 1994, p177).  
 
Therefore, as each firm’s reaction to another’s price or production change is not 
uniform and may vary from firm to firm within an industry, or between industries 
a range of models to define oligopolistic behaviour’ have been developed. The 
most pertinent of these are outlined below: 
 
 Kinked Demand Curve Model and Cartels – these are described as market 
sharing models and are either overt or covert in nature. The kinked demand 
curve model explains price stability within oligopolies but is limited in its use 
to understand what factors exist to enable profits to be maximised.  Used to 
examine price stability and the effects of price changes the model is also 
linked to non-price competition which may proliferate where an oligopoly 
operates with a high degree of excess capacity - as such a price war would 
force prices down to a point that would cause loses and exit from the market 
for firms experiencing these loses (Hardwick, 1994). A situation seen in the 
early days of UK deregulation between British Coachways and National 
Express. Cartels may therefore form to stop this happening and to set viable 
prices; and, 
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 Dominant Firm Model – defined as; 
 
“A firm that accounts for a significant proportion of the supply of a 
particular good or service. Such a firm exercises a considerable 
degree of power in determining the supply terms of the product. 
Under UK Competition Policy a dominant firm is defined as a firm 
which supplies one-quarter or more of a specified good or service” 
(Pass, 1993, p143).  
 
The model itself is dependent on the dominant firm setting the price and 
having a lower marginal cost per unit of production than smaller firms within 
the oligopoly who accept the price dictated by the dominant firm and produce 
up to a point where this price meets their own marginal cost curve. This model 
is not efficient as the dominant firm can produce at a lower marginal cost and 
therefore an efficient market place would see all other production shift to the 
dominant firm as the same overall quantity could be produced for less. 
However, should more producers enter the market in the longer run facilitated 
by contestability, then this difference would be significantly lowered and the 
dominant firm’s position weakened (Hardwick, 1994). In terms of the UK 
coach market after deregulation it is arguable that this state existed in the 
settled phase after short-term competition with many firms running alongside 
National Express or finding a niche within the market that allowed both to co-
exist, each in their own cost ‘comfort zone’ but not at the most efficient 
consumer outcome. 
 
The main operational difference between an oligopoly and other structures is the 
interdependence between firms. An oligopoly recognises that firms will react to 
each other when supplying the market. They will vary their levels of output and 
price in accordance with what competitors are doing and will look to develop 
products and processes that are differentiated from competitors to underpin or 
grow market share. This development process is a direct reaction to what 
competitors may be intending, or indeed have done, already. The notice periods 
required for new services, or amendments to existing services in most liberalised 
markets (for example the UK and Germany) aid this process and help perpetuate 
the oligopoly structure. 
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2.4 Monopsony 
 
Monopsony is mostly applied within labour markets. The condition is 
characterised as one buyer acting with many sellers (Hardwick, 1994) and is in 
complete contrast to the more commonly observed state of market monopoly. 
 
In its operational format, many sellers are seen to be suppliers of products. These 
products all act as significantly close substitutes for each other and as such can 
coexist in the same market place, affording the sole buyer the opportunity to 
source these products at very competitive rates and on similarly competitive 
terms (Pass, 1993). 
 
Whilst the structure of monopsony is widely applied to labour markets it may also 
apply in service and product markets. For example, Wal-Mart, a super-sized 
retailer in North America, is commonly defined by economists and journalists as 
a monopsony. Wal-Mart’s sheer size and market dominance means that in many 
product areas it is the only buyer of outputs by selling firms. This has advantages 
for Wal-Mart and other similarly described monopsonies as the competition 
between these ‘selling firms’ to supply the single product buyer in theory drives 
down the final output price, the single buyer benefiting from lower purchase prices 
and potentially bulk purchasing deals, particularly as producers will often strive 
for longer-term supply agreements for their produce often at fixed prices. The 
single buyer therefore finds themselves in an enviable position, and indeed may 
set up the market to act in this way if it suits their business model. However, they 
may alternatively prefer shorter-term deals or one-off purchases so that the price 
is constantly checked and is at its lowest point possible in each market situation, 
this may be more applicable to perishable and seasonal products such as fruit 
and vegetables. 
 
To set a market place up as a monopsonistic operation a buyer must either be 
significantly larger than anyone else in the field to become a monopsonist, or the 
product being purchased (although produced by more than one seller), must be 
so bespoke as to limit the likely buyer numbers to just one. However, firms can 
also be observed to be a monopsony buyer but a monopoly seller. This is 
effectively what National Express has created through its business model of 
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service procurement and allocation where, until the advent of long-term 
competition by Stagecoach Megabus it was close to a monopsony buyer. Now, 
with the growth of the Megabus network and National Express finds that it must 
compete for custom with Stagecoach to secure third party services, moving 
power partially back into the hands of the seller and breaking the once enjoyed 
monopoly in contracting conditions.  
 
However, what happens when firms supplying a monopsonist diversify to become 
a ‘seller’ due to market freedoms (newly allowed or already in place) - 
furthermore, what might prevent them from doing this, and entering the market 
alone? If the market were barrier free to entry and exit (contestable) the argument 
suggests suppliers choose not to enter the market alone owing to the greater 
protection, stability, and complementary services that the monopsonist provides.  
 
For example, the monopsonist will take on the role of marketing and planning, 
often operating under one single brand and this will remove these variable costs 
from the independent firm who may have local spin off benefits to other business 
areas through association with the larger brand. 
 
Regarding implications for social welfare in relation to monopsonistic market 
structure Hardwick notes that; 
 
“It can be concluded that the monopsonistic buyer of labour pays a wage 
less than the value of the marginal product of labour. The buyer thus 
employs a smaller work-force than that required for Pareto Efficiency” 
(Hardwick, 1994, p299)  
 
Pareto Efficiency is a situation where it is not possible to make someone better 
off without making someone else worse off; in the UK the number of third-party 
contractors to National Express has decreased over time exemplifying this effect. 
In theory the competition for National Express diagrams will make cost per mile 
contracts low in comparison to the returns that independents may aim for if 
working as a direct market operator. However, reducing the number of operators 
to below Pareto Efficiency ensures that those in the market will work harder to 
achieve additional work, keeping prices keen as a result.  
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2.5 Monopolistic Competition (Imperfect Competition) 
 
Monopolistic competition, or imperfect competition, was developed in a period 
where economists were dissatisfied with the extreme structures promoted by the 
models of perfect competition and monopoly. Forming part of the neoclassical 
thinking on market structure process it is a middle ground between monopoly and 
perfect competition (Mallard and Glaister, 2008). The structure is defined as; 
 
“One in which there are many firms that are all supplying similar, but not 
identical, products to the market. There are barriers to entry but they are 
not prohibitive and so there is a constant fluidity to the market as firms do 
enter and exit” (Mallard and Glaister, 2008, p125). 
 
In this structure, each individual firm is designed to act independently from the 
next, thereby one firm will not take account of any other firm when adjusting its 
output or price - this is ‘largely’ the case (Maunder, 1995) and alludes to some 
ambiguity over the practicality of this structure which assumes firms act 
independently. However, in many industries firms will closely observe the 
activities of competitors and within the confines of competition law act to protect 
and often expand their share of the market – this is true of the express coach 
market where competing firms matched each other on price at deregulation (less 
so on frequency) and continue to do so in today’s market. 
 
Monopolistic competition is defined as having relevance to the real-world 
operation of markets, where product differentiation is allowed, and where there is 
a notion that total monopoly has disadvantages. The ability to have differentiated 
products allows non-price competition to exist, in turn providing the potential for 
prices to remain higher than those found in a perfectly competitive structure over 
the long-run. This was exemplified by the product and price differentiation and 
the attraction of different passenger groups through competition between 
Trathens and National Express in the 1980s and more recently between 
Stagecoach Megabus and National Express. However, it is argued that the 
optimal allocation of resources that is a long-run result of perfect competition is 
not replicated in the monopolistic competition model (Hardwick, 1994) because 
of the potential to continue to innovate and differentiate within the structure – for 
example the more recent trend for larger capacity coaches operating on long-
distance express services in the UK. 
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This structure, with above-normal profits often observed to occur over a long 
period of time (for example that exhibited by National Express in the early 1990s) 
does provide the opportunity for new market entrants, and coupled with the 
availability of product differentiation, makes this market structure desirable to 
selling firms. If demand for the overall product remains static then arguably any 
new levels of market entry will force profits to a normal level, however, if the 
market grows, and indeed continues to grow even with the advent of new market 
entry, then the ‘constant fluidity’ of the market (Mallard and Glaister, 2008) is in 
evidence and higher levels of profit can be retained by incumbent and new market 
actors. 
 
Under monopolistic competition there is a high level of ‘brand competition’ often 
stimulated by product differentiation (Mallard and Glaister, 2008). This is 
designed to extend as far as possible the short-run abnormal profit levels created 
through the model’s allowance of product differentiation. If brand competition 
continues into a long-run scenario, and the market continues to grow, it is likely 
that the consumer will start to pay a higher price to that which may be paid in a 
perfectly competitive market; this may lead to evidence of the ‘excess capacity 
theorem’ (Hardwick, 1994). 
 
Excess capacity will occur when one or more firms are operating at levels where 
the cost to the buyer is not at the lowest point on the long-run average cost curve, 
yet these firms remain unchallenged by any new or existing market supplier on a 
cost or capacity basis. Essentially it allows for the market to continue in a state 
where excess profits can be made for sustained periods of time by one or more 
firms until such a time that new entry creates a significant enough shift in demand 
by consumers as to have an overall effect in lowering the price paid for goods or 
services by the consumers in the market place. In the case of National Express 
through the early 1990s excess capacity existed as higher fares saw a reduction 
in passengers with little erosion of profits – however, increased competition from 
rail and a change in management team eventually saw a reduction in fares and 
increases in passengers. This showed market forces to be working less well in 
the deregulated environment - change only occurring after some years of high 
prices and with considerable loss of demand, consumer surplus, and with no new 
road based market entry occurring to check this at any stage. This lack of entry 
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was likely aided by the business model created by National Express creating 
enough diversion to deter direct entry even with rising fares. 
 
It is arguable, therefore, that the more settled period in the post deregulation 
express coach service market met the criteria for the ‘excess capacity theorem’. 
However, in 2003 the Stagecoach Megabus operation created a significant 
enough change in the operational landscape to further challenge this position and 
force incumbent market suppliers to react and reduce the average fare levels for 
inter-city coach travel; the significant trigger here to changing the market 
landscape was the use of e-commerce (technology advances) as a sales and 
marketing media. Through the harnessing of this channel dynamic management 
of fares and capacity using ‘yield management’ was observed and has 
fundamentally changed the market forever. 
 
While product differentiation is one of the keys to monopolistic competition it 
creates the linked ‘existence of advertising’ (Maunder, 1995). Increased 
advertising may be a double-edged sword; on one hand, increasing information 
and therefore knowledge to guide the market place towards perfection, it also 
highlights the product differentials and is used to exploit the unique elements of 
one producer over another, heightening the imperfections of the market from a 
product homogeneity view point (Stanlake, 1971). With each firm having total 
control over its product it may use tools to differentiate it physically and 
aesthetically from other firms in the market. 
 
Monopolistic competition may be a cyclical process creating at times a producer 
surplus before market forces cause it to re-stabilise. Nash (1982) points to the 
issue of ‘wastefulness’ - making the point that competition in the passenger 
transport field is wasteful owing to the lack of storage of the product created; this 
being immediately perishable on production in the scheduled market for 
transport. Increased competition, Nash argues, has the effect of increasing 
market supply and the short-run effect of this will be a lowering, perhaps 
drastically, of the average load per unit of transport provided by the market 
suppliers and increased waste.  
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For example, if a scheduled inter-city coach service operated at a high load factor, 
for example 80%, and was the sole supplier to the market the implications of 
competition may not be an immediate loss of traffic, nor might it be an initial 
growing of the market – instead a competitor competing with exactly the same 
capacity per hour would double the transport opportunity (seats available) for the 
existing market and would effectively halve the average load if this additional 
capacity was timed to match incumbent supply - at least for the very short-run 
period. This would raise the unit costs for the incumbent firm who may have to 
further worsen the situation by lowering their fares or providing more service 
differentials to retain market share and stem the impact of competition. However, 
if the new competition operates between the services provided by the incumbent 
then the market will see a net gain as more accessible journeys will be provided 
through choice – the corridor effectively seeing a doubling of frequency and 
experience shows that this will increase demand, significantly with the incumbent 
noticing little negative effect as a result. 
 
However, ultimately; 
 
“Even if competition is strong enough to eliminate excess profits, the 
resulting equilibrium will be a monopolistic competition one of excess 
capacity and unnecessarily high unit costs” (Nash, 1982, p69). 
 
Nash also opposes the possibility of long-run abnormal profit operation in this 
structure, claiming that market suppliers would be naive to be so short-sighted as 
to allow the potential for market entry by operating at above normal profit levels 
even though this is possible in a growing market with prices being higher than 
that which could be offered (Hardwick, 1994). Nash argues that if market 
suppliers maintained lower prices they would naturally secure a higher market 
share free from the threat of market entry by new suppliers, leading to the 
conclusion that; 
 
“If a price war does emerge, it is likely to be the operator with the greatest 
financial strength, rather than the one with the lowest costs, that wins. 
Financial strength may result from having profitable operations 
elsewhere” (Nash, 1982, p70).  
 
This was demonstrated at deregulation in the competition between British 
Coachways and National Express, the latter having enough financial resource to 
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overcome the intensive competition waged, and also today between National 
Express and Stagecoach Megabus, the latter this time having financial resources 
to sustain competition with the dominant firm and eventually carve out a long-
term market position – not replicated in Europe where entry to newly liberalised 
markets saw Stagecoach unable to sustain services in competition with often 
state bank-rolled operators, for example in France and Italy. 
 
It is notable at this stage that the process of maintaining market position using 
cross-subsidisation from other areas of a firm’s business sits juxtaposed to the 
conditions for a contestable market where such cross-subsidisation is disallowed 
and where anti-competitive activities are discouraged, and equitable use of 
infrastructure, resources and process is required. 
 
In markets that are in a state of monopolistic competition market power manifests 
itself through the ability to differentiate products and therefore have some form of 
price, quality, and quantity control, possibly being able to divide the market into 
segments using these criteria. For example, Brian Souter now talks of a three-
tier express coach structure within the Stagecoach Group in Scotland; Megabus, 
CityLink and Gold are all used to segment passenger types, fares, and service 
levels - these tailored to maximise profits in each segment and increase market 
share.  
 
The structure’s application to the deregulation of express coaches is interesting; 
easy market entry afforded through contestability allows the potential for the 
numerous firms required and the structure supports the creation of choice, albeit 
at different costs to the consumer than may be efficient, through product and price 
differentiation. Price discrimination has latterly been allowed to occur using yield 
management where the same product (coach departure and service) may be sold 
at different rates depending on the time of booking and what the market will bear 
in relation to demand and competitor pricing. This adds further technicalities to 
the market conundrum and the structure also provides a certain level of 
inefficiency in production, explained simply as the cost of choice and 
‘differentness’ (Chamberlin, 1933) – this inefficiency likely to manifest itself as 
waste, a criticism of the model argued by Nash (1982), but a likely consequence 
in passenger transport where the product can seldom be ‘stored’. 
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In the long-term the structure will see profits tend to zero as demand declines and 
costs increase – potentially symbolic of the 1970s prior to deregulation, though 
competition was also limited by road service licenses (RSLs) (quantity) 
restrictions. However, in a free market (post 1980 Act) the dynamics of the real 
world and the allowance for a firm to differentiate its product and exercise some 
market power allows a good firm to run at above normal profits for the long-term 
period through innovation and keeping pace with changing customer trends. For 
example, the adoption of e-commerce has removed the need for physical tickets, 
manned offices, and customer trends have moved back toward kerb-side pick-
ups and away from central stations for convenience, unless these stations are 
well located to other transport modes or main population centres. 
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Chapter 3 – The UK express coach market 
 
3.1 Overview  
 
The hypothesis questions the lack of continued activity in the UK express coach 
market by small to medium sized firms. This is in regard to very early intensive 
activity followed by almost total inactivity by these firms even though the freedoms 
of the Act and removal of entry barriers prevails and have indeed been 
strengthened through e-commerce and the increased popularity of kerb-side 
passenger access. 
 
Changes to the market from 1980 and those to the market structure in the short-
term period demonstrate a movement from a controlled monopoly characterised 
by state control of quantity, to a short period of monopolistic competition, this 
giving way to a longer term dominant firm oligopoly structure as the market settled 
into a new equilibrium. 
 
The short-term results of deregulation following the Act delivered the anticipated 
changes to the market as hoped for by proponents of the deregulation process. 
By short-term, we refer to the period from deregulation to the end of the 1980s. 
Though contestability existed in keeping the market in check, the new equilibrium 
state structure did not sustain this. 
 
The market, before deregulation, was subject to market control processes dating 
back to the 1930 Road Traffic Act. This Act sought to remove wasteful 
competition from the near perfectly competitive market that was in situ following 
the First World War. However, market forces had already exhibited some self-
regulation through the use of ‘coach pools’ and the 1930 Act in removing 
duplication and underutilised resources created further ‘coach pool’ operations. 
Coach pools were, and still are, an innovative business model and in the UK,  
they stimulated the skeletal national network of long-distance travel – halted only 
by the Second World War - we see today. 
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The following years saw a drive for nationalisation, first of the railways and then 
the road transport market – this resulted in a pseudo state run network – partly 
state (former Tilling) and partly independent (BET and others). Developments 
outside of the market aided its progression – motorways, A-roads (trunk roads), 
vehicle technology, and a continuation of home-based tourism. 
 
External factors started to erode the traditional market through the 1960s and 
1970s such as; high-speed rail developments; an increase in cheaper private car 
ownership / use; the start of overseas package holidays; income and social 
mobility increases. During this period and following the 1968 Act full 
nationalisation of the market coincided with the peak in domestic long-distance 
coach use at circa 23 million passenger journeys (Anderson and Frankis 1985). 
Nationalisation brought austerity, a lack of innovation, basic ‘no-frills’ services 
levels and patronage decline to a pre-deregulation level of 9 to 10 million annual 
passenger journeys. Of note is 1980; the year as a whole being 9.8% down in 
passenger numbers over 1979. However, for the last three-months after 
deregulation, passenger journeys increased by 16.2% - showing the substantial 
first nine-month decline and a significant increase after the Act and based on only 
a 2% network mileage increase (NBC Annual Report, 1980). 
 
In the period of decline the coordinated state network was branded National 
Express (from 1972) and re-shaped through CoachMAP (1978-79) – preparing 
the network for competition following deregulation. This re-shaping moved the 
network away from regional hubs and made better use of the emerging motorway 
system and direct connections between London. This was very different to the 
experience in Scotland where Scottish Bus Group (SBG) subsidiaries (all 
nationalised) continued under their own brands with no coordinated network - 
meaning a fragmented system ahead of deregulation. Furthermore, services 
were mainly long-distance buses with little 'coach' use. Here, the deregulation 
experience and market structure differed because of each region’s approach to 
business structure in the 1970s; had National Express remained regionalised 
then the following market structure and resultant long-term competition may have 
been very different - potentially looking more like the recent German experience. 
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3.2 Summary of events before 1980 
 
The market in which scheduled express coach services operate in the UK has 
evolved in economic terms over a sustained period. A series of key events has 
shaped it; from the 1920s boom in road passenger transport, the following 
prescriptive regulatory frameworks imposed through the 1930 and 1968 Acts, and 
latterly through the freedoms afforded by the 1980 Act and the following years of 
competitive market forces – these being free to shape the market and the actions 
of those within it, albeit less free of barriers and external competition than the 
1920s. 
 
3.2.1 Early years 
 
The supposed freedom of the market to develop and operate in a contestable 
market environment beyond the 1980 Act was not a new approach to the 
scheduled express coach industry, though the notion of contestability was.  
 
The boom in passenger transport in the 1920s saw a rapid rise in the number of 
road transport services. Prior to this, experimentation with long-distance travel 
had taken place with the Vanguard Omnibus Company pioneering regular 
leisure-based services between London and Brighton. However, following the 
serious Handcross Hill accident in 1906, there was little development of the long-
distance market until after the First World War when an era of apparent ‘chaos’ 
quickly developed (Aldcroft, 1974). Initially, this fierce competition was across 
shorter distances, but the market quickly evolved and splintered into two areas; 
local bus services for daily use and a leisure market prompted by the 
development of charabanc ('chara') services. 
 
In this period, the market structure was arguably as close to perfectly competitive 
as the market has ever been in the UK. This was achieved by; an oversupply in 
labour and surplus commercial vehicles following the end of the war allowing 
quick and easy set-up of small (one-man) firms, and; few legislative barriers to 
entry, meaning many firms could operate. Competition was so numerous that 
passengers dictated prices for travel and products were close to homogenous 
and nearly all consumed due to a lack of substitutes. 
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Changing the face of long-distance travel, charabanc services brought cheap 
mass long-distance transport to the public for the first time. Through the 
conversion of surplus army lorry chassis to rudimentary leisure coaches across 
one-deck, services to the coast using vehicles which seated 24 or more people 
became very popular. 
 
It was at this stage that the long-distance market began to move away from a 
structure approximating perfect competition to one closer to imperfect 
competition. While the number of buyers in the market remained high, the number 
of firms began to fall as some failed to sustain the high levels of competition. 
Additionally, there was a significant move to differentiate vehicles and services to 
create higher market shares – innovations such as roofs, pneumatic tyres, 
sleeping berths, and observation coaches all played their part in seeing rapid 
development of the market and a change in structure stimulated by technical 
advances. 
 
For the railways the inter-war years saw a consolidation of much earlier and rapid 
pre-war growth encouraged by the ‘British’ sense of free enterprise in that period 
(Nock, 1980). After the First World War steps were taken to maintain the 
efficiencies and coordination of the railways. Triggered by the economic crisis 
railways found themselves in, new laws were imposed that saw four groups of 
lines formed and over 1,000 miles of railway progressively closed from 1923. This 
contradicted the road passenger market where expansion and alliances saw 
increased competition but did provide the footing for rail to compete more 
effectively with road transport. 
 
Following this early period further diversification occurred. Continuing 
improvements in vehicle technology set the scene for regular (scheduled) long 
distance services and the mail coach network of the 1800s (both mail delivery 
and long-distance passenger travel) created the template for the express motor 
coach network. Two forms of express service developed; in 1920 Royal Blue 
operated a twice daily service that was ‘non-stop’ between Bournemouth and 
London (prompted by rail strikes) and the entrepreneurial enterprise was running 
twice-daily by 1921, and; Greyhound Motors provided the first ‘scheduled’ long-
distance service where passengers could travel end to end or board and alight at 
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various intermediate stops. This service between Bristol and London commenced 
in 1925 and followed the same route from Bath to London used by mail coach 
services from 1782 (Gerhold, 2012). 
 
The network comprising both forms of service grew as mechanical reliability 
became common place amongst operators and their vehicles. Although the 
expansion of the network from the mid-1920s onwards was rapid, some 
restrictions remained in place through local authority licensing laws. These were 
erratically enforced creating an uneven platform for market development until the 
1930s. With such an explosion in development and use, there was increasing 
concern over the waste of resources in providing services, and the likelihood of 
a saturated market that may quickly collapse. Furthermore, the ferocity of 
competition had led to accidents and wider safety concerns over vehicles and the 
crew that operated them. 
 
With the market now in an imperfectly competitive state the opportunity for some 
level of self-control and efficiency came through the neoclassical route of cartels. 
In the observed structure, the long-term results of the market would tend to zero 
profits, unsustainable for most firms and a prospect that stimulated innovation. 
With fierce competition and evident waste in the market there was also growing 
pressure for regulation which would likely limit long-term profitability. Innovation 
therefore came through the appeal of a singular network approach across as 
larger area as possible.  
 
This vision was achieved through the development of 'coach pools’ - something 
that has similarities to a cartel and where a group of firms work together to set 
market prices and seek protection from market forces as a collective. Pragmatic 
coach owners, such as Shirley James and Len Turnham, promoted coach pools 
(Paramor, 2007) as they saw the value in sharing services and resources 
combined with a common approach to marketing and co-ordination. One such 
pool was the London and Coastal, commencing in 1925 and comprising nine 
initial members. The object of the pool was to eliminate harmful competition, 
centralise and reduce administrative and planning costs (extending the period for 
profitability), and ensure back-up facilities existed at each end of a route to aid 
reliability. Seeing the benefits of this approach in the south and east of England 
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more pools developed through the 1920s and notable amongst these was the 
Yorkshire pool which saw up to five companies pool services between Yorkshire 
and London by 1929 (Paramor, 2007). 
 
Although coach pools began to widely develop, there continued to be widespread 
competition on high volume routes. This activity stimulated government action, 
designed to remove wasteful competition from the market (Royal Commission, 
1929). The 1930 Road Traffic Act placed heavy restrictions on fares, timetables, 
and quantity in the market as well as allowing the railways to object to any 
changes to the coach network. At a stroke, the Act removed notable competitive 
examples such as the eighteen service providers that had developed a total of 58 
timetabled journeys between London and Oxford each day by 1930 to just two 
providers (Crowe, 2012) and regulated wider competition (Anderson and Frankis, 
1985). In this way, the Act enforced a route by route monopoly through quantity 
restrictions. In this new market structure, there was the potential for a welfare 
‘deadweight’ loss. This occurs when a perfectly competitive market (or near 
perfect) moves to a monopoly with no change in costs to operate but real 
increases in price to the consumer (Hardwick, 1994). The Act avoided this by 
requiring fares to be agreed and set as part of the issued licence. 
 
The Act also regulated quantity in the road passenger transport market by 
defining three forms for which new road service licenses (RSLs) would be 
provided by the newly formed Area Traffic Commissioners (ATCs) - quasi-judicial 
bodies who administered and monitored the quantity controls required through 
the Act (Robbins, 2007). These markets were: 
 
 Stage Carriage – passengers carried for hire and reward at separate fares 
between stages. A service that stops along a line of route to pick up or set 
down passengers. Minimum or maximum fares imposed on the licence; 
 
 Express Carriage – passengers carried for hire and reward at separate 
fares for a journey from one (or more) points, to one (or more) common 
destinations. Not stopping to take up or set down passengers’ other than 
those paying the appropriate fares for the journey and subject to minimum 
or maximum conditions imposed at the point of the licence granted, and; 
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 Contract Carriages – motor vehicles carrying passengers (as one group) 
under a specific contract for hire and reward at a fixed sum or agreed rate. 
 
The Act outlined operating conditions for each market in terms of how vehicles 
could be used under each market condition (sections 67 (1), 68 (1), 72) and 
permitted (in section 72 (4) (b)) that fares shall be fixed to prevent wasteful 
competition with alternate forms of transport along the route (or part of the route) 
– although intended to be discretionary (section 72(4)) this was in practice 
enforced by the ATCs (Hibbs, 2003). It also aimed to improve levels of traffic 
safety through restrictions to speed; a maximum speed limit of 30 miles per hour 
set for all vehicles adapted to carry more than seven passengers, and additional 
requirements for professional competence by owners and operating officers. 
 
Unlike the 1980 Transport Act, the legislation passed in 1930 was not specific 
about minimum distances for service types, instead allowing the operator and 
ATCs make these distinctions based on the service details submitted at the point 
of application and when considering existing services and the railway network, 
including any objections lodged by these very powerful and protected institutions. 
This application was by way of an RSL – required for all road passenger transport 
services. At a stroke RSLs had the effect of removing competition on routes 
between major towns and cities as, typically, only one (or a very limited number) 
were available from the ATCs. Therefore, many routes passed to a single 
incumbent operator after the 1930 Act was passed. 
 
Taking the earlier example of the service corridor between London and Oxford it 
is noted that upon the 1930 Act coming into effect competition between the two 
cities was reduced to just two firms; South Midland and Varsity Express (Crowe, 
2012). This was permissible under the Act by the ATC as the two services 
followed slightly different routes. By 1934, between the two services, only fifteen 
timetabled trips operated per day – a significant decline from the pre-Act peak of 
58 services offered by eighteen providers and potentially a degradation of social 
welfare and choice despite the likely higher seat utilisation and lower ‘waste’. 
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Through the example above it can be seen how the 1930 Act created restrictions 
on the number of services allowed within the market, both point to point markets, 
and wider geographical areas. This situation created a controlled monopoly 
(Hibbs, 2003), with a structure close to a coercive monopoly; a structure where 
no price competition, technical innovation (for product differentiation), marketing, 
or free movement into and out of the market is allowed. However, the Act did not 
prevent innovation within the boundaries of each RSL in terms of technical 
advancement and vehicle facilities, and services naturally required marketing to 
ensure buyer knowledge, meaning that while the remaining conditions of a 
coercive monopoly at this point are valid some conditions were not met. 
 
The Act sought to regulate quantity and create pseudo-monopoly situations on 
each corridor. However, while this had the potential to fragment the network with 
many operators running legacy routes with little regard to the wider market the 
processes of restrictions on service quantity did force firms to think creatively 
about how they attracted passengers, expanded their reach and service portfolio, 
and maintained at least normal profits within this new, near coercive monopoly 
environment. These are briefly summarised as follows. 
 
3.2.2 Coach Pools 
 
In several notable cases firms revisited the idea of coach pools. As co-operatives, 
they created large networks of services, achieving passenger growth (peaking in 
the late 1960s) and maximising social welfare through this mechanism as well as 
more traditional process of merger and acquisition. For example, Royal Blue saw 
the 1930 Act as a spring-board for expansion, using the tools of acquisition and 
coach pooling (as a founder member of Associated Motorways) to expand the 
geographical reach of their network and fill spare capacity on inbound legs to the 
south and west of England (Anderson and Frankis, 1985). 
 
Through the 1930 Act, coach pools had two main functions;  
 
(a) to create usable bi-directional services and/or networks with balanced 
timetables to attract the widest level of use from the broadest passenger 
base; and,  
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(b) to overcome the pre-1980 issue of RSL quantity restrictions that 
stopped individual operators expanding routes or networks over areas 
where parallel services already existed (with such applications being 
rejected on quantity and waste grounds).  
 
The Associated Motorways model, the most well-known coach pool in the UK, 
paid no reference to traffic area boundaries but did coordinate services at defined 
hubs (e.g. Cheltenham) to allow interchange between member services. The 
network focused on travel to and from the south and west of England, London, 
and the Midlands. It’s tenure spanned a period of tremendous change within the 
industry – commencing in 1934 as a minor pool of six operators focusing 
connections on the west of England and immediately adjoining regions, the 
operation expanded in both membership and geographic reach until its cessation 
(in name only) in 1974 as it passed into the National network, six-years after the 
1968 Transport Act restructured existing nationalised operations, placing the 
Tilling Group companies into the newly-formed National Bus Company (NBC). 
This also incorporated the BET Group companies, sold to the state at this time, 
and leaving municipalities under local control alongside many private 
independents, five years prior to deregulation of the long-distance coach market.  
 
Associated Motorways helped to shape the network footprint that was seen from 
1980. The coach pool spanned the period of the Second World War (though 
suspended for part of this time) and was an integral part of people’s social mobility 
in the immediate post war era when rail was suffering from significant damage 
and neglect with few funds to reconstruct the system.  
 
Figure 3 shows the reach of the coach pool by 1948 and has synergies with the 
National Express network through the 1970s, before rationalisation meant the 
loss of several cross-country services and links such as those in Cornwall (Dean, 
1983). 
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Figure 3: Associated Motorways network map 1948 
 
 
 
Using connections to make more efficient use of vehicle and crew resources saw 
coach pools make extensive use of the ‘hub and spoke’ operating method. In the 
case of the 1930 Act this efficiency was initially driven, by the lack of good direct 
road connections between major cities and towns as the motorway network was 
yet to be developed. Coach pools allowed each operator to add connections to 
further afield cities and towns to its ‘home’ network, attracting passengers that it 
may not have been able to otherwise use their services (an early example of the 
network effect also noted in 3.2.4) and later in 8.2. All but one operator within the 
pool operated their own separate branded network and it is arguable that these 
benefited widely from the network effect of the Associated Motorways network. 
The coach pool was simply a marketing organisation and each company was 
required to operate an agreed amount of service mileage to allow overall 
operation of the network - in return receiving back a commensurate level of profit 
from ticket sales. 
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Lessons learnt from coach pools give economic arguments for co-operation; 
 
 The wider benefits of a network over lone services – e.g. through tickets; 
 Mitigation of wasteful competition with resources better coordinated; 
 The reach and impact of a singular branded and marketed network; 
 Operation from a single hub creating better connections and information; 
and, 
 Centralisation of administration and consequent cost efficiencies. 
 
In the same period as the 1930 Act national rail services continued, including 
through the Second World War, albeit with a preference for freight and troop 
movements, and provided a skeletal and basic national network for the public. 
However, following the war, the rail network struggled to improve quickly. Political 
change saw a move to nationalise critical industries, such as coal and the 
railways. With infrastructure that had suffered through the rigors of the war years 
the railways were quickly surpassed by coach in terms of passenger growth 
through the late 1930s and 1940s and this hastened the need for market structure 
change, from line by line monopolies to state ownership and a controlled 
monopoly. In contrast, the quantity controls still in place in the post war era for 
coach services stimulated network development and innovation, allowing it to 
capture market share without the wasteful competition of diverted resources –
important in difficult economic times. 
 
3.2.3 Exogenous factors triggering operator innovation 
 
The opening of motorways in the UK stimulated some innovation within the 
express coach market even though A-Roads and dual carriageway by-passes 
had been in use since the 1930s. Independent operators could take advantage 
of faster point to point roads as did the group operators. Ribble (BET) pioneered 
the ‘Gay Hostess’ express services from the North West to London in the 1960s 
with the opening of the first motorways, the M6 Preston By-Pass in 1958 and the 
M1 in 1959, stimulating the development of specialised double-deck vehicles with 
at-seat hostess service and on-board washroom facilities.  
 
67 
 
A similar innovation saw the motorway between Birmingham and London 
stimulate innovation through increased operating speed. Midland Red introduced 
motorway services using the M1 between the two cities and took advantage of 
the initially speed-limit free operating conditions for seven years using specially 
designed single deck coaches built by the company itself to ensure a unique 
niche market product and often travelling between 70 and 100 miles per hour 
(Richards, 2010). At one point in the early days of the new service the shortest 
journey time between the two cities was recorded as 1 hour 40 minutes. 
 
The development of the motorway network in the UK also aided the shift away 
from co-operative networks that relied upon the benefits that their ‘hub and spoke’ 
operating model gave when applied to a slower network of A and B road 
connections between towns and cities. With motorways providing fast point to 
point times and extending the reach of singular firms more direct routes by 
independent and group companies were set up in isolation - the nationalised 
network (see 3.2.4) further compounded the effect and saw remaining coach pool 
activity significantly decline. Ahead of deregulation National re-cast its network to 
make better use of motorways, maintaining a reduced hub and spoke operation 
it refined connections between principal cities and towns while keeping a host of 
intermediary locations through its cross-country network (these would be further 
stripped at deregulation by resource reallocation). 
 
Analysis of post deregulation corridor competition also argues positively for the 
beneficial effects of improved road infrastructure. Indeed, for the South West 
corridor which saw heavy competition from deregulation between Devon and 
London, the improved road links may have contributed more to passenger growth 
and corridor success than the freedoms alone created by the Act with journey 
time reductions in the magnitude of 4-hours observed due to the completion of 
the M5 to Exeter and work to make the A30 and A38 roads dual carriageways 
(Dean, 1983). 
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3.2.4 Nationalisation 
 
As coach pools were established beyond the 1930 Act several firms became 
independently owned by either Tilling or BET - both large bus operating groups. 
The railways (private firms) also had significant interests in these groups, 
however, the 1947 Transport Act began the process of nationalisation; starting 
with the creation of the British Transport Commission (BTC), a holding group 
which controlled British Railways from 1948, and due to the railways’ interests in 
Tilling and BET these groups also - moving these and their coach pools into a 
semi-nationalised state. This increased further when Tilling entirely sold out to 
the BTC in 1949.  
 
At the same time, nationalisation of the railways enabled standardisation to drive 
efficiency and innovation through the potential for economies of scale. Investment 
in diesel locomotives to improve speeds and reliability as well and large-scale 
electrification and infrastructure projects followed in successive years after a 
Government change in 1952 which failed to see a reversal of nationalisation or 
these processes. Centralised control was still seen to allow greater regional 
freedoms (Nock, 1980) and these were important as the industry looked ahead 
to ten or more years to map out the competitive market it would find itself 
operating within.  
 
This strategic thinking, stimulated by decisions being required for infrastructure 
replacement and increasing daily losses on the current network, prompted 
reviews in mid 1950s and again in the 1960s. While express coach services 
enjoyed strong passenger growth and high levels of use until the late 1960s, 
initially using expansive networks of hub and spoke connections across major A 
and B roads and latterly the motorway network, the railways were undergoing 
significant change. Although nationalised, losses were high and the Beeching 
reports ’The Reshaping of British Railways’ (1963) and ‘The Development of the 
Major Railway Trunk Routes’ (1965) provided the stimulus for extreme 
rationalisation. Based on ‘making the railways pay’ the first report recommended 
that 55% of network stations and 30% of route mileage be closed – replaced 
instead by a variation of ‘hub and spoke’ that aimed to see private car, 
replacement bus, and road haulage connect passengers and freight to ‘rail-
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heads’ (hubs). However, with the motorway network quickly developing and 
private motoring becoming cheaper and more accessible the reality saw these 
journeys being made entirely by road and a total loss of traffic to the rail network. 
 
Most line and station closures were carried out with activity peaking in the mid-
1960s and completed by the early 1970s. One fundamental error with the 
closures resulting from the Beeching reports was the underestimation of the 
importance of the ‘network effect’ of connecting legs – branch-lines. In economic 
terms, the cost to maintain the connecting legs is often unknown and their loss 
can have a larger loss to revenue than the operating savings made in addition to 
the social welfare losses suffered by passengers left without access to the 
network. The same effect was exhibited when deregulation of the coach market 
caused shrinkage of the cross-country network enabling resources to be focused 
on trunk routes, but with little consideration regarding access to these routes for 
provincial passengers. 
 
For the road transport market, the 1968 Transport Act saw the gradual 
nationalisation of local and long-distance road transport in the UK resulting in the 
formation of the NBC in the same year. Nationalisation was achieved through 
acquisition and not compulsory purchase with many independent firms remaining 
and full nationalisation of the market never completed.  
 
3.2.5 The decade prior to deregulation – the 1970s 
 
The UK scheduled express coach market demonstrated a steady decline in 
passenger numbers from 1970, despite attempts by the NBC subsidiaries in 
England and Wales to create a single operational unit, ‘National’ from 1972 to 
promote an identifiable and single network.  
 
Figure 4 comparing the express sector to all road passenger transport, highlights 
a decline in express passenger journeys, of approximately 44% over 10-years, 
showing passenger journeys as an index figure (1970 = 100%) and equating in 
real terms to 69 million passenger journeys (Douglas, 1987).  
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Figure 4: Express and Bus Patronage (from Douglas, 1987, p27) 
 
 
Of note is the rapid decline in the express market in a very short period between 
1976 and 1978 as well as in the last year of the decade;  
 
“The principal causes of this latterly quite spectacular decline were the 
recession and the encroachment of BR [British rail] in the student, senior 
citizen and off-peak period markets” (Douglas, 1987, p26).  
 
However, further causes of the decline may also be due to the following reasons 
(drawn principally from Douglas and White): 
 
 The modification of routes to claim fuel duty rebate (the forerunner to 
today’s Bus Service Operators Grant) as defined by the 1968 Act meaning 
whole routes or several route sections were re-registered as local bus 
services; 
 
 Changes to minimum fare levels that classified express from other 
services; with these raising some services fell into the local bus service 
category; 
 
 Decline in ‘works contract’ services which due to very few defined stops 
(often only two) were deemed express in their classification, and; 
 
 Rising operating costs that discouraged independent firms, coupled with 
tighter driving hours regulations. 
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Although attempts were made to reverse the decline in passenger journeys the 
overall market was hampered by the restrictions still in place for RSLs. 
Additionally, the railways right to object to proposed route and fare changes by 
operators coupled with incentives given to the inter-city rail sector by the 
Government exacerbated the decline. Regarding inter-city rail, the Government 
required this sector to cover its overheads leading to significant fare reductions 
(in particular off-peak) and competitive marketing and promotion of the coach 
markets traditional passenger market to grow their own passenger base 
(Douglas, 1987).  
 
Ahead of the 1980 Act the established long distance scheduled coach network 
was operated in England and Wales under the National (Express) brand and 
formed a single division within the otherwise regionally fragmented NBC 
framework. This process started in 1972 when all NBC subsidiary scheduled 
coach services were brought under one singular timetable guide and promoted 
as ‘National’.  
 
This process saw 300 coaches initially carry thirteen million passenger journeys 
(from a total market of approximately 61 million – Douglas, 1987) on a network 
with popular destinations such as London, Bournemouth, and Blackpool. The 
guide and branded network was initially ‘National’ (displayed in alternating blue 
and red letters on uniformly white coaches). However, in 1973 the revised name 
'National Express' was used on publicity and coaches, setting a single brand 
designed to make travel simpler and seamless between vehicle and crew 
providers. Based on this approach Figure 5 shows passenger volume data and a 
peaking in use immediately following the re-brand to National Express but a 
decline after the introduction of InterCity Rail by British Rail from 1977 (NBC 
Annual Reports); 
 
Figure 5: National Express Patronage (re-brand to deregulation, 1973-79) 
 
Year Passengers 
(million) 
Turnover (£ 
million) 
1973 11.0 - 
1974 12.0 - 
1975 13.1 - 
1978 10.0 26.0 
1979 10.4 28.0 
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The long-distance market prior to deregulation was not wholly the preserve of the 
nationalised companies; 
 
“In 1980 scheduled services between towns and cities were mainly 
operated by the state-owned NBC (and in Scotland SBG) company 
subsidiaries. However, a small collection of strong independent firms 
(such as Grey-Green and Yelloway) had created small networks and ran 
jointly on some routes with the NBC subsidiaries and so were able to 
access their terminal facilities as a result – reducing the problems with 
entry to the market considerably”. (Townsin, 1992, p19).  
 
This evidences of independent activity in the market during the 1970s (ahead of 
deregulation) which moved to a level of cooperation with the incumbent, National 
(in England and Wales) post deregulation and was reminiscent of the former 
associations and coach pools which had found success in the restrictive RSL era.  
 
With larger independents in operation on the network and holding RSLs for trunk 
services there was a credible threat from the further growth of these companies 
upon deregulation and the entry of new firms, of similar or smaller size, on 
otherwise untouched network areas. Interestingly, Grey-Green (a strong 
independent operator of express services through the 1970s) initially joined the 
short lived British Coachways consortium in 1980 to compete with National 
Express before leaving to resume sole operator services and later co-operating 
with the market incumbent. Seeing the potential threat to its market dominance 
and established identity the NBC’s National Express centralised division, which 
was responsible for planning the network and setting fares policy, began gearing 
up for the new market environment that the Act would facilitate ahead of 
deregulation day. In so doing National Express undertook several activities: 
 
(a) Use of the Manchester – London service in the summer of 1980 to test fare 
elasticity and trial 'stand-by' fares (Birks, 1990); 
 
(b) The ‘EXTRA’ computer reservations system was introduced across the 
network of National Express ticket agents in 1978. This immediately 
delivered an improved service to customers and booking agents; 
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(c) Notable networks, such as Royal Blue, were incorporated into National 
Express through the 1970s (and 1980s) (Anderson and Frankis, 1985). Of 
note are regional subsidiary names (former network owner branding) such 
as Black and White, Ribble, and Greyhound which were not dropped from 
the livery of coaches until 1986 to simplifying and promote a single network 
and brand, and; 
 
(d) In 1979-80 National Express undertook a market research programme 
called CoachMAP. This built on the local bus Market Analysis Project (MAP) 
and was designed to systematically filter vast quantities of data regarding 
travel patterns and optimise the coach network;  
 
“The techniques employed were not dissimilar to MAP and 
contributed to the development of a network of frequent, regular 
direct express coach links between principle centres using the 
motorways and providing interchanges at certain key points.” (Birks, 
1990, p411). 
 
Whilst these factors significantly helped in preparing the incumbent National 
Express prior to deregulation, two exogenous factors also aided it: 
 
(a) Some of the barriers to market entry enshrined in the 1930 and 1968 Acts 
were not fully repealed in the lead up to (1970s) or post (early 1980s) 
deregulation – critically one of these was access to the main London coach 
terminal, Victoria Coach Station, which National Express had the monopoly 
over; and, 
 
(b) A restructured network making better use of the motorway system in the 
UK. 
 
Additionally, long term planned developments in rail (still state controlled) would 
come to fruition through the late 1970s and in time to meet head-on with the 
deregulation of the inter-city coach market. Railways in the 1970s were focused 
on inter-city travel with the Government keen for this to be a self-financing market 
sector (Douglas, 1987). Planning for the network had begun a decade earlier; 
through actions following the Beeching reports and acknowledgment that high 
average journey speed, convenience emulating the private car, safety, reliability, 
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and increased on-board standards would be critical in a future passenger’s choice 
– the importance of each fluctuating in relation to journey length (Nock, 1980). 
Predictions regarding competition for passenger traffic in the late 1970s and 
1980s pointed to rail being competitive for all journeys up to three hours (typically 
distances of 200 to 250 miles). Beyond this domestic air would increasingly have 
a dominant market share, and for journeys between 100 and 200 miles rail would 
see intense competition with road transport (public and private) due to the 
motorway network (Nock, 1980). 
 
While both road and rail sectors were under state control, both anticipated the 
future in different ways; road using exogenous factors to re-shape it’s network 
ahead of new competition with an emphasis only on lower trunk journey times, 
whereas rail took a more comprehensive approach, including the passenger 
experience as part of its plans over the same journey distances. 
 
3.2.6 The stimulus for change 
 
A Government pursuing the privatisation of a raft of nationalised utilities and 
industries created the path to inter-city coach deregulation. This approach was 
supported by the continuous decline under state control of the market in the 
1970s - a reversal of earlier fortunes where until the mid-1960s the market for 
long-distance coach travel continually grew due to; a lack of car ownership; post 
war economic recovery, and; a focus on UK destinations for annual holidays. The 
latter decline was due to changes in the categorisation of the market and positive 
developments in rail and private transport that enabled greater and lower cost 
personal mobility.  
 
It was felt that private firm intervention would make a more cost-conscious 
industry and see a reversal of the passenger decline. Rather than cutting the 
network and replicating the Beeching approach to rail of the 1960s, it was felt that 
allowing free-market forces to exist, the market would find a new, profitable, 
equilibrium, matching supply to demand and maximising social welfare. However, 
there was an argument for continued control due to potential economies of scale 
within the industry (Douglas, 1987).  
75 
 
Establishment of this would be critical in how the Government tackled changes 
to the market. If the sector could be classed as a natural monopoly, such as 
energy utilities, then there may be little to be gained from regulatory change as 
the economies of scale would be too great to allow new market entry.  
 
With the 60-year period of long-distance coach service development prior to 
deregulation being notable for its changing market structure – from near perfect 
competition to a controlled economy (Hibbs, 2003) and stimulated by various 
market interventions, not all of which being legislative such as technology 
improvements, it was likely that obstructive economies of scale did not exist. 
Indeed, Douglas concludes through detailed studies of wider inter-city coach 
markets that in the UK; 
 
“The weight of empirical evidence suggests constant or very weak 
economies of scale. Therefore, to have continued entry control on the 
basis of economies of scale would have been ill-founded” (Douglas, 
1987, p66). 
 
However, in some areas of the market there were advantages to scale; wider 
spread of overhead costs to offset buyer price; efficiencies in maintenance (cost 
and time advantages); brand creation and recognition (important for sustainable 
market share); faster entry / competitive retaliation through lower sunk costs and 
more available resource. 
 
With economies of scale not sufficiently in evidence to prevent free-market forces 
to occur (but some advantages of scale being seen nonetheless) a legislative 
process was commenced to address and halt the decline in long-distance coach 
passenger journeys – removing the market from state control (and cost) and 
providing a model for which wider transport deregulation may later be achieved. 
Evidence suggested that a lack of regulatory control and the provision of easy 
market entry and exit would allow a market to tend towards one of three states 
(Samuelson, 1976); single monopolist; oligopoly, or; imperfect competition. Each 
achieves differing levels of social welfare and market freedom as noted in 
Chapter 2. The way in which the market moves is a product of the initial landscape 
prior to regulation removal (See Chapter 8 and Figure 26) as well as the level of 
barrier removal through legislation and competitive process. In terms of the 
express coach market it was felt that the restrictions brought by RSLs created 
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difficulty in utilising spare resource between markets for independent operators 
who were traditionally entrepreneurial and competitive in nature, and who had 
localised critical mass and the ability to provide new capacity. Free-market 
economics applied to the express coach industry would transform the market with 
use of contestability as an economic tool (or process) to regulate price in the long-
term even if a single monopolist structure emerged instead of the much hoped 
for competitive market structure. 
 
3.3 Deregulation – the 1980 Transport Act 
 
The replacement legislation to that of the 1930 Traffic Act and subsequent Acts 
in 1947 and 1968 came into effect on the 1st October 1980. At a stroke, it claimed 
to remove barriers to market entry and provide the platform for a flourishing new 
network of competitive long-distance services that would offer choice across a 
range of areas for the travelling public. The market could now develop and 
promote its own fares, timetables and most importantly of all could add additional 
services (in the case of incumbent operators) or enter the market with new 
services (in the case of entrepreneurial firms) - market entry was now possible at 
‘apparently little cost’ (Robbins and White, 1986). 
 
The 1980 Transport Act, brought in by a Conservative Government whose 
manifesto sought a greater role for the private sector across state supported 
industries from 1979, looked to fundamentally review the 1930 Transport Act; 
radically amending its principles to bring about more competition within the 
market place – a reversal in many ways of the original Act, and the nationalisation 
created through the 1968 Act. 
 
To achieve this competition, it was felt that the vibrant and highly populated 
independent coaching sector, hitherto focused on operating private and contract 
hire services in a very competitive market with few regulations could bring the 
desired levels of competition and choice to the establishment. New approaches 
such as product differentiation, quality enhancements, and equipment innovation, 
were within the private sector’s gift for use in driving up public demand for 
services, delivering operational efficiencies, and bringing down the costs of 
service delivery and, vis-à-vis, coach fares. 
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However, Cole (1998) suggests that small coaching firms at that time might 
instead have taken a pessimistic view of deregulation and the opportunities open 
to them, and Hibbs (1986) notes that many small operators lacked 
entrepreneurial drive, and were put off competing due to their size, the high risks, 
and the perceived dangers of moving into a new market, with such companies 
likely to remain in their chosen sub-market. 
 
To stimulate and facilitate the private sector’s entry into the market the Act used 
the theoretical mechanisms of contestability to create market entry (Robbins and 
White, 1986) and more importantly, give market forces a ‘free hand’ to determine 
a new economic structure the to achieve the Act’s aims.  
 
In so doing, the authors of the Act were essentially working on the economic 
principle of laissez-faire (Pass, 1993). The belief was that a market place such 
as this would be an attractor to a myriad of operators who were able to enter the 
market and diversify from their core activities with relative ease, securing year-
round work that would either remove the risks of seasonality inherent in the 
independent coach sector, or build on their already prosperous operations by 
tapping into their local passenger base – akin to Royal Blue in the 1930s. 
 
This approach remained the most significant goal of the Act - to experiment with, 
and prove a place for, free-market economics in the public transport industry. The 
legislative change was focused on opening the scheduled express coach market 
to wider competition than had previously been allowed through the 1930 Act, itself 
regulating quantity, quality, and price for all public road transport services apart 
from those of private and contract hire for 50 years.  
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The contestable market structure would create the environment for freedom of 
movement into and out of the market, by any firm, and deliver three supporting 
goals, summarised by Kilvington and Cross (1986): 
 
(a) the removal of bureaucratic restriction; 
 
(b) to ensure that almost everyone gains good access to public transport, and; 
 
(c) the provision of maximum choice to the user, by facilitating competition. 
 
Delivering these goals would not only provide stability for small to medium sized 
independent firms to test the market, but would also, in theory, allow consumers 
a large level of choice with freedoms of entry and service design allowing niche 
services to develop and product differentiation to occur. 
 
The contestable market structure would also ensure fares would be kept to levels 
where only ‘normal profits’ could exist due to the permanent threat of competitive 
market entry. The Act sought to exploit this as a benefit; the threat of market entry 
would, either as a ‘hit and run’ or a sustained operation, ensure that fares would 
remain competitive. This would see any incumbent operators attempting to use 
market power or dominance to excessively increase their own wealth face 
competition and a potential loss of market share. 
 
The official line regarding that new Act tended towards the goal of creating as 
close a perfectly competitive market as possible. As this extreme market situation 
is commonly seen as an idealised structure the Act had two potential outcomes: 
 
(a) the total shift of the pre-Act market structure to a wholly new situation with 
new conditions and outcomes as close to perfect competition as 
sustainable, or; 
 
(b) despite the application of the Act to allow increased market activity, little 
actual shift in market structure in the long-term (signifying a failure of the 
Act). 
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If the Act managed to achieve the first outcome, the change in market structure 
may realistically have seen the market move to a state of imperfect competition 
(or monopolistic competition); essentially a market with many buyers and sellers, 
the allowance of differentiated products, and freedom of movement for firms with 
the market, this being described as similar in all aspects to a perfectly competitive 
market save for the allowance of non-homogenous products (Pass, 1993).  
 
If the second outcome occurred the Act would have facilitated a contestable 
environment but, either due to exogenous factors, or endogenous flaws within the 
Act’s ability to remove all barriers to successful market entry, the market structure 
would remain static or at best move to a slightly better ‘seller to buyer’ ratio on 
the proposed spectrum, potentially signifying failure of its goals and legislative 
process. However, in achieving contestability the Act in this instance may still 
have succeeded and would at least allow for potential changes in structure in the 
long-term dependent on advances in factors and technologies effecting the 
industry - this is now the observed outcome and concluded through Chapter 8.  
 
At the time of the Act however, it was supposed that if the second outcome 
occurred and a dominant operator did remain in place, but that operator had; 
been forced to innovate; better match supply to demand, and; only operate at 
normal profit levels this would not wholly be a failure (something perhaps now 
seen in today's market)  Therefore, regardless of market composition, if more 
choice, lower fares, and better quality were resultant features of the market, akin 
to the 1930 Act enabling the development of a lean UK wide network, could it 
may be argued that the Act was successful. As such, much depended in 1980 on 
the reaction of the independent sector, the reaction of British Rail, and if the first 
casting of the Act was flawless in creating contestability - as discussed below in 
section 3.4. 
 
Briefly, however, in terms of rail, the market, this remained state controlled under 
British Rail. Considerable state funding had developed a network of high-speed 
services on trunk routes to provide shorter journey times and British Rail was 
given a mandate to make these profitable and therefore self-sufficient - paving 
the way for intensive competition on corridors where rail and coach were close 
substitutes. 
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3.4 Deregulation – barriers to entry 
 
Although the Act appeared to have created a ‘level playing field’ and the potential 
for a contestability there did remain some barriers to market entry, such as: 
 
(a) the need to register any new service, or change an existing route or 
timetable, with 28 days’ notice (note that there was no notice period for fare 
changes and passenger trips had to be at least 30-miles in length); 
 
(b) access to some main ‘hub’ terminals (e.g. Victoria Coach Station, London) 
was restricted due to ownership by the NBC. This forced new entrants to 
use ‘kerb-side’ locations and impeded ticket sales and public knowledge of 
new services. In the days following deregulation over 65% of private 
operators ran services under the new Act that departed and arrived at car 
park or street locations (Barton and Everest, 1984). In 1980 ‘kerb side’ 
access was deemed poor in comparison to the terminal operation, offering 
poor facilities and information – in contrast to today’s market which sees 
kerb side locations as better access; 
 
(c) a staged process of access rights to termini seriously damaged the 
momentum of the Act and blocked new entrants from setting up services 
with attractive additions such as good quality facilities and information; 
 
(d) financial disparity between incumbents and new entrants; with National 
Express principally having already born the sunk costs of establishing a 
service through years of state ownership; however, in defence of this; 
 
“The management of National Express was given a free hand by NBC 
to meet and respond to this competition, though no subsidy was 
forthcoming.” (Lloyd and Potter, 2000). 
 
(e) the NBC taking the opportunity of state ownership to develop a recognisable 
brand ahead of legislative change; reinforcing public trust as the established 
market leader and a recognisable service offering as National Express. 
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Of these remaining barriers, the most significant to detracting from free-flowing 
competition was the requirement to provide notice for new or amended routes. 
This requirement left a legacy of regulation within the sector and a large level of 
protectionism for the incumbent operator on any route where there was 
competition from a new entrant (this prohibitive situation is also seen in the 
recently liberalised German market). For an incumbent operator, the knowledge 
that a new entrant had applied to operate across its route gave it time to react to 
the threat. With 28 days’ knowledge of the competitor’s plans, the incumbent 
could take two courses of action: 
 
(a) fares and facilities could be altered to enhance the existing service, offering 
discounts on services that overlapped with the ‘competitors’ planned 
timetable and better passenger facilities (this could be immediately applied), 
and; 
 
a counter attack to the threat could be lodged by the incumbent and serve to spoil 
the impact of the new service by very quickly mirroring or bettering it as the 
incumbent operator would not incur large sunk costs for this change. However, it 
is true that if no restriction on lead time existed a new entrant would still need to 
advertise a service prior to operations - alerting existing operators of the 
competition. 
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3.5 Deregulation – short term activity 
 
From deregulation there was an immediate intensive period of competition 
(Robbins, 2007) between coach firms on several main corridors with often short-
lived multiple competition within each corridor. Jaffer and Thompson state that 
the Act had; 
 
“… an immediate and dramatic impact on the coaching industry. New 
companies entered the market, frequently offering innovatory services, 
and there were spectacular price cuts on the major inter-city routes” 
(Jaffer and Thompson, 1986, p45). 
 
 
Although National Express had completed much preparatory work to meet, head 
on, the challenges that deregulation would create there was still an initial wave of 
competition across its UK network causing it to weather a storm of competition 
that manifested itself in two forms: 
 
(a) individual operators taking on an existing operator (often National Express) 
on a route where the new operator counted one end of the route as ‘home 
territory’. Such routes often centred on journeys to and from London 
(Thompson and Whitfield, 1995). Examples included Whittle’s ‘Goldhawk’ 
service and Swanbrook’s operations from Gloucestershire to London, and; 
 
(b) a consortium of operators working together as a co-operative to provide a 
comprehensive offering and attempting to remove some of the residual 
barriers facing new market entrants by using greater strength, depth and 
geographic spread to provide bi-directional frequencies, connections, and 
competitive fares, the main example being British Coachways. 
 
Figure 6 provides as complete a picture as possible of the new market entrants 
(from 1980) that competed at deregulation. It shows the market entrants ranked 
by the distance (in miles) of these services provided; 
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Figure 6: New market entrants at deregulation (1980) ranked by trip distance 
 
Operator Origin Destination Distance (miles) 
Stagecoach Aberdeen London 536 
Stagecoach Dundee London 471 
Stagecoach Perth London 450 
Stagecoach Stirling London 417 
Silver Choice (b) Edinburgh London (overnight) 405 
Cotters Edinburgh London 405 
Silver Choice (a) Glasgow London (overnight) 403 
Cotters Glasgow London 403 
British Coachways London Glasgow 403 
Northwest Coachlines Douglas / Isle of Man London 299 
British Coachways London Newcastle 283 
Trathens Plymouth London 238 
British Coachways (a) London Plymouth 238 
Mid-Warwickshire Leeds Gatwick 234 
British Coachways (b) London Paignton 216 
Applebys Hull / Cleethorpes London 214 
British Coachways London Liverpool 210 
British Coachways London Bradford 205 
Wallace Arnold Leeds London 196 
Glennline Exeter London 196 
British Coachways London Swansea 187 
Travelways Bradford Isle of Man 170 
British Coachways Swansea Birmingham 155 
Morris Coaches Bromyard London 151 
Parks of Hamilton Aberdeen Glasgow 146 
Stagecoach Aberdeen Glasgow 146 
Whittles Bridgnorth London 144 
Knight Brown Aviemore Glasgow 140 
Luxicoaches Derby London 130 
British Coachways London Nottingham 127 
Swanbrook Tewkesbury Oxford / London 120 
Hogg Boston London 119 
Elseys London Peterborough / Boston 119 
British Coachways London Bristol 118 
Robinsons Leeds Carlisle 117 
Red Car Norwich London 117 
Youngs Norwich London 117 
JDW Norwich London 117 
Flights Birmingham Heathrow Airport 116 
Castleways Gloucester London 114 
Swanbrook Gloucester London 114 
British Coachways London Grantham 112 
British Coachways London Bournemouth 107 
Shaws Coventry London 97 
Victory Tours Salisbury / Andover London 95 
British Coachways Bristol Birmingham 92 
Heyfordian Banbury / Oxford London 88 
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Operator Origin Destination Distance (miles) 
Shaws Leeds East Midlands Airport 83 
Reading / Southend (BTs) Reading Southend (via London) 83 
Renown Eastbourne / Bexhill London 80 
British Coachways London Portsmouth 75 
Ramsons Ramsgate London 75 
British Coachways London Weston Favell 69 
City of Oxford Oxford London 59 
Wallace Arnold Leeds / Bradford Manchester Airport 57 
Stagecoach Dundee Stirling 56 
Swinards Faversham London 55 
Whippet Huntingdon London (Barnet) 55 
A C Coaches Brighton London 53 
Ementon Cranfield London 51 
British Coachways Hamilton Edinburgh (feeder) 48 
Buffalo Maulden London 46 
UMBH Shoeburyness London 46 
Richardson Skylink Sheffield Manchester Airport 45 
Stagecoach Edinburgh Perth 43 
CK Cardiff Swansea 41 
Smiths Luxury Coaches Reading London 41 
Olsens Medway Towns London 40 
Pilchers Medway Towns London 40 
Glastonia Cranleigh London 38 
Dale Coaches Stirling Edinburgh 36 
Average Entry Distance (miles) 157 
 
Figure 6 using data gathered from a range of research texts, commercial 
literature, and historic accounts shows: 
 
 71 new services commenced in the last quarter of 1980 following the Act; 
 
 22% of new market entrants were part of the British Coachways network; 
 
 66% of market entry was in the ‘0 to 150’ mile journey length group; 
 
 27% in the ‘101 to 150’ mile journey length group; 
 
 36% of the new market entries ceased their services before January 1981; 
 
 77% of the new market entries provided a service to/from London; and,  
 
 34% of these ceased before January 1981. 
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The Act facilitated huge potential for service type and choice and saw a significant 
take up of these opportunities in the first period of deregulation. However, this 
significant exploration by independent operators may have been down to the 
timing of deregulation and seasonality of the industry. October forms part of the 
low season for coaching, meaning that many independents had spare vehicles 
and crew to trial services at no significant additional cost. However, this period of 
trial was not long enough to build up regular demand to sustain the year-round 
operation and create a foothold in the market before the new tour-coach season 
began in early spring 1981.  
 
This is the case when robust competition from National Express on such routes 
is also considered alongside inter-modal competition from British Rail. This 
competition being focused on price due and geared primarily to competition 
against National Express but with likely effects for new entrants establishing 
themselves in the same market. Because of this multi-faceted competition, many 
new enterprises ceased before the 1981 coach season; 43% by April 1981. 
 
With 66% of market entry occurring in the 0 to 150 miles category, some of the 
intensive competition predicted by British Rail was realised. In fact, they predicted 
intensive competition on journeys between 100 and 200 miles and in this respect 
new entrants represent 37% of all entry (with the average new entrant route 
length being 157 miles). Five years after deregulation, 40% of the remaining 33 
services were in the 100 to 200 miles journey category. 
 
By the end of 1981 up to 46% of new services had ceased and only one new 
service was planned to start in the second quarter of that year. The table 
demonstrates the strength of the market when the journey length is no more than 
150 miles. By motorway this would typically take three to four hours dependent 
on local traffic at each end of the route and this suggests the efficient working for 
a one-man crew, who under driver working regulations could drive for a maximum 
period of four and a half hours before requiring a minimum break of 45 minutes. 
With crew and fuel representing the main cost centres for any new venture, 
minimising each of these through efficient scheduling, high-speed/non-stop 
running, and limitations to a once daily service in each direction was essential – 
though perhaps not the vision of customer choice the government had planned. 
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It is notable that most new entrant services focused on providing a link to London, 
either as a commuter service or as a leisure focused daily return. This was 
essential for provincial operators as they did not have the ability to market return 
services effectively to the London ended market - something National Express 
could do due to its market presence and established sales agent network. 
Therefore, this forced a concentration on ‘home’ markets and inbound orientated 
services to London as they had brand presence and population penetration. This 
approach meant few post deregulation independent services began in London to 
serve regional UK towns and cities as the first leg of their journey – instead, this 
opportunity was left to the more ambitious network attempted by the British 
Coachways consortium. 
 
Following the initial increase of market entry after deregulation and until the mid-
1980s, National Express continued its focus on market retention using a mix of 
increased (displaced) resources and predatory fare pricing. This combined action 
resulted in a decline of independent market activity, with this only accounting for 
10% of journeys to/from London by 1981, too low to sustain long-term passenger 
choice, and seen by some as potential failure of the Act (Townsin, 1992).  
 
The early outcomes in Scotland were juxtaposed with England and Wales at 
deregulation. With no unified network of Scottish services prior to the Act, 
sustained competition thrived until the formation of Scottish CityLink in 1983. 
CityLink used a similar franchise model to National Express requiring several 
smaller operators as well as SBG subsidiaries, to provide branded coaches for 
operation across its newly coordinated network. However, as with the National 
Express model in England and Wales this began and then assisted the decline in 
competition north of the border. However, the resultant network within Scotland 
did still sustain longer-term competition in comparison to England and Wales due 
to the more extensive motorway infrastructure, direct motorway access into 
Glasgow, in a relatively smaller geographic concentration and the lower density 
(often single track) rail network. These culminating to ensure coach and rail 
competed more evenly on journey time and cost.  
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The Anglo-Scottish corridor was a separate market again, with coach competing 
with high-speed rail and domestic air services. This created huge disparities 
between travel times. At deregulation, National Express competed with SBG and 
Stagecoach, the latter concentrating on Anglo-Scottish services and using three 
service levels for customers by 1989 (50% of Anglo-Scottish services operated 
with standard coaches and 50% upgraded to higher specification ‘super’ coaches 
with low-cost ‘no-frills’ Magicbus services operated for a short period between 
Glasgow and London in response to competition from Bruce of Airdrie). However, 
Stagecoach abruptly left the market in the summer of 1989 to concentrate on the 
deregulated bus market (Thompson and Whitfield, 1995) with its services bought 
by National Express and initially operated as Caledonian Express before being 
absorbed into their wider network as Rapide level services in competition with 
Scottish CityLink's routes. 
 
The corridor proved to be a fertile ground for innovation. The substantive 
distances between various Scottish cities and London stimulated a varied range 
of competition between both nationalised and independent firms. The SBG in 
expectation of significant competition replaced its fleet of long distance coaches 
ahead of deregulation, its only preparation ahead of the Act in the late 1970s. 
These standards were matched and exceeded at deregulation by independents, 
such as Cotters who experimented with a ‘first class’ area within the coach 
saloon, and Stagecoach who innovated with high-capacity double-deck vehicles.  
 
3.6 Deregulation – the British Coachways consortium 
 
On the 6th October 1980, a consortium of six independent operators launched a 
singularly branded network designed to compete with National Express. Unique 
to this venture was the focus on London as the hub, notable at the time as a stark 
contrast to all other independent market entry originating from the provinces.  
 
The British Coachways network ensured connections through its London Kings 
Cross station facility (exceptionally rudimentary in comparison to Victoria used by 
National Express) and initially saw services provided by Grey Green, Wallace 
Arnold, Shearings Pleasureways, Park’s of Hamilton, Morris Bros (Swansea), 
and Ellerman Bee Line as founder consortium members.  
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These operators through their ‘home’ locations across the UK created a skeletal 
trunk network focusing on links to the North East, North West, Yorkshire, 
Birmingham, South Wales and the West of England. British Coachways entered 
the market with a clear plan to run against National Express using fare 
competition as its principal, and ultimately only, tool to secure a foothold in the 
market.  
 
Figure 7: British Coachways information showing network and fares 
 
        
 
 
The choice to use a geographic spread of operators that enabled effective crew 
and vehicle workings in each direction as well as ensuring useful daily trips out 
of London as well as too London, was sensible - as was the single name 
marketing approach that echoed the approach used by Associated Motorways. 
However, while the British Coachways operation focused on the concept of a 
singular branded network to rival that of National Express it failed to compete 
sustainably on cost. Unlike National Express, the consortium did not have the 
long-term financial resources to establish the brand and the network. Notable 
here is the comparison to more recent market entry by Megabus in 2003 in which 
the parent company, Stagecoach, planned for a three to five-year period of losses 
ahead of eventual profitability and sustained market presence. 
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Ultimately fare based competition proved a naïve approach. National Express’s 
immediate reaction was to cut fares on all trunk routes by one third and at least 
match all other fares on routes where the two companies competed directly 
(Robbins and White, 1986) – thus moving to protect routes that may attract 
competition as well as defending its position where competition had begun.  
 
To highlight the fare competition seen, the London to Liverpool route is 
considered: 
 
 In 1975 period return fares were £5.35 and six services were operated, 
albeit it two being indirect. Journey times ranged from 5 hrs 45 minutes to 
10hrs; 
 
 By the summer of 1979, just prior to deregulation National Express offered 
three services as well as an overnight service. Return fares (period) 
ranged from £10.00 to £13.20 though the three-day services were 
marketed as White Arrow Express with return fares set at £9.00. Journey 
times for core services had fallen to a consistent 4hrs 35 minutes with the 
overnight being 8hrs 30 minutes. 
 
Figure 8: National Express 1979 London/Liverpool information 
 
 
 
 In 1980 British Coachways launched services that included Liverpool. 
Initially fares were £8.00 return. However, by the summer of 1981 return 
fares were £9.00. Two services were offered, though both required a 
change at Altrincham and journey times ranged from 4hrs 45 minutes to 
5hrs 15 minutes; 
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Figure 9: British Coachways London/Liverpool information 
 
 
 
 The National Express response was to match deregulation day fares at 
£8.00 return but reduce direct services to two and operated one requiring 
a connection (showing how resources were moved to other network areas 
while maintaining a slight competitive edge). Journey times were 5hrs 45 
minutes to 5hrs 55 minutes. 
 
Figure 10: National Express post 1980 Act London/Liverpool leaflet 
 
 
 
Another example of aggressive fare competition was seen on the Manchester to 
London route. Here, British Coachways entered the market with return fares of 
£8.00 and three direct services each day taking around 4hrs 30 minutes (shown 
as part of the City Liner service above). National Express quickly defended its 
position with advertised fares cuts and more ‘fast’ journeys taking 4hrs 15 
minutes. 
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Figure 11: National Express post 1980 Act London/Manchester information 
 
                             
 
Ultimately, National Express quickly matched all British Coachways’ fares on 
each competing route (Townsin, 1992), and in doing so British Coachways 
appeared to have little further to offer the travelling public (Thomson and 
Whitfield, 1995), particularly as National Express were running equivalent or 
faster journey times and diverting resources from cross-country routes to trunk 
service frequency increases – a negative effect of the competition (Douglas, 1987 
and Kilvington and Cross, 1986). 
 
It the first year of deregulation British Coachways carried 750,000 passengers, 
compared to 12.5 million by National Express and an increase of 39% over the 
previous year (Townsin, 1992 and Douglas 1987). At the same time, National 
Express had also taken up to 5% of overall British Rail business (Birks, 1990), 
with a significantly higher proportion coming from the London to Oxford and West 
Country corridors where British Rail competed heavily with National Express and 
several other independent coach firms in addition to British Coachways. 
 
At its peak, the British Coachways consortium had ten members, with a further 
four joining within a month of the network’s launch; Yorks Travel, Barton 
Transport, Warners-Fairfax, and the Excelsior Group. These additions allowed 
an expanded route network with new services provided to Nottingham, Leicester, 
Northampton, Bristol, Southampton, Portsmouth, and Bournemouth. However, 
there were few service expansions beyond this point. Instead, several services 
were reduced in scope, merged, or cancelled. Even though Grey Green and 
Wallace Arnold quickly left the consortium it continued until 1983 when it finally 
ceased and left the market.  
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The main reasons for the failure of British Coachways can be summarised as: 
 
(a) The incumbent advantage of National Express as a brand and a network 
including its ticket sales agent network and ability to use its internal financial 
strength to subsidise fare cuts on isolated routes; 
 
(b) A lack of access to coach station facilities enjoyed by National Express, a 
situation not rectified until the 1985 Act, forcing the use of kerb-side stops 
with little information or recognition of the services provided; 
 
(c) Continual flux in services and the operators running them, and a lack of 
consist brand application to vehicles to provide reassurance to new 
passengers; 
 
(d) The choice to compete solely on cost requiring operation at two pence per 
passenger mile and near full coaches from day one to break even at the 
fare levels set (Bateman and Woodliffe, 1984). Compare this to research for 
the London commuter market showing a requirement of closer to 4 pence 
per passenger mile for break-even costs at a 2/3 load factor and a 30-mile 
one-way trip with this increasing to 6 pence when the journey distance fell 
to 20-miles. (Dyer, Robbins, White, 1985); 
 
(e) The additional costs of dead mileage caused by one-way excess loads at 
peak times and the inefficient use of duplicates which ended up out of 
position with no other routes to run on to; and, 
 
(f) A lack of special fares for concessions or children coupled to a fare structure 
that ended up being too simplistic and at odds with more flexible systems 
used by National Express and British Rail. 
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3.7 Deregulation – other market developments 
 
3.7.1 Competition quickly moved to co-operation 
 
Following early phases of competition, the market quickly moved towards 
partnerships between National Express and independent operators, rather than 
new or revived competition. The example below shows the partnership between 
Yelloway and National Express between the North West and the South Coast. 
Other examples included the partnership with Trathens that created the Rapide 
level of service. 
 
Figure 12: Example of National Express coordination with an independent 
 
 
 
With partnerships being developed, echoing the form of network expansion seen 
in the post 1930 Act era by the likes of Royal Blue and Associated Motorways, 
there is evidence that the primary goals of the Act were not being realised as had 
been planned (numerous independent and own branded competition). However, 
it was evident that choice was increasing, and fares were falling, albeit mainly 
through the response to competition by the continued monopoly operator, 
National Express – this is evidence that contestability was influencing the market. 
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Where partnerships developed, it occurred with larger operators with which 
National Express already had good working relationships, often forged prior to 
deregulation – for example;  
 
“Although there was a new spirit of competition, relations between NBC 
and most of the major independents which had run express services 
previously were not unfriendly and pooling arrangements with Wallace 
Arnold on Torbay services and Grey Green on routes in East Anglia 
continued [Starting with a Romford – Birmingham service and then 
expanding across the region]. Both Premier Travel and Yelloway, long-
established partners with NBC subsidiaries, chose not to compete, while 
Whittle, after a period of direct competition [Whittle’s Goldhawk], entered 
a new agreement with NBC on services between the West Midlands and 
London” (Townsin, 1992, p24).  
 
There are similarities here with the more recent liberalisation of the German 
market in terms of the speed of market contraction. However, in the German 
example co-operation in the medium term can be replaced with acquisition and 
expansion by one dominant firm once new entrants exited the market of their own 
accord (as many did in the UK) instead of any alliance arrangements. Regarding 
this newer market, the largest operator FlixBus acquired its main competitor to 
achieve 90% market share. 
 
3.7.2 Innovations in service quality 
 
Easing of intensive competition through the early 1980s began to reveal corridors 
where competition may be sustained for reasons beyond the traditional use of 
fares. Whilst National Express reached common operating agreements with 
some competitors, it had not been agile in the field of innovation outside of fares 
and schedule matching, to fend off competition – its main innovation had been 
the successful ‘beeper’ fares, changes to its stand-by fare policy, and trunk 
frequency enhancements (at the expense of some cross-country capacity). 
 
What had initially escaped National Express’s attention was deregulation being a 
stimulus for wider innovation – something recognised in the 1960s by British Rail 
and an integral part of their inter-city rail strategy. Before the Act, coach travel 
had been a basic affair, suffering from years of underfunding following the demise 
of classical networks such as Royal Blue, and the ending of coach designs 
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stimulated by the external opportunities, such as Midland Red’s motorway 
coaches and Ribble’s ‘Gay Hostess’ double-deck vehicles. National Express, as 
part of the state-run NBC, had done little to raise the bar of coach travel in terms 
of quality and facilities since its inception in 1972 and British Coachways had 
used basic coaches and fares competition for their network making the passenger 
experience no different from pre-Act days. It was more progressive and 
entrepreneurial firms such as Trathens (West Country) and Cotters (Anglo-
Scottish) that caught the headlines. These firms, and others, saw a gap in the 
market to apply their unique private hire market and customer centric skills to 
provide choice within the market. As such they used a combination of appropriate 
fares and improved passenger facilities to compete. 
 
Through these developments is could be seen that innovation was particularly 
relevant to longer distance services where passengers might logically expect 
higher quality as competition based on frequency was nullified by the distances 
involved. While coach could not compete with rail in terms of speed, it could aim 
to match or better the standards seen in first-class and offer these luxuries at 
fares lower than a standard class rail ticket – the trade-off being time. Figure 13 
summarises competing modes in 1982 for the West Country corridor from Baily 
(1982) and Dean (1983) – at this point Trathens and National Express were co-
operating on services, an arrangement starting in 1981 after an earlier twelve-
month period of direct competition. 
 
Figure 13: Comparison by mode for the London/Plymouth corridor in 1981 
 
Operator / mode O/D pair Time Fare 
Brymon / Air 
Plymouth to London 
1.00 hrs £31.00 
British Rail / Rail 3.75 hrs £21.00 
Trathens / Coach 4.00 hrs £7.00 
 
Trathens, with their London to Plymouth route used advanced European-built 
coaches, featuring ‘at seat’ hostess service, toilets, and video facilities. This level 
of service was hitherto unheard of in the market since the days of the Ribble’s 
Gay Hostess and carved out an immediate and popular niche for the independent 
operator.  
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Trathens were not alone in their discovery of the advantages of capacity 
increases. They, along with Stagecoach, two of the more successful operators in 
the market, introduced double deck coaches to the market and saw immediate 
growth alongside cost efficiencies; regarding the use of these coaches; 
 
“Operators such as Trathens and Stagecoach were quick to see that a 
coach carrying 77 passengers was a cost-effective way of competing with 
established National Express services.” (Brown, 1989, p37). 
 
Other independent firms also saw the advantage of providing higher quality 
vehicles (though often single-deck) with greater reliability, comfort, and aesthetic 
appeal such as Whittle’s Goldhawk service between the West Midlands and 
London. The competition provided to National Express by Whittle’s seeing a 
partnership develop, before eventual absorption of the service into the National 
Express network – something also seen between with Trathens. 
 
Following sustained competition from firms using differentiated and 'up-market' 
products, National Express consolidated the leading innovations in a new product 
- launching ‘Rapide’ in 1982. This new product was largely a result of lessons 
learnt from Trathens' West Country service; where innovation and product 
differentiation, two economic tools allowed by the Act, were used to carve a niche 
in the long-distance market between Devon and London. Following a period of 
intense competition between Plymouth and London an agreement was reached 
to co-ordinate services in 1981. The Trathens’ SkyLiner services were operated 
jointly for a short time before being absorbed fully into the National Express 
network and the luxury service format retained as ‘Rapide’. This was a new sub-
brand of the traditional National Express network that did not necessarily attract 
higher fares as all seats were part of the service (not a section of the vehicle). 
Indeed, higher fares may have left the market open to new 'no-frills' competition 
(something already used by Stagecoach with Magicbus services against SBG 
and Cotters between Glasgow and London). Rapide was quickly rolled out across 
the National Express network - the popular innovation offering first-class rail 
standards and significant passenger comfort improvements over long distances. 
National Express now competed a more equal footing with inter-city rail, and most 
Rapide services also used London as their anchor point. Their success saw 20% 
of all services being Rapide by 1985. 
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3.7.3 The British Rail response 
 
British Rail, nationalised from 1947, already operated a trunk network of high-
speed diesel and electric inter-city routes across the UK at the point of express 
coach deregulation – the first diesel high speed trains (HSTs) operating as the 
branded ‘InterCity 125’ network from 1976 between London and the West before 
being progressively rolled out on other city to city pairs and high-volume corridors. 
 
With a high-speed network in place that also offered two tiers of travel and on-
board catering facilities British Rail offered more than National Express in terms 
of service delivery at the point of deregulation. This network had been a long time 
in the planning, taking nearly 20-years to design, develop and implement. 
However, the initial impact of deregulation in rail was brought by independents 
such as Glennline, Trathens, and Cotters amongst others that attracted 
significant market share away from rail as service delivery was matched with 
lower fares, attracting the time rich passenger groups to coach. For example, 
nearly 40% of Glennline’s and 47% of Len Wright’s passengers came from rail 
(Kent, 1984) and on the Cotter’s Anglo-Scot service 55% were abstracted from 
rail (Wilson, 1982) – these figures higher than abstraction levels from National 
Express (and SBG services for Anglo-Scot). 
 
The initial deregulation response from British Rail focused on fare reductions on 
volume markets. This was in response to revenue losses to coach of £12m in 
1981 and £15m in 1982 and 30% of ‘new’ coach passengers stating that they 
would have made the journey by train (Bleasdale, 1983) and therefore 
representing a loss in journeys to coach. The first response was group save 
tickets. Rail targeted leisure and time rich passenger groups onto trains with 
saver cards that provided up to 33% off the standard ticket price. This had some 
effect in stemming the flow of early losses but did not go far enough, prompting 
a second and more sustained response by British Rail. This focused on single 
saver tickets aimed at utilising spare off-peak capacity and were typically directed 
at journeys that originated in the provinces and terminated in London. The first 
application was on the London to Liverpool market, and in 1981 the 'Supersaver' 
offered return travel for £9.00, a reduction in 50% on standard fares, and 
prompted a 116% volume and 22% revenue growth (Kilvington and Cross, 1986).  
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Although concerns were addressed over the potential for pseudo state support 
for British Rail through the tax payer as a nationalised industry following its 
success on the Liverpool/London route the Supersaver fare was quickly rolled out 
across several corridors that were seeing intensive coach competition. Figures 
from Bleasdale (1983) suggest a strong recovery of lost volume and revenue with 
the fares arguably growing the market as well as competing with coach on these 
corridors by 1981 (in the face of otherwise significant overall loses as noted above 
for 1981 and 1982). 
 
Regarding the express coach market, it can be observed that distance stimulated 
innovation in service standards and on-board facilities – delivered at lower fares 
than equivalent domestic air and first-class rail travel these provided a stronger 
competition than anticipated by rail on corridors such as Devon/London and the 
Anglo-Scot corridor, before fare wars between the modes began fully in 1981. 
 
While concerns over state funded activities may be raised with respect to British 
Rail, it should also be noted that the ability of the dominant coach operator, 
National Express (nationalised at deregulation) to match fares and sustain a fares 
war with both British Coachways and British Rail simultaneously highlights a 
potential flaw in the Act. The demise of several independent services was 
arguably a bi-product of the fierce competition between British Rail and National 
Express and as such arguably state supported. 
 
Through contestability and the removal of regulatory ties the Act had enabled the 
market to ensure that production tended towards efficiency, resulting in a 
potential increase in social-welfare levels. However, this is an outcome contested 
by Douglas regarding the express coach market, instead concluding that while 
social welfare was at best maintained for coach passengers, that of rail 
passengers who saw little change to the network provided was increased due to 
the wider range of ticket products and some enhancements to journey speeds 
made in competitive response. However, one market where rail failed to respond, 
or retake initially lost market share was the London commuter market (from Essex 
and Kent). National Express did not compete with local operators, leaving NBC 
subsidiaries and local operators to compete with slow regional rail services with 
poor connections to emerging city areas such as Docklands 
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3.7.4 Niche market services 
 
The fortunes of independent coach firms in the scheduled express market were 
mixed by the mid-1980s. National Express had maintained and, in some areas, 
grown its market share, and this was aided by innovations such as Rapide as well 
as strong competition with British Rail leaving smaller firms little room to enter the 
market or secure sustainable market entry (Thompson and Whitfield, 1995).  
 
The collapse of the British Coachways network just two years after the Act came 
into effect ensured only piecemeal competition remained - this consisting of spin-
off services by some of the former consortium members and continued operation 
of other niche services by stand-alone independents. In contrast there remained 
varied and sustained competition on the Anglo-Scottish corridor. 
 
Around 23 routes operated by 14 independent firms remained in operation 
beyond the collapse of British Coachways in 1983 and three distinct service types 
had emerged to find a foothold in the market; 
 
1. Services that did not compete on price, instead carving out a niche in the 
market for greater in-vehicle services and capitalising also on their trusted 
status locally. Of the 23 independent routes still running by 1983, eleven 
offered a differentiated product by ‘in-service’ quality and higher vehicle 
specification. These niche market services competed more effectively with 
National Express than British Coachways with the higher quality delivering 
higher loads (Hackett and White, 1981). 
 
2. Airport services had expanded dramatically and were one market where a 
significant choice was offered by National Express and other 
independents. With many airports lacking good rail connections, the long-
distance city to airport market had little inter-modal competition and won 
high market share by offering in many cases the first direct services to 
Heathrow, Gatwick, and Birmingham. For example, prior to the Act only 
3% of air passengers used scheduled coaches from London Heathrow 
(Doganis, 1980) - only the Green Line network had a strong association 
with airports around the London area.  
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As such, the potential rewards from this new market prompted thirteen new 
services by independents at deregulation (Douglas, 1987). Although the 
British Airports Authority made access to London Heathrow difficult, 
causing delays to British Coachways and the Reading/London/Southend 
X1 service due to private road access, equal rights for all operators was 
finally granted and through the later 1980s and into the 1990s the airport 
authority actively supported land transport links and improvements.  
 
Before this change in direction, many services were withdrawn due to 
difficulties in promoting services to irregular air travellers (Douglas, 1987); 
the market, more effectively grown through diverting existing services, 
non-Rapide, through airports (Dean, 1983) and growing the market so that 
coach had captured 30% of the market from the West Midlands and Wales 
to Heathrow alone by 1984 (Astill and White, 1989). 
 
Research in the 1980s by Astill and White proposed that critical thresholds 
for airport use were required to support the full range of feeder transport 
services, such as express coach. At the time London Stansted did not see 
sufficient use but today its growth in use supports competition between 
three operators across seven services to London as well as a host of 
regional links, making in an important network stop but not an interchange 
hub as London Heathrow has now become (Urry, 2011). 
 
3. Some firms concentrated on short inter-urban links that were either 
commuter services to London or short regional city to city links. At 
deregulation these generally fell outside the scope of National Express, an 
example being Oxford to London where City of Oxford (NBC subsidiary) 
ran services prior to deregulation but saw competition from Thames 
Transit’s 'Oxford Tube' (1987) after bus deregulation. The success by 
smaller coach firms in the commuter service category may be due to the 
gap between the deregulation of scheduled coach in 1980 and local bus 
in 1985 but is essentially a phenomenon unique the London catchment 
area. 
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The gap in legislation change, noted above in (3), left many links up to 65 miles 
operated by NBC subsidiaries and, as a result, more vulnerable to independent 
competition. This was because they were not part of a national network and drew 
their usage from the same catchment area as trusted independent firms. This 
was the same nationwide, but the high commuter flows into London and already 
high rail mode share created a perfect storm scenario for emergent coach 
competition with only a small amount of inter-modal shift required to make 
commuter services sustainable – not the case in other major UK cities (Dyer, 
Robbins, White, 1985). Figure 14 highlights the London market in the early 1980s 
showing the coach corridors by scheduled peak departures and 10-mile distance 
bands; the catchment area for London extends typically to 40 miles, but at its 
maximum is 65 miles. 
 
Figure 14: London commuter catchment 1981 (Dyer, Robbins, White, 1985) 
 
 
 
Even though growth was significant, the big bang to stimulate change did not 
come from the 1980 Act itself, but from the rail strikes of 1982 (a similar stimulant 
to the development of the first non-stop express services in the 1920s by Royal 
Blue) and real fare increases in regional rail fares, particularly those into London 
(Dyer, Robbins, White, 1985).  
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Growth and sustainability also depended on network development (such as that 
run by Olsens and latterly Grey-Green) and financial support to establish services 
through initial loss-making periods – something exhibited by NBC subsidiary and 
municipal operator services; such as Reading/London/Southend X1. (Dyer, 
Robbins, and White, 1985). Furthermore, for success by independent firms there 
needed to be inter-peak work available – this was plentiful in London with the 
year-round tourist market, but in other cities the same levels of work did not exist. 
 
3.7.5 Further deregulation and privatisation 
 
The 1985 Transport Act sought to mitigate some of the residual barriers 
experienced by independent market entrants to the market in 1980, such as 
terminal access. At the same time, this new Act set in motion the break-up of the 
NBC through privatisation. Many commentators expected this new injection of 
private ownership to spark renewed competition on long-distance routes in 
tandem with a revitalised local bus market. However, the Act caused many firms 
to leave the long-distance market to focus on the higher gains seen in local bus 
operation – for example Stagecoach. 
 
In parallel to the local bus deregulation process, National Express had begun to 
consolidate its operations, ahead of the potential competition that might arise 
from further industry deregulation. Consolidation focused its network even more 
onto faster motorway links as competition with rail remained intense in the battle 
for off-peak leisure users who, being time rich, were attracted to the low fares that 
the coach now offered, and the improved journey times and on-board services 
offered between principal destinations on Rapide services. However, very few 
cross-country services were developed, due in part to the continued activities of 
NBC subsidiaries before and after local bus deregulation. 
 
This differing approach to trunk and cross-country networks had two effects; (1) 
there was an opportunity to develop new shorter-range services where none 
existed such as commuter services, and; (2) it allowed independent and NBC 
subsidiary activity in this market, preserving long-standing limited stop services 
such as Premier’s Cambridge to London service and those between Cardiff and 
Swansea, as well as NBC’s Oxford to London services operated by South 
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Midland. However, the 1985 Act had further ramifications for the express coach 
market. Not only were NBC local bus subsidiaries gradually privatised, but 
National Express itself was privatised in the first wave of major sell-offs.  
 
By 1988 National Express had been the subject of a management employee buy-
out (MEBO). This MEBO, and the changing nature of local subsidiaries, now 
opened the market for independent firms to operate contracted services under 
the National Express brand. This broke the significant relationship that hitherto 
had been in place with NBC subsidiaries to supply the network and stimulated 
market entry and potential quality increases without seeing on-road competition. 
Privatisation therefore saw the National Express business model move away from 
vertical integration with the business tapping into the private market to find lower 
delivery costs in what was still a contestable market. This change in business 
model had two effects; (1) it sought to remove and prevent direct on-road 
competition with National Express services by independent operators who 
instead would compete for single services or combined service diagrams offered 
to the market by National Express on a cost per mile basis (revenue retained by 
National Express), and; (2) through this competition, National Express brought in 
independent expertise and quality while achieving competitive operating prices 
on a cost per mile basis. 
 
The results of this approach, stimulated by the 1985 Act, was increased 
competition for work, and efficient cost and resource allocation for National 
Express. Independent firms become part of the national network through direct 
contractual relationships with this diminishing the threat of competition from small 
and medium sized firms. In creating an open market place for their contracts, 
National Express themselves created a contestable market which had the 
potential to be close to perfect in nature with operators of all sizes free to enter 
and exit. Of note are sharp fare rises in the late 1980s following the MEBO (White 
2001), which due to the high short-run price elasticity of the market failed to 
increase total revenue for National Express. This also saw a lack of entry by other 
firms which in theory should have made good profits at the same or lower fares. 
This was in contradiction to the assumptions of the deregulation approach 
(contestability) but inactivity was due to the low revenue yield level, remaining 
high sunk costs, and intense rail competition. 
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The deregulation of the domestic inter-city coach market in the UK was a valid 
and worthy attempt to enliven an otherwise declining market. Setting out clear 
policy aims and creating a contestable environment for free-market activity its is 
demonstrable that all policy aims were met in part or in full across the early years 
of deregulation. Competition stimulated advances in the product, entrepreneurs 
aimed to segment the market, and physical technology advanced quickly. 
However, the main benefits to deregulation were seen on the core corridor 
network where journey times and fares fell in addition to frequencies increasing. 
This was important as the market remained highly price-elastic in the short-run 
meaning that passengers were highly susceptible to changes in price. While there 
is plenty of evidence for market entry using a range of strategies, there is also 
evidence to suggest that the dominance of National Express prior to and beyond 
deregulation coupled with residual market entry barriers did affect the long-term 
sustainability of market entry for new firms. Indeed, much new entry was 
conducted in the off-peak coaching season where firms trialled services using 
otherwise redundant resources that were then quickly withdrawn and re-allocated 
following competitive action by the dominant form and the start of the following 
year's touring coach activities. Most success was found when the product was 
differentiated between firms - here new entrants sustained entry for longer 
periods than those who entered the market with parallel products to National 
Express and who competed solely on price. The 'network effect' has also been 
evidenced as important to support long-term sustainability, in-particular its impact 
of efficient vehicle allocation across a range of routes and its ability to ensure 
both directions attract viable passenger loads. While by the end of the 1980s the 
market had settled to a macro level dominant firm oligopoly (and a micro level 
monopoly on many corridors), the Act has seen a general up-turn in coach use, 
a significant increase in service standards, greater choice in destinations served 
and lower fares that remained in check through the decade not least because of 
the competitive threat created by the contestable market environment. 
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Chapter 4 – Medium and long-term effects of the Act 
 
4.1 Overview 
 
Following deregulation and the short-term period of direct competition the market 
settled back to a non-coercive monopoly. However, changes in the market 
structure from that point onwards have more often been prompted by exogenous 
factors in the absence of any further regulatory or legislative change. Technology 
has been one such factor, significant in facilitating new entry, removing residual 
barriers to market entry, and attracting new passengers. It has been this factor 
that has redefined the market to its current traditional oligopoly structure with two 
large firms competing for passengers.  
 
The business model used by National Express following privatisation in the late 
1980s created a private monopsony market in an otherwise non-coercive 
monopoly market structure through the 1990s. This approach helped to protect 
National Express from new competition, with small to medium sized firms 
preferring the lower risk option to serve the dominant operators – being part of 
the network and not competing with it. 
 
Whilst National Express’s business model had allowed it to remain the dominant 
supplier in the market through the 1990s the situation changed in 2003 when 
Stagecoach entered the market with its low-cost, ‘no-frills’ Megabus operation. 
Learning lessons from the airline industry and using yield management, Megabus 
entered the market as a loss-leader with three-years financial support given by 
its parent company to secure sustainable market share. Use of technology to 
raise awareness and remove the need to use traditional 'ticket agents' combined 
with substantial financial support has enabled sustained market entry and 
expansion to new markets, endorsing post-deregulation research that market 
entry requires financial strength, network approach, and product differentiation. 
This was not exhibited by the failed entry of First (Greyhound) in the late 2000s 
but has been seen in Germany and France by current dominant operators in 
those markets. 
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Applying technology to the processes of passenger interaction, capacity 
management and price setting has seen costly overheads removed from the 
market and raised the potential for low-cost market entry. Use of technology in 
this way following the emergence of Megabus saw National Express and 
independents quickly react with similar systems to keep pace. Operating with an 
internet only booking policy, Megabus tapped into technology savvy passenger 
groups and enticed travellers with minimum fares of £1, winning market share 
and creating a platform for innovation. 
 
While competition between inter-city coach and rail continues alongside that of 
trunk corridor competition between National Express and Megabus there has 
been little, if any, further entry into the long-distance market by smaller firms save 
for some niche market operations such as New Bharat serving the Asian 
community. However, the airport sector has contradicted this. Firms such as 
EasyBus, Terravision, Stansted CityLink, Oxford CityLink, Greenline, and Airport 
Bus Express have all challenged National Express on the regional airport/London 
market, forcing changes in the supply of airport coach capacity and some exits 
after fare and frequency responses by National Express.  
 
Market structure has evolved from 1990 to the present day. An imperfectly 
competitive structure gave way to dominant firm oligopoly (late 1980s) and then 
again to non-coercive monopoly (1990s). However, the entry of Megabus has 
moved the market back to a situation between these states at a macro level. 
However, on isolated corridors (Oxford and the West Country) and distinct 
markets (airport services) micro level differences in structure are evident and 
range from duopolies through to imperfectly competitive markets. 
 
Most recently technology has stimulated potential change in the market. 'Virtual' 
operators, like Sn-ap. are using digital technology to create a demand-led inter-
city network. Using crowd-sourcing and journey matching technology (similar to 
Uber), to create routes, third party contractors drawn from the smaller sized firm 
pool then run services. This new entry may make the buyer a price maker and 
has potential to move the market towards imperfect, or even perfect, competition 
if early ventures weather competition.  
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4.2 Deregulation – the 1990s 
 
By the 1990s the market structure had moved to a position of non-coercive 
monopoly following a decade of movement from controlled monopoly, imperfect 
competition, and dominant firm oligopoly. In this new decade National Express 
remained dominant across the UK and lived side-by-side with small pockets of 
sustained but non-harmful independent competition. This small market of 
medium to long-distance daily services being separate from additional London 
commuter and airport services that were also in operation at the same time. In 
the long-distance market, a competitive equilibrium was being maintained - 
contestability remained but was felt by all firms within the market (e.g. Primrose 
Motor’s service seeing new entry competition from another Herefordshire 
independent, Yeoman’s Canyon, before being forced to leave the market - the 
latter then being absorbed into the National Express network - becoming a third-
party operator).  
 
Figure 15: UK Long-distance independent operators at 1989/90 
 
Operator Route Started Ended Duration 
National Express Network / 70% share 1972 ongoing ongoing 
Armstrong Galley North-East / London 1984 1992 c8-years 
Bakers Dolphin West Country / London 1983 2013 c20-years 
Bere Regis / Bluebird Dorset / London 1984 2007 c12 years 
Berry’s Superfast West Country / London 1983 ongoing ongoing 
City of Oxford / Go-Ahead Oxford / London 1972 ongoing ongoing 
Elsey’s Coaches / TransLinc Lincolnshire / London 1980 2007 c27-years 
Excelsior Coaches Bournemouth / London 1988 1998 c10-years 
Hoggs Coaches / Brylaine Lincolnshire / London 1980 2001 c21-years 
Len Wright / Skyliner Int’l Manchester / London 1982 1989 c7-years 
London Liner (LT/ WMPTE) Birmingham / London 1986 1995 c9-years 
Primrose Motors Herefordshire / London 1983 1997 c14-years 
Silver Choice / First Group Scotland / London 1980 2012 c32-years 
Swanbrook Cheltenham / London 1980 ongoing* ongoing* 
Thames Transit** Oxford / London 1987 ongoing ongoing 
Whippet Coaches Cambridge / London 1980 2003 c23-years 
Yeoman’s Canyon Hereford / London 1991 1994 c3-years 
 
Note: * - now truncated to serve only Cheltenham to Oxford. ** - now part of the 
Stagecoach Group and operated as The Oxford Tube. 
 
 
In the 1989/90 period the market consisted of at least 16 firms providing 
competition to the dominant market supplier, National Express (this reduced to 
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15 from 1990). Ten of these entrants had commenced services in 1982/83 or later 
– a period in which initial fierce competition had subsided and arguably allowed 
these new entrants to find gaps and niche opportunities - leading to longer 
sustainability for most entrants. Through the 1990s the market was operating as 
a non-coercive monopoly structure, observing the following conditions: 
 
 A dominant supplier in the market makes price and production decisions; 
 
 There is an upper limit to pricing - if breached profits may erode (the inter-
city coach market is highly price-elastic, limiting total revenue despite an 
upper limit, and profitability depends on costs as below); 
 
 Excessive pricing or too lower quality will see new competition enter the 
market; 
 
 If price and quality remain acceptable, the market is an efficient monopoly; 
 
 Production costs cannot be met by new entry in an efficient monopoly; 
 
 The dominant firm can charge a lower price and still be profitable, and; 
 
 Competition is possible but seldom occurs as few can enter at low cost. 
 
This market structure is demonstrated by activities in this medium-term period. 
While settled, the passenger market remained cost conscious. Substantial fare 
increases by National Express in the early 1990s lead to a negative reaction by 
passengers and a pegging back of journey totals to deregulation levels (circa 
10m) by 1993.  
 
While passengers quickly moved away from National Express in this period, this 
move towards potentially excessive profit making did not stimulate new market 
entry as would be expected under contestable market conditions. Instead, due to 
the high short-run price elasticity of the market, normal profits remained even with 
higher fares, therefore failing to alert potential entrants to the opportunities 
available. A review of fares after the flotation of the FTSE 200 Index as a public 
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limited company (plc) saw fare cuts revive passenger numbers to their former 
state by 2002 as National Express became even more profit and dividend 
focused. 
 
The non-coercive monopoly structure also explains why fare increases did not 
stimulate competition. Although National Express pushed prices (fares) above an 
acceptable ceiling for passengers, on-road production costs were still low 
preventing new market entry as other firms could not match or reduce production 
costs. Additionally, internal competition for National Express work through its 
private monopsony market stopped these firms (who had the likely capacity to 
becoming innovators) from entering the market as own-branded operations. 
Competition instead entered the market with alternative modes (rail and air) and 
passengers moved to these or did not travel. 
 
At this time smaller firms found entry and operation easier in the deregulated bus 
market. This allowed cheaper vehicles and similar crew resources to be used 
more efficiently. Though lower speeds than express coach saw fewer seat miles 
per vehicle-hour operated, the higher load factors and the ease of attracting 
ridership made this market a better proposition with success also due to 
continued long-distance rail competition and the monopsony market that National 
Express had created with its business model. 
 
The late 1990s saw the market maintain a settled and contestable structure. 
National Express operated several brand identities seeking to segment markets 
- linking fares to service attributes. Brands were: National Express (core network), 
Rapide (up-market long-distance services), FlightLink (long-distance airport), 
SpeedLink and JetLink (short-range airport services), and Express Shuttle (high 
frequency inter-urban links with a 100-mile range). 
 
The medium and long-term periods in Scotland have contrasted slightly to that of 
England and Wales with mergers and acquisitions heavily shaping the landscape. 
Scottish CityLink, formed in 1985 and operated to the same monopsony style 
business model as National Express following its privatisation, was itself the 
subject of a MEBO in 1990. The network remained intact, but contracts operated 
by independents grew quickly, aided by the wider privatisation of the Scottish bus 
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market. Some former SBG subsidiaries were acquired by Stagecoach who 
quickly launched new inter-urban express services in competition with CityLink, 
relinquishing CityLink contracts in many cases. CityLink was then purchased by 
National Express in 1993 seeing all Anglo-Scottish services fall under the UK 
branding and CityLink forming the domestic network. The market structure was 
like the UK, a dominant firm oligopoly with some limited independent activity 
remaining across Scotland. National Express was forced to divest itself of the 
domestic network when it won the rail franchise for ScotRail upon privatisation, 
selling CityLink to the Comfort DelGro Group in 1998. 
 
Through the 1990s two important sub-markets remained strong. Airport services 
were one of the notable successes of the Act and continued to operate to high 
frequencies with London airports the focus for this activity. National Express was 
dominant in this market segmenting the market into brands and competing on the 
Cambridge corridor until an amalgamation with Cambridge Coach Services 
occurred. London commuter services were also popular. They represented a low-
cost alternative to rail which was still heavily congested and expensive. The 
success of coach services in Kent saw a mixed level approach with higher priced 
The Kings Ferry services operating against lower cost services provided by 
Travel Rite, North Kent Express and The King’s Ferry’s own low-cost brand, The 
London Link, until the end of the 1990s. At the same time First Group (as 
Thamesway) were operating on the south Essex corridor to Southend every 30 
minutes and competing with Green Line coach services and the municipal 
operator as well as local rail – this situation occurring for several years. Today 
this coaching corridor has almost completely disappeared - being served only 
once a day by National Express. 
 
With the market across the UK in a period of stability, two processes were 
occurring at a low-level, one an unintentional bi-product of the free market created 
by deregulation, and the other in stark contrast – delivering what the Government 
had intended but only in very small quantities: 
 
 Firstly, although started in the 1980s as a reaction to competition seen on 
some core corridors, increased rationalisation of the network (removing 
intermediate points) occurred through the 1990s as continued market 
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freedoms shaped the market further. This concentrated resources to areas 
where profit levels could be maximised (a result of plc creation), often with 
demand being higher than existing supply in relation to resources used 
and where rail posed the greatest level of competition over long distances 
such that this active competition may dissuade any new market entry. 
While deregulation brought lower fares, higher frequencies, and improved 
quality, Douglas (1987) challenges the theory that free markets create 
greater social welfare, asking instead if a ‘net reduction’ in social welfare, 
was caused by the 1980 Act whose end results after an early competitive 
phase were the reallocation of resources and a largely single supplier 
scenario. In respect of this point, Kilvington and Cross (1980) and Cole 
(1998) note that most competition and improvement to service was to be 
found on city to city routes, and that whilst trunk, city to city services were 
greatly improved in terms of frequency, quality and pricing structure 
(providing a net benefit) the wide ranging ‘retrenchment’ of National 
Express’s resources had left many settlements, those between 20,000 and 
100,000 people, to be ‘adversely affected’ with lower service frequencies 
and fewer links on the secondary (cross-country) network. Therefore, in 
this way the aims of the Government to create choice through competition 
had given way to a situation in which inter-modal competition was 
determining the shape of the network, removing travel options where costs 
to serve these locations outweighed economic gain (even given the 
‘network effect’) and new entrants failed to materialise with coach/rail 
competition keeping fares in check within a price elastic market; and,  
 
 Secondly, some corridors were not a non-coercive monopoly, instead 
operating to policy intentions. This was due to continuing independent 
activity being sustained in isolated areas. One example was the West 
Country corridor which at deregulation was an oligopoly, with various 
coach firms and rail being suppliers to the large number of buyers. An 
oligopoly allows product differentiation, and in the short-term period, both 
Trathens and British Coachways demonstrated this together with National 
Express and Glennline. While some operators exited early, the 
oligopolistic nature of the market, distances involved, cost differentials 
between modes, and product variation all combined for more sustained 
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success by a host of companies. In the medium-term due to further 
mergers and an improved rail product the competitive corridor shrunk to 
focus on the M4 which continued to represent an oligopoly with National 
Express competing with Berry’s (Superfast), Bakers-Dolphin, and rail 
services. Additionally, the Oxford-London corridor continues to be an 
example of a very strong duopoly (close to a Chamberlin duopoly) – a 
situation preventing National Express entering the market and seeing the 
two firms in the market operate, providing choice and innovation away of 
the dominant UK provider. 
 
4.3 Deregulation – 2000 to 2010 
 
By 2000 the market for express coach travel across England and Wales was 
stable. In Scotland however, examples of cross-country competition persisted 
into 2000. Although owned by Comfort DelGro from 1998, CityLink, the dominant 
firm, competed with independents such as Parks of Hamilton and West Coast 
Motors. However, in the early 2000s some independents began to jointly operate 
services (e.g. West Coast Motors) or run franchised diagrams (e.g. Parks of 
Hamilton) with CityLink in addition to their own services and a period of stability 
followed and save for some localised activity, competition was restricted to 
regional rail. However, on the Anglo-Scot market National Express was dominant 
- competing with Silver Choice (an independent overnight service), rail and air.  
 
Long-distance competition in England and Wales was confined to the West 
Country corridor and, only early in the 2000s, the south coach and east coast: 
 
 Bakers Dolphin (West Country to London) – ceased 2013; 
 Bere Regis (Dorset to London) – ceased c2007 (as Bluebird Coaches); 
 Berry’s Superfast (West Country to London) – still in operation; and, 
 Elsey’s (Lincolnshire to London) – ceased in 2007 (as TransLinc). 
 
The most significant competition to the National Express network remained on 
the West Country corridor where two significant competing services provided very 
different issues for National Express with their strong home markets and 
continued use of in-service refreshments and luxury feel – a significant 
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differentiation given National Express’s decision to drop this level of service 
across the network. Both competitors also made good use of kerb-side stops and 
one, Berry’s, uses Hammersmith as the London terminus to make journey times 
faster and more reliable. 
 
Additional to these longer distance markets a short-range corridor continued to 
thrive, not only following deregulation and through the 1990s, but also through 
the 2000s and to the present day.  The Oxford/London corridor has always been 
fertile coach territory. Having seen significant competition with up to eighteen 
service providers ahead of the 1930 Act, the market, although reduced to two 
providers for over 80 years as continued to operate under intense competition. 
The Oxford/London market is the most intense commercial coach corridor in 
Europe and operates as a duopoly between Oxford Tube (Stagecoach) and the 
X90 (Go-Ahead Group). Services compete intensely 24-hours a day, in contrast 
to the heavily peaked commuter networks operated between London and Kent. 
At their height, the combined services provide a headway of every 8 minutes 
between London and Oxford and upwards of 375 seats per hour. With both 
companies being part of much larger international transport groups, the rate of 
service innovation and expansion is impressive and includes free WiFi, higher 
capacity coaches and increased passenger legroom.  
 
Their combined activities leave little or no room for new market entry, due to this 
innovation and frequency, and fare levels - with some trips being offered at rates 
as low as £1 single on the Oxford Tube. 
 
Competition between the Oxford operators has also expanded to the airport 
market where both have periodically competed between Oxford, Heathrow, and 
Gatwick, though currently only one (Go-Ahead) serves the airports. In a wider 
sense the lucrative airport market discovered through the 1980 Act still grows. 
National Express runs numerous services to all the London airports and 
competes with Green Line (Luton) and Airport Bus Express (Stansted), as well 
as guaranteeing a proportion of seats for EasyBus passengers (this firm formerly 
competed with all other operators using mini-van style vehicles but found market 
entry at this level unsustainable due to fierce competition and too smaller 
vehicles). 
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From 2000 to 2010 sub-markets have had contrasting fortunes. The airport 
market (above) has seen a substantive increase in competitive activity on some 
corridors. In a bid to simplify its competitive product and ensure a singular 
network National Express rationalised to a single brand in 2000, removing 
branded airport services and only distinguishing them by route number prefixes. 
This helped to protect the long-distance to/from airport market and little to no 
competition on such services to Heathrow and Gatwick was seen across the 
decade. This, however, contrasted with very heavy competition for passengers 
between London and the regional 'low-cost airline' airports, such as Luton and 
Stansted.  
 
The commuter coach market, however, has sat juxtaposed to the airport market 
although remaining between imperfect competition and oligopoly through the 
2000s. During this period The Kings Ferry (TKF) dominated in North Kent with 
competition from several firms falling away. However, some remained (e.g. 
Chalkwell (now withdrawn) and Redwing), even after acquisition of TKF by 
National Express (2007). Such was the brand recognition of TKF that National 
Express retained this, instead seeking new market gains through product and 
fares innovation that competed with rail.  
 
4.4 Megabus, technology and beyond 2010 
 
In 2003, new competition emerged from Stagecoach - branded Megabus. Its 
business model replicated that of the ‘low-cost, no-frills’ airlines (Southwest 
Airlines (USA) and EasyJet (UK)), using internet only booking and real-time 
management of capacity and fares (yield management). The market was also 
seeing continued competition from the rail network - fully privatised since 1997 
and seeing aggressive moves by new train operating companies (TOCs) to 
maintain and increase market share inherited from British Rail.  
 
One innovation that helped the 'new' rail market present a significant benefit to 
existing and potential passengers was the simplification of journey planning and 
ticket purchase, brought about by ‘thetrainline.com’ – a Virgin Trains initiative 
launched in 1999 (Fisher and Walton, 2001). This provided a single use web 
portal for the planning and booking of tickets between two locations which may 
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span more than one TOC. The portal offered comparisons on ticket prices and 
journey times, showed routes with and without connections, and allowed on-line 
payment for tickets as well as collection at any station. 
 
National Express had been using a basic website since 1995, providing simple 
journey planning and fares information. This also allowed real-time ticket sales 
though this was not widely used at the time with traditional ticket sales channels 
(on-street, station ticket agents and telesales) preferred by passengers. With 
increased rail competition and a rapidly moving ‘dot.com’ market a need was 
identified by National Express in 2000 to react to competition, which would (Fisher 
and Walton, 2001): 
 
 compete with increasingly sophisticated dot.com travel sites;  
 targeted the ‘tech-savvy' and increasingly mobile internet population; 
 create a website that would become a core ‘direct sales’ channel; 
 generate new sales and reduce costs of commission based channels; 
 create a web site that would encapsulate and represent all sub-brands; 
 compete with the trainline.com. 
 
GobyCoach.com was the result - launched in late 2000 at a fraction of the cost of 
thetrainline.com it provided an updated sales channel required to compete in the 
market. GobyCoach.com generated sales revenue over £0.5m after just ten-
months; reduced costs lost to commission (5% of each ticket) for on-street agents 
by £241,000; saw 195,000 bookings made; saw average on-line ticket sale prices 
of £26.00; registered 23.3m ‘hits’ (120 hits per booking), and; saw internet ticket 
sales more than double the launch figure by the peak in winter operation. Figure 
16 shows its impact in terms of being a channel for internet sales and is tracked 
against the former website offering. 
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Figure 16: National Express internet ticket sales revenue from 1997-2001 
 
 
 
This new channel and significant growth helped National Express to compete 
effectively with the TOCs and prepared it for new competition. By 2003 the use 
of GobyCoach.com for ticket sales had seen a year on year increase of 50% and 
in the same year Megabus, a Stagecoach innovation and re-entry into a market 
vacated in 1989, launched. The business model was based on internet only ticket 
sales, removing costly ticket offices and telesales teams, and using ‘no-frills’ 
vehicles with kerb-side stops to achieve low-cost fares. Developments in e-
commerce technology enabled market entry but the parent group also provided 
three-years financial support - allowing early losses to establish market share – 
differing from deregulation day approaches. 
 
Using yield management techniques and forcing competitors to use the same 
approaches, Megabus re-ignited the market place, creating competition on key 
corridors with real-time changes to each operator’s fare product and closely 
matched departure times. The market structure also changed; National Express 
once the dominant firm in a non-coercive monopoly (and most corridors an 
efficient monopoly) became one of two firms on each main city pairing – market 
entry being possible through Megabus' use of e-commerce to lower fixed cost 
overheads and exploit a condition of a non-coercive monopoly - ‘low production 
costs’ - something not being achieved by National Express and therefore opening 
the possibility for new entry. Competition was not representative of a duopoly as 
each firm did not match the quantity supplied by the other firm, as a result, the 
market moved back to a dominant firm oligopoly. At the time National Express 
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still maintained the higher share, over 50%, and influenced prices, albeit often as 
a reaction to Megabus. Through the 2000s, and beyond 2010, increasing 
competition from Megabus and expansion into new markets such as the west of 
England and major airports such as Heathrow, Gatwick and Manchester have 
seen the market structure move further towards a straight forward oligopoly state.  
 
Megabus initially focused on key north-south and east-west routes, using London 
and Birmingham hubs and launching with old vehicles akin to Anglo-Scot routes 
at deregulation and its Magicbus response to competition in 1989 between 
London and Glasgow. Using its widespread UK bus operations as the source of 
maintenance, stabling, and driver resources it quickly established a skeletal 
network linking Cornwall, central England, the north, and Scotland. Competition 
was focused on fares, similar to British Coachways in the early 1980s, but has 
increasingly switched to capacity in recent years. In response to the Megabus' 
initially low fares in 2003 and ‘50p online booking fee’ National Express launched 
internet only ‘fun-fares’ – these were sold at very low cost but had significant 
restrictions on use, were not refundable or transferable and targeted specific 
services and journeys where National Express was seeing significant competition 
or had the available seat capacity.  
 
Megabus not only entered the long-distance market in England. In 2004 it 
competed heavily on the domestic Scottish network with CityLink. High 
competitive attrition focused on fares and matched service levels using the 
Megabus and Motorvator (Edinburgh/Glasgow) brands caused a joint venture to 
be agreed in Scotland between CityLink (Comfort DelGro) and Stagecoach 
(parent company of Megabus and Motorvator). This consolidated the network at 
a stroke, moved the market to a near monopoly, and saw fares on some corridors 
rise. However, following a competition commission enquiry (Competition 
Commission, 2006) Stagecoach was forced to divest some CityLink routes. 
Park’s of Hamilton, a founder member of British Coachways, took on these 
services, albeit branded as CityLink and part of a co-ordinated network. 
Domestically, the market has now settled to a predominant duopoly structure. 
Megabus competes on all main city pairings with the CityLink network which 
retains its contracting business model and sees a mix of Stagecoach, Parks and 
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Comfort DelGro operated services run alongside contracted route run by notable 
independents (such as West Coast Motors). 
 
A significant contributing factor to Megabus' success was the original business 
plan. Stagecoach Group provided financial support for the operation over the first 
three years, effectively allowing losses to be made to secure a long-term foothold 
in the market. Megabus was a typical ‘loss-leader’ business in this respect – 
significantly different from all other market entry attempts seen since 1980. Using 
this approach, the Megabus network reached a point of break-even during 2007 
and profit thereafter - consistent with the planned outcome by the parent company 
(Robbins and White, 2012). 
 
Following profitability and a secured market position Stagecoach has invested 
significantly in fleet renewal and further network expansion. The operation has 
grown strategically, increasing market share and quickly gaining a reputation for 
innovation. It was the first inter-city operator to use 15m coaches on its network 
following relaxation of laws regarding maximum vehicle lengths and pioneered 
overnight sleeper travel on Anglo-Scot services using articulated coaches.  
 
Its latest operations model has seen a move to a centralised vehicle and staffing 
operation from Rugby with far less dependence on outstations and in contrast to 
National Express' continued third-party model. This has created a denser network 
focus which is operated with very limited outsourcing of services 
(London/Norwich, Birmingham/Norwich) and additional capacity from third party 
operators such as Hamilton's where required. However, in 2017 a unique 
partnership was formed with South Gloucestershire Bus and Coach (SGBC) 
following their hand-back of National Express diagrams. A co-ordination 
agreement with Stagecoach was struck to run services in the West of England 
against National Express using Megabus branding but with SGBC taking revenue 
risk. This expansion brought Megabus into the airport market for the first time, 
stimulating it to divert own-operated services from cities in Scotland and the North 
of England to Manchester Airport. Significant competitive retaliation from National 
Express in terms of fares and service levels has now seen the SGBC services 
withdrawn (summer of 2018) and the South Wales/London Airports route run in-
house by Stagecoach Megabus. 
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The Anglo-Scottish market has been continued to see competition between 
National Express and Megabus. Between 2013 and 2017 Megabus introduced 
the Gold network offering a step-change in on-board customer service and 
facilities. This looked to segment the market using differing levels of quality 
between Megabus products. Gold overnight sleeper services used uniquely 
developed (fully flatbed) coaches and following initial high interest the financial 
case for the services failed and Gold was discontinued. However, competition 
remains significant with both operators rationalising services to invest in higher 
core frequencies and larger vehicles.  
 
In contrast to Megabus' success during the same period was First Group. 
Through their ownership and operation of the iconic Greyhound network in the 
USA, First Group attempted to introduce the brand to the UK in 2009 with the 
intention of securing its own share of the inter-city travel market. The first services 
focused on the south coast, hitherto untapped by Megabus despite Stagecoach’s 
large local bus presence in the area. Greyhound provided London/Southampton 
and London/Portsmouth services, with rapid expansion including London/Isle of 
Wight (connecting with Red Funnel ferries). All coaches included WiFi and 
increased legroom, the latter a differential from National Express and Megabus 
but putting financial strain on revenue with fewer seats available for sale. For the 
first time in the market, social media was used extensively for real-time 
information and ‘flash’ travel offers. 
 
Although initial success was seen, further expansion only occurred on a 
piecemeal basis. The overnight Anglo-Scottish service to London, acquired by 
First on the take-over of Silver Choice Coaches was ‘converted’ to Greyhound as 
was the short distance service between Cardiff and Swansea. These later 
expansions did not, however, constitute a cohesive network and were moreover 
an approach to quickly rejuvenate existing, tired services and brands. This was a 
critical mistake, as the development of a network with hub locations had already 
been shown as a requirement to ensure a significant share of the market. With 
contestability allowing quick reaction to new entry, the existing firms reacted to 
the competition by improving frequencies and lowering fares on comparable 
routes in the weeks before Greyhound launched. As a result, strong competition 
on the south coast from National Express, and on Scottish the corridor by all 
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modes saw these services cease by 2012. Prior to its cessation, decentralisation 
to regional subsidiaries for daily operation, the opposite to the approach seen at 
Megabus, failed to see the operation react favourably to the competition, with 
Greyhound finally ceasing as a continuing market entry attempt in 2015 - though 
the brand remained in use on the Cardiff to Swansea service for a few months 
prior to this service being re-branded once more by First Group. 
 
While market entry across the long-distance UK network has had mixed fortunes 
the markets for regional airport and short-range commuter services have seen 
some growth. Due to significant demand for travel and competition for 
passengers some regional airports have tendered terminal capacity to operators, 
creating a competitive environment in which to guarantee long-term prime market 
positions – this has forced innovation, reliability, and high frequency services but 
has contained competition, potentially dampening the welfare benefits that 
competition could bring. 
 
While the commuter coach market has remained competitive around parts of 
London, attempts to replicate the model elsewhere have largely failed, even with 
financial support such as Avonmouth/Bristol. However, competition remains 
between North Kent and London though the recent acquisition of Clarkes, an 
operator of Kent commuter services and significant tourist work in London by 
National Express, has consolidated the market. Notwithstanding this, notable 
independents such as Redwing, Centaur Travel, Buzz-Lines and Brookline, 
provide services - mixing commuter and inter-peak tourist work to sustain the 
routes. However, Chalkwell, a long-standing commuter coach operator has 
recently left the market citing falling passenger numbers and rising costs. Enough 
competition remains though to ensure the market is between oligopoly and 
imperfect competition at the micro level. Outside of Kent limited commuter 
services are operated (such as Leighton Buzzard/London by Marshalls) and only 
a small Green Line network remains. In contrast to Kent, the Essex 
(Southend/London) market has all but ceased following improvements to rail 
service conditions and now Southend and London are only connected once daily 
by National Express. 
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4.4 Overall financial performance of National Express 
 
Between 2000 and 2017 National Express, although challenged strongly by rail, 
Megabus (from 2003) and minor market incursions, has remained the firm in the 
free-market for inter-city coach services with the largest market share. Figure 17 
below tracks the profitability and passenger data for National Express from 1999 
to 2017, bringing up to date information from Robbins and White (2011) using 
information sourced from the firm's annual reports; 
 
Figure 17: National Express Profits and Passengers 1999-2017 
 
Financial 
Year (end) 
Passengers 
(million) 
Turnover (£ 
million) 
Turnover at 
2017 prices* 
Operating 
profit (£m) 
Operating 
margin % 
1999 19 168.2 276.2 11.0 6.5 
2000 22 186.8 298.0 11.2 6.0 
2001 17 181.3 287.2 10.6 5.8 
2002 17 184.5 283.9 12.2 6.6 
2003 17 186.4 279.0 15.9 8.5 
2004 18 195.6 282.9 19.3 9.9 
2005 No figure available 200.5 283.8 21.5 10.7 
2006 19 207.3 280.9 23.7 11.4 
2007 19 231.0 300.9 23.1 10.0 
2008 22 244.7 315.7 27.0 11.0 
2009 21 242.9 306.1 34.3 14.1 
2010 17 250.3 301.0 32.0 12.8 
2011 17 259.1 297.3 34.9 13.5 
2012 17 255.1 283.9 20.6 8.1** 
2013 18 263.5 285.7 24.5 9.3 
2014 19 275.2 293.6 28.0 10.2 
2015 19 281.2 296.4 32.3 11.5 
2016 20 282.8 290.8 33.3 11.8 
2017 20 287.8*** 287.8 34.2 11.9 
 
Source - figures 1999-2009 Robbins and White (2011), figures 2010-2017 National Express 
PLC Annual Reports. All information is for National Express only and includes long and short-
range services (inc hotel hoppa) – with up to 33% of all figures and being airport coach links. 
* Adjusted using RPI Factor.   
** Drop in margin due to the withdrawal of concessionary income from free travel for over 60s, 
removed from non-local bus services in 2011 (National Express, 2012) 
*** 3% drop over expected revenue due to terrorism in 2017 and effects to travel and tourism. 
Revenue Management System rolled out in 2017 and driving up coach occupancy by 5.5%. It 
helped revenue growth by 2% and offset a -3% decline in revenue due to terrorism.  
 
The data above shows the largely static totals for passenger journeys across the 
period, with an overall change of only 5%, though National Express' (Coach) profit 
as tripled and its operating margin doubled over the same period. Revenue has 
increased by 71% but at 2017 prices this difference reduces to 4% across the 
period. Overall low growth masks a significant rise in the market for airport 
services, up to 33% of National Express' business, and the substantive gains on 
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key corridors such as South Coast, Bristol and South Wales to/from London. In 
terms of deregulation success and market health analysis of the data suggests 
efficiencies have been found by National Express in response to competition. 
While overall passenger numbers have remained stable, these efficiencies have 
seen increased choice in journey times, a geographic network maintained with 
core corridors seeing most resource, and low fares. The latter point is explained 
by the low level, in real-terms, of the change in turn-over and demonstrates that 
the firm is remaining within normal profit levels. These results are symptomatic of 
al firms in the market and as such contestability is in evidence. All firms are leanly 
operating close to capacity, cognisant of potential competition and not at levels 
which would see current competition erode each firms' market share. New entry 
by 'virtual' operators such as Sn-ap may impact further on this position with 
margins likely to reduce in response to further competitive action. 
  
123 
 
Chapter 5 – Liberalisation case study: Sweden  
 
5.1 Overview 
 
Sweden has a population density of 23.1 people per square kilometre over a land 
mass of circa 450,000 square kilometres. Population growth levels are largely 
static and there is an aging population. The country is rural in nature and heavily 
forested with most economic and residential activity focused on the south and 
east in the capital, Stockholm, the west coast at Gothenburg, and to the south 
near Helsingborg and Malmö, both close to the Danish capital of Copenhagen. 
 
The rail network across Sweden is more expansive than that of Norway (see 
Chapter 6) with 12,821km of track, of which 1,152km is double track and 67% 
electrified (Spaven, 1993). The system provides lines from the south to the north 
of the country with all major cities connected by regional rail services. In the 
south, a network of high speed (200km/hr) lines connect the principal cities of 
Malmö, Helsingborg, Gothenburg, Ostersund, Sundsvall, and Uppsala with 
Stockholm. 
 
There is a history of successive levels of fragmentation and decentralisation 
across Sweden’s public transport sector. Prior to 1988, the rail network across 
Sweden - Statens Järnvägar (SJ) was operated wholly by the state. However, 
with rising operational costs, low levels of use, and reported deficits linked to 
infrastructure and maintenance costs the Swedish government broke-up SJ Rail, 
separating infrastructure and operations in 1988 (Spaven, 1993). This process 
was the originator of mandated EU directives that required the same vertical 
separation in each member state through EU Directive 91/440 - stimulating UK 
privatisation and Norwegian re-structuring. While there were commonalities with 
the privatisation approach used in the UK, the Swedish model took a far greater 
interest in maintaining social, economic, and environmental welfare - ensuring 
that privatisation was kept closely within the confines of local government control 
and co-ordination of public transport (Spaven, 1993). 
 
The process opened train operations to market forces through competitive 
tendering and the privatisation of the local rail network. The process took thirteen 
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years and has seen the gradual dismantling of SJ into separate businesses 
resulting in a mixed landscape of state and private companies. The state still 
owns and maintains infrastructure while local passenger services are 
competitively tendered where commercial operation is not possible; a mix of 
private rail companies operate these and the state SJ operates the largest share. 
 
Of the remaining modes in Sweden, domestic air services were fully liberalised 
in 1992, followed a year later by a partial liberalisation of the express coach 
industry in 1993 (Jansson et al, 1997). The driver for change, as with rail above, 
was the ability to create competition, move cost and risk to the private sector, and 
increase social welfare through greater choice, lower fares, and innovation. 
 
Being fully deregulated, the express coach market has represented a viable and 
competitive alternative mode for some years in Sweden, particularly in areas 
where rail is limited. While domestic air is the quickest mode, it is the most 
expensive. Rail travel is slower and cheaper than air with average fare costs per 
kilometre between 0.1 and 0.15 Euros, but still twice that of long-distance coach 
which typically sees fares closer to 0.05 or 0.06 Euros per kilometre (Andersson, 
2001). 
 
5.2 The market before liberalisation 
 
Prior to deregulation long distance coach services across Sweden were limited, 
unlike the UK. Considered harmful to the state operated rail network, attempts to 
enter the market were nearly all blocked by SJ. However, to complement the rail 
network SJ ran some coach services, creating a ‘network effect’ for rail 
(Alexandersson, 2009). The definition of a long-distance coach service in 
Sweden remains that of a service operating over 100km in length and crossing 
at least one county border and aligned in form with inter-regional rail. Use of 
services that were provided just prior to deregulation totalled 170m passenger 
km in 1992. During the same period, rail journeys were recorded at 5,351m 
passenger km and domestic air as 2,879m passenger km. Therefore, the coach 
share was 2% of all passenger km operated (Jansson et al, 1997).  
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Sweden employed a two-stage process for the deregulation of express coach 
services. The first stage of deregulation took place in 1993, at the same time as 
competitive tendering for tracks and all non-profitable inter-regional rail lines 
began. This stage focused on reversing the burden of proof from coach (having 
to prove any services was of no detriment to the rail network) to rail (SJ needing 
to prove that the planned coach service would affect the viability of existing rail) 
(Jansson et al, 1997). 
 
This first stage saw early gains in passengers and revenue for express coach 
services - seeing an increase in the supply of coach service km of 39% by 1996 
(Jansson et al, 1997). Coach firms, who no longer had to prove they would not 
damage rail services, saw increases in passengers and revenues from time-rich 
passengers whereas rail saw a passenger loss (Van de Velde, 2009). This modal 
shift took place due to lower fares and increased competition with inter-regional 
rail services and between the large numbers of new coach services that had 
commenced (Nordenlöw and Alexandersson, 1999). Seeing the potential for 
market expansion as deregulation made progressive steps to being fully realised, 
a notable UK commercial operator, Stagecoach, bought Swebus AB from the 
Swedish State Railway (SJ) in 1996.  
 
This operation comprised routes across Scandinavia and created a potential 
spring board for the company to expand further in bus, coach, and rail. However, 
failure to secure new contracts and the limited scope of the acquired routes in 
Norway and Denmark led Stagecoach to quickly sell operations outside of 
Sweden, itself quickly branded into Stagecoach Swebus in 1997 using the same 
livery as applied to its UK operations. This also coincided with a significant 
marketing and fares promotion campaign seeing rapid growth in passengers 
largely at the expense of regional rail.  
 
The market structure ahead of deregulation can be observed as a state controlled 
monopoly. This gave way during the first stage of deregulation to an imperfectly 
competitive market which moved quickly to a dominant firm oligopoly where 
Swebus was the largest operator in the market but still with barriers linked to rail 
holding some control over routes and market supply. 
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5.3 The market since liberalisation 
 
Sweden is now a completely deregulated market (Van de Velde, 2009). Taking 
place over a six-year period and in parallel with elements of rail privatisation, full 
deregulation, the second stage in the process, took place in 1999. This coincided 
with capacity improvements on Sweden’s regional and inter-regional railways, 
four years after the launch of high speed services. This has synergies with the 
UK experience where deregulation coincided with roll-out of InterCity rail 
services, originally launched in 1976, but applied to core routes between 1978 
and 1980. 
 
The Swedish Transport Policy Bill enabling full deregulation of inter-city coach 
services was tabled in 1998 following studies showing abstraction from private 
cars rather than rail services was more likely – similar to study results seen in 
Norway. In the period of partial deregulation some proposed long-distance coach 
services had been objected to by appeals to the government from SJ but full 
deregulation saw an end to the ability for rail to contest routes and instead allowed 
free competition (Nordenlöw and Alexandersson, 1999). This stepped process 
was not seen in the UK, instead full competition with rail from occurred from 1980. 
 
The effects of full deregulation in terms of new entry and incumbent expansion 
was not as high as initially thought (Nordenlöw and Alexandersson, 1999). 
Following its entry into the market in 1996, Stagecoach had expanded 
significantly, challenging earlier decisions to block new services in 1993 and in 
many cases overturning decisions to realise its originally planned network. By 
1999 Swebus Express had expanded considerably but only a few further market 
entrants followed, stimulated by the success of Stagecoach’s challenge to 
formerly blocked routes by SJ. This meant Swebus Express controlled around 
50% of a passenger market, which nationally had seen a doubling of km operated 
between 1996 and 1998 and coinciding with Stagecoach’s acquisition of Swebus 
from SJ. The remaining 50% was populated by expanded services from existing 
operators and some new entrants who focused on single routes, either providing 
new public transport alignments or competing with other road and rail operators, 
(Nordenlöw and Alexandersson, 1999). 
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In 2000, Stagecoach sold Swebus Express to Concordia Bus, jointly owned by 
Schoyen Gruppen (47%), Bus Holdings Sarl (51%) and the management team 
(2%). With ownership of Swebus changing hands further expansion, a change in 
brand, and a new company structure followed under Concordia Bus. Further 
developments in ownership continued through the early 2000s with the operation 
moving to Nobina Sverige AB (a Norwegian firm trading as Swebus) in 2009. In 
the same period passenger journeys stood at 3.6m (2007) rising to 3.8m by 2009 
with the mode share of passenger kilometres for express coach at 6% nearly 
double that of 1996 (3.3%) and three times the share prior to deregulation in 1992 
(2%) (Jansson et al, 1997).  
 
During the same period use of rail services increased from 1993 - a time when 
all non-profitable lines were subject to competitive tendering for open access 
competition and state monopoly was broken. Growth was due to increased 
regional investment in passenger services, greater efficiency generated through 
competition, and new market entrants leading to innovations in pricing 
(Alexandersson and Hultén, 2008). Growth continued through the final break-up 
of state rail holdings and in the period 2007 to 2012, passenger journeys 
increased by c25%. However, even with growth the cost of rail remains an issue 
in its success; the development of the high-speed network from 1990 (with trains 
used more intensely from 1995 onwards) was costly to the nation and the 
introduction of wider bodied train sets from 2000 have helped operating 
companies to lower the costs of rail travel for the end user but have represented 
a considerable capital investment. 
 
By 2009, the coach market was split between three operators; Swebus (50% of 
km), Svenska Buss, and Nettbuss (Safflebuss and Bus4you) (29% km 
combined); the remaining market consisted of some 25 smaller operators and 
90% of all services were operated commercially providing a proxy to the UK 
market though little use of coach services for distances over 600km (373 miles) 
was made (Van de Velde, 2009) contrasting to the UK where corridors over this 
distance saw considerable growth and competition. Today’s network sees 
Swebus remain the dominant firm, offering several services with partner 
operators (SDG, 2016), reminiscent of joint operations in the early 1980s between 
National Express and large independents such as Trathens and Yelloway, and a 
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focus on airport connections, again like the UK. The operators of airport express 
coach services are; Flybussarna (Transdev), Ybuss (partners Swebus), and 
Airshuttle (a new start-up connecting Stockholm to Arlanda Airport and competing 
directly with the Arlanda Express rail service). Figure 18 compares the current 
Swebus and high-speed rail networks. There are broad similarities; express 
coach being more expansive and competing with high-speed and regional rail. 
 
Figure 18: Current inter-city coach and high-speed rail maps for Sweden 
 
 
Travel times are important for passengers. Figure 18 shows two routes where 
coach to rail competition is intensive; Stockholm / Gothenburg and Stockholm / 
Malmö and Figure 19 summarises the mode times and costs. 
 
Figure 19: Journey time and cost comparisons for the Swedish market 
 
Journey Option 1 time 
Option 2 
time 
Option 3 
time 
Option 1 
cost 
Option 2 
cost 
Option 3 
cost 
Stockholm to 
Gothenburg 
SJ (rail) 
3.5 hrs 
MTR (rail) 
3.5 hrs 
Swebus 
7.0 hrs 
SJ (rail) 
445-735 
SEK 
MTR (rail) 
420-520 
SEK 
Swebus 
239-339 
SEK 
Stockholm to  
Malmö 
SJ (rail) 
4.5 hrs 
Swebus 
9.0 hrs 
FlixBus 
8.0 hrs 
SJ (rail) 
475-625 
SEK 
Swebus 
519 max 
SEK 
FlixBus 
115 max 
SEK 
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Each corridor sees considerable price and time-based competition between and 
within modes – a healthy bi-product of a successfully deregulated environment 
which has met original aims to maximise social, economic, and environmental 
welfare. In the current market, on-road coach competition is maintained on the 
core corridors, similar in style to competition in the UK between National Express 
and Megabus. Several routes in Sweden, particularly those radiating from 
Stockholm see competition from multiple operators – growing the market (SDG, 
2016) and like the Oxford/London and West Country/London corridors in the UK. 
 
5.4 Sweden Summary 
 
Sweden was the first major liberalisation of express coach activities, occurring 
some 19 years after the UK. The process followed liberalisation of the domestic 
air market. Of note was the parallel rail privatisation process and entry into the 
market of a notable UK bus group. In comparison to the 1980 Act, the following 
points are useful: 
 
 Like the UK, Sweden has a well-developed high-speed network operating 
between all major cities and paralleling road routes across Sweden, 
particularly in the more densely populated southern region; 
 
 However, the regional rail system is slow and more expensive than coach 
travel. With journey time differences small on some corridors express coach 
has found a significant market for services, replicating experiences in 
Germany and France; 
 
 Prior to liberalisation, coach services in Sweden were limited due to heavy 
levels of protection given to the rail network. However, SJ did operate some 
coach services where no other transport existed, similar to Germany; 
 
 The two-stage approach allowed coach to compete with state operated rail 
and saw relief from protectionism though rail was still able to block some 
network expansions. The rail network was less dynamic with low investment 
and capacity combined with uncompetitive fares – this helped the coach 
market grow as unlike the UK the rail network had no mandate to compete; 
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 The six-year period to full rail privatisation saw coach grow, the network only 
contracting when full privatisation of rail added capacity, drove pricing 
innovation, and the high-speed rail network fully launched with further added 
capacity; and, 
 
 The network has settled to three commercial operators. There is considerable 
joint working and fares remain competitive. Around 25 small and medium 
sized operators run c20% of the network with airport services an important 
niche market. 
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Chapter 6 – Liberalisation case study: Norway 
 
6.1 Overview 
 
Norway has a low population density of 15.5 people per square kilometre over a 
land mass of circa 385,000 square kilometres. Population growth levels are 
largely static and there is an aging population. The country is heavily rural with 
most economic and residential activity focused in the southern capital Oslo as 
well as Bergen, Stavanger, Kristiansand, and Drammen.  
 
Domestic air services are an important part of the public transport network and 
focus on domestic services between the north and south of the country, often 
providing the only mode. Routes between the capital and Bergen, Stavanger, and 
Trondheim are some of the busiest domestic routes in Europe. While these routes 
are busy and the market is well developed air, as a mode, still sees a lower share 
than rail and coach. 
 
Current rail infrastructure, comprising c4,100 kilometres of rail track is limited to 
a low-speed network of mainly single-track lines. Only 6% is of double track 
configuration and within this only 26% is high-speed (the line from Oslo to the 
international airport). The limitation of rail infrastructure, with a focus of resources 
to the south, may be one reason for the sustainability of express coach operation 
- itself limited in scope by the low resident population densities in many parts of 
the country. 
 
After rail, the next principal public mode of long and medium distance travel is 
express coach. Norway has had a well-functioning deregulated coach market 
from 2003 (Van de Velde, 2009). The process began in the early 1990s, a time 
where considerable restrictions to market entry were creating a bias towards 
regional subsidisation and a focus on rail industry protection at a county level. By 
the late 1990s a ‘de facto deregulated market’ trialled the removal of some of the 
‘evidence of proof’ activities otherwise required by operators when setting up 
services if they considered wider benefits to passengers (Leiren and Fearnley, 
2008).  
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This was successful and saw moves to formal deregulation by 2003 where market 
entry conditions were widely abolished, and emphasis switched to the 
accommodation of long-distance coach services by each county into their 
regulated local bus market. Figure 20 from Aarhaug (2012) shows passenger use 
of express coach services in the three stages of market structure change; early 
1990s with heavy restrictions and rail protection, late 1990s a move to make 
market entry easier, realising passenger benefits of choice, and 2003 - the effects 
of full-scale competition with development of competing networks, fares, and 
service innovations. 
 
Figure 20: Express coach passenger use by deregulation stage - Norway 
 
 
 
 
6.2 The market before liberalisation 
 
Local transport and long-distance road services were organised at the Norwegian 
county level - a county being an area representing political and local government 
authority within Norway, akin to the UK’s local government structure. Operating 
public transport in this way presented significant problems for passengers 
travelling longer distances across the country by road as in Norway (unlike the 
UK) the county boundaries signified a requirement to change services due to the 
funding and subsidisation structure used and combined with the area (county) 
based licensing process. This created interchange penalties to passengers, long 
waiting times, and more complex levels of travel information.  
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Rail was state controlled, and unlike systems in neighbouring countries was 
lagging in terms of infrastructure investment causing stagnation in passenger use 
between 1995 and 2007, the last four years of this hastened by deregulation of 
the coach market. Structurally, the rail system has seen a much slower movement 
towards decentralised operation and a more competitive market structure. 
Vertical separation of the operating structure (between infrastructure and train 
operations) occurred in 1996; eight years after the same process in neighbouring 
Sweden, but only two years after UK privatisation – this being triggered by EU 
Directive 91/440. Vertical separation meant train operations would have more 
opportunity to innovate and be separated further through privatisation over the 
coming years. 
 
For coach operation a licensing structure was in place until the late 1990s. 
Operators either held an area, or an individual route licence (Leiren and Fearnley, 
2008), the latter akin to RSLs seen in the UK prior to 1980. These licenses were 
authorised by the county but were often initiated by the operator who saw a need 
for the service being promoted (Van de Velde, 2009), and prior to deregulation, 
could successfully argue its case regarding abstraction from the rail network. 
Licenses were issued on an exclusive basis, and whereas the UK system focused 
on quantity restriction to remove competition, the Norwegian approach owed a 
lot to the different funding landscape used for all public transport. In contrast to 
the UK, long-distance transport in Norway formed part of the county level 
subsidised network with rules for subsidy precluding the promotion of activity that 
was deemed wasteful of public funding – for example competition between 
operators across the same route. This meant services operated within tight 
controls and the system gave protection to local bus and rail, the latter built to 
traverse county boundaries and provide the long-distance domestic public 
transport network.  
 
Prior to deregulation, the coach network had two functions; firstly, cross county 
travel between main towns and county boundaries, and secondly, as a feeder to 
rail-heads where rail travel continued to the capital city, Oslo. The pre-1998 model 
of operation in Norway caused a fragmented network with many local operators 
evident across the country but confined to licensed operation of public services 
within their home county. This compares to the UK situation of fewer express 
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coach operators, limited to market entry by the RSL system, but able to operate 
outside of their ‘home traffic area’. In economic structure terms, the market was 
controlled through state mechanisms and each route was a monopoly and, as 
with the UK market, a controlled monopoly was observed alongside a vibrant 
market of operators who concentrated on the contract and private hire sector 
which had no boundaries to operation. 
 
With licenses restricting the growth and efficient shape of the network the 
controlled structure forced innovation, as it had done in the UK, through the use 
of coach pools. Co-operation between firms was used in Norway to reshape the 
network and overcome enforced inefficiencies created by county boundaries and 
ring-fenced subsidies. Operators co-operated to establish longer through 
services as an amalgamation of common lines of route formerly supplied by each 
operator in their respective county (Leiren and Fearnley, 2008). To mitigate 
against the issues caused by county subsidy restrictions, each operator ran these 
extensions commercially in the county, or counties, outside of their home county 
operation. This co-operation was mutually beneficial as; 
 
“The Public Transport Administration got more service for the same 
amount of subsidy, the bus companies increased their income [by 
offering a better service network and attracting passengers], and the 
passengers received better services” (Leiren and Fearnley, 2008, p3).  
 
As in the UK, barriers to this level of innovation prevailed. Firstly, the railway in 
Norway had rights of objection over co-operation between regional coach 
companies using arguments for passenger abstraction and wasteful ‘competition’ 
- as seen in the UK before 1980. A further issue complicated the allowance of 
licences to operate ‘co-operated’ through services; counties required satisfying 
that subsidies were not crossing country boundaries through creative accounting 
by each operator. To satisfy county administrators, new applicants needed to:  
 
 prove the need for the service; 
 prove the service would not abstract from existing public transport; and, 
 prove there was no detraction in use of infrastructure investments (e.g. 
rail stations) 
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With many services being approved, the approach in using co-operative 
agreements to overcome licensing barriers began to shape the future of the 
deregulated market in Norway. The acceptance of co-operatives resulted in the 
development of NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS during the 1990s; a co-operative 
initially comprising 40-member operators and acting as a marketing umbrella 
created to provide a single network (resonating with the success of the UK’s 
National Express network). Services in Norway were provided through member 
operators running coaches in common colours and using common marketing and 
fares between destinations. However, the National Express business model uses 
private firms to operate the network on a contractual basis whereas in Norway 
firms were equal members of the co-operative with the operation being more like 
Associated Motorways and British Coachways of the deregulation period. Like 
these consortia, common hubs, connecting services and through fares are used 
with a background reconciliation process linking revenue payments proportionally 
to miles operated by each member firm. 
 
Before beginning the legislative process to deregulate the express coach market 
in Norway, studies conducted in the early years of co-operative operation were 
designed to address concerns that allowing expansion of long-distance service 
networks would undermine the rail and domestic airline markets – something not 
required by the UK government ahead of the 1980 Act with, instead, a mandate 
given to British Rail to make InterCity services self-supporting. The studies 
concluded that the development of coach lines in parallel to rail and air routes 
across the country had complemented the overall public transport system, 
providing increased choice and overall market growth (Van de Velde, 2009 - from 
studies by Hjellnes COWI, 1999; Strand, 1991) and existing rail and air 
passengers remained loyal to these modes due to speed advantages over coach 
(Leiren and Fearnley, 2008). This contrasted with the UK where there was little 
evidence of abstraction from private car; most passengers being new to public 
transport (e.g. student and inbound tourism market) or ‘time rich’ rail passengers. 
 
Later surveys prior to deregulation showed increasing competition between rail 
and coach in the late 1990s with evidence of higher abstraction than earlier 
shown. However, broad conclusions followed earlier surveys as far as 
abstraction. This was less important to rail as in volume terms a small shift away 
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from rail would meet coach capacity but would not undermine the viability of rail. 
In totality, the effects of modal shift were greater on the private car. Intense 
competition between rail and coach showed higher abstraction rates from car due 
to the greater level of choice in travel times, frequencies, and costs by mode. 
 
6.3 The market since liberalisation 
 
The market for express coach services was fully deregulated in 2003, making the 
Norwegian market juvenile in comparison to the UK, and seeing it continue to 
mature 14-years later. In the immediate seven-year period following deregulation 
the market for companies operating express coach lines consolidated from 30 to 
17 operating firms, with only 5 major operator networks existing by 2006 (Leiren 
and Fearnley, 2008). This compares favourably with the UK experience over the 
same time span following deregulation where a 55% drop off rate can be 
observed, the higher figure explained by the more intensive competition from rail 
and a dominant incumbent working as a monopsony provider, a situation not 
replicated in the Norwegian market at deregulation as the equivalent single 
operator was a cooperative of independent firms who shared in the revenue 
returns of the network. 
 
Many firms in 2003 were small, operating individual services or in joint ventures 
with other firms under the NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS umbrella (Aarhaug, 
2012). Through mergers and acquisitions the market continues to shrink, as has 
membership of NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS, dropping from 40 prior to 
deregulation to 25 currently. 
 
The market has demonstrated that survival is possible both within and outside of 
co-operatives. For example, Nettbuss are a member of NOR-WAY 
BUSSEKSPRESS but operate individual services in competition with the network 
as well as on corridors unserved by any other firm – this has parallels with the 
rise and consequent fall of British Coachways with companies such as Grey 
Green and Wallace Arnold operating in and out of the co-operative before 
eventually competing with it and is replicated today with some National Express 
third party contractors also operating in the inter-city coach market themselves 
(e.g. Go-Ahead Oxford). 
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The market has also settled regarding the type of express service operated and 
has attracted market entry through shorter distance services in a category known 
as hourly-express (Leiren and Fearnley, 2008). This was an invention of a main 
competitor TIMEkspressen just prior to full scale deregulation and since 2003 
growth in this market has been considerable in relation to other long-distance 
service categories. Figure 21 from Aarhaug (2012) demonstrates this showing 
growth in passenger journeys by trip distance in Norway between 2000 and 2010. 
The substantive change and growth in volume was in the 200km (124 miles) or 
less market with smaller growth in services between 201km and 350km. By 2010 
the 351km category was largely unchanged following growth and decline through 
the period. 
 
Figure 21: Passenger journeys by trip distance 2000 to 2010 - Norway 
 
 
This concentration on short distance connections contradicts the UK experience; 
at the point of deregulation in the UK 56% of new services operated at 200km or 
less with 25% (201-350km) and 19% (350km+) in the remaining two distance 
categories. After seven years of deregulation the number of services in total had 
fallen to 33, some dating back to deregulation while others being new entrants 
and 37% operated at 200km or less, 24% (201-350km), and 39% (350 km+). 
Whilst this is not a direct comparison to passenger journey volumes the 
suggestion here is there was a largely equal attraction to market entry and 
sustainability on long and short distance markets, the latter being buoyed 
significantly by the London commuter and airport markets.  
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Not only is the Norwegian market now fully deregulated, but it enjoys barrier free 
entry regarding objections to the issue of route licenses. Still dealt with at a county 
level, these are now issued freely if operators exhibit key standards on safety and 
operational control, and if they accept ‘closed door’ operation when these 
conditions are placed on the license to protect locally subsidised buses. 
 
Today’s Norwegian express coach network has evolved to see principally three 
main competitors emerge; NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS, a co-operative of 25 
operators running over 50 services under one brand and unified network; 
Nettbuss, owned by the Norwegian State Railway and providing long-distance 
services across Norway and into Sweden - complementing the domestic rail 
network; TIMEkspressen, who initiated shorter express coach services on 
distances up to 200km and focus on the denser southern residential market 
where there is more demand for this style of service - competing with rail even 
though the firm is now part of Nettbuss. Flybussen, who have developed services 
to and from cities and regional airports are a growing fourth operator. There is 
healthy market for these services, replicating the UK in this growing market. 
 
Rail has provided more competition recently with passenger use increasing by 
5% year on year from 2010 after organisational re-structure and significant 
investment in higher capacity trains. Plans to dismantle the state operated 
network are now underway with privatisation following, line by line (like the UK). 
 
While entry to the coach market is barrier free, there is still a defining dynamic 
which shapes the structure. Subsidies from local counties remain and although 
now more limited, some services do have a level of subsidy which precludes 
competitive entry by other firms - thereby protecting the incumbent. Furthermore, 
the effect of consolidation and market power of the long-standing NOR-WAY 
BUSSEKSPRESS network and its more recent competitors has limited market 
entry by small and medium sized independents due to advantages of scale and 
co-operation on services - this limiting competition further as each operator takes 
a joint stake in a route rather than operate individually under full competition.  
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Finally, technologies have been slow to develop. Yield management is evident 
but used to a lesser extent by operators (Aarhaug, 2012). Only one firm is using 
this technique, Lavprisekspressen, and their experience is showing a decline in 
the number of services operated as they appear to use the approach to manage 
existing demand more efficiently, instead of stimulating new growth. This is in 
stark contrast to experiences of this technology in the UK from the early 2000s 
and most recently across Germany and continental Europe. 
 
6.4 Norway Summary 
 
Occurring 23 years after the UK, there are some comparable results as well as 
notable differences that can be drawn between the two deregulated markets: 
 
 Through a three-stage deregulation spanning 12-years a significant co-
operative of firms emerged to overcome licensing barriers. By stage three 
this lowered the potential for widespread competition and moved the focus to 
rail competition; 
 
 Growth and fall off in new market entrants and the volume of services and 
passengers is comparable to the UK. The market stagnated in the seven 
years following deregulation even though rail is less developed than the UK; 
 
 Continued subsidy of local bus markets is having a negative effect on the 
growth and competition within the Norwegian coach market. This has created 
a barrier in the Norwegian market, though market maturity is now suppressing 
new entry; 
 
 Co-operation in the Norwegian coach market continues to work well, ensuring 
a comprehensive coach network is operated – itself supressing new 
competition; and, 
 
 Low-cost fares are important but yield management techniques have failed 
to find a foothold. Instead, frequency has remained a core factor of coach use 
in the short distance market and product stability of the network in the long-
distance market.  
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Chapter 7 – Liberalisation case study: Germany and France 
 
7.1 Overview   
 
The German inter-city coach market was liberalised in January 2013, with the 
French market following in 2015 after the ‘Macron Law’ came into effect. Since 
liberalisation the German market has moved quickly from a highly competitive 
position, close in structure terms to imperfect competition to a near monopoly 
state with the market at best described as a dominant firm oligopoly but becoming 
close to a non-coercive monopoly with FlixBus holding a near 90% market share. 
In France, the market quickly consolidated to a position of three operators through 
2015/16 with Ouibus and FlixBus holding around 80% of the market between 
them (Blayac and Bougette, 2016). 
 
The market for coach travel in both countries remains buoyant. In Germany, 
following an intense period of competition between several coach operators and 
the domestic rail network (mainly state owned and operated) a single firm has 
emerged as the market leader following a mix of aggressive fare based 
competition and a series of acquisitions, mergers and market exits. In France, the 
state rail provider SNCF launched iDBus (now Ouibus) with this enjoying strong 
financial backing and shared ticketing with the rail network and the acquisition of 
a main competitor (Starshipper in 2016). Stagecoach (Megabus) provided a 
range of domestic services before their withdrawal in 2016 and sale of the 
business to FlixBus, and in France Isilines remains present and is partially state 
owned. 
 
A large passenger base in both countries is drawn from the student market 
segment, with up to 90% of passengers being students in the German market 
(PTV / STRATA, 2012) and many operators continuing to look to tailor their 
services to this group using kerb-side stops and university campuses. However, 
feelings are that some operators in each market continue to be locked into the 
more traditional city centre termini and lack the flexibility required by the likely 
passenger markets attracted to coach. This is one reason for the success of more 
innovative (and student originated) services such as FlixBus in both markets. 
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Following liberalisation and the immediate 12-months of intensive competition, 
there was a strong appetite amongst the German population to try inter-city coach 
and make potential long-term mode switches. This was also evident in France 
with the market described as seeing an unprecedented step change following 
liberalisation. 
 
Overall results for express coach use in Germany following liberalisation were 
impressive. Though starting from a low base of service numbers, mainly in the 
Berlin area, prior to 2013, increases in domestic coach services has been 
dramatic; Figure 22 demonstrates the increase in services, pre and post 
liberalisation, showing services operated per week for each month (excluding 
airport services) and the point (red line) at which liberalisation occurred. 
 
Figure 22: Number of German domestic services per week (Gipp, 2016) 
 
In France, growth has been equally significant with August 2015 just after 
liberalisation seeing 250,000 journeys alone compare to 100,000 in the whole of 
2014 (The Economist, October 2015). 
 
However, in Germany from 2014 to the present-day growth has been supressed 
to 25% (2014-15) following the market’s rapid consolidation. The market leader 
has focused on international expansion at the expense of midweek frequencies 
and IC Bus, the coach network operated by state rail operator Deutsche Bahn 
(DB) has concentrated on fewer, but more frequent, short links that complement 
the rail network as well as providing choice through price and time differentials. 
The market in Germany remains contestable but has seen little new entry even 
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given the change in midweek frequencies by the monopolist. This is a similar 
phenomenon to that seen in the UK when National Express cut frequencies and 
raised fares in the mid-1990s but attracted no new competition from new entry. It 
shows the power of the market leader in each case, and sensitivity of the market 
as highly price-elastic and therefore difficult for new entrants to succeed. In 
France, the market has been heavily influenced by the German experience and 
there is evidence that economies of scale are now occurring amongst the 
oligopoly operators – this is blocking new smaller firm entry but maintaining an 
equilibrium between larger firms and keeping Flixbus from increasing its share. 
 
In both markets abstraction from private car travel has occurred, while a very low 
level of abstraction from competing public transport modes is reported. 
 
7.2 The market before liberalisation 
 
7.2.1 Germany 
 
Before liberalisation of the German domestic express coach market freedom of 
entry was heavily curtailed in lieu of the perceived benefits of rail. Like the UK, 
Germany had restrictions on domestic express services from the 1930s though 
the market was more heavily restricted with an almost total ban on the 
development of coach travel. From 1981, DB acquired the ability to run long-
distance coach routes when the Government required it to take over all postbus 
services. However, it did not develop this market for fear of abstraction from its 
own rail network (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 2013) - in hindsight this was a short-
sighted decision. 
 
The almost total protection of the rail network led to inefficiencies and a 
stagnating of the passenger market with a falling share of the total inter-city 
market in the years preceding liberalisation, and for a longer period, falling levels 
of passenger facilities, operational efficiency, and overall productivity (Knorr and 
Lueg-Arndt, 2013). This is similar to the UKs rail experience where only in the 
mid to late 1970s did British Rail start to address stagnation and low productivity 
with investment in high-speed routes – protecting itself from future competition. 
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Express coach services in Germany were limited to protect DB. Prior to the 
market being liberalised only a small number of services operated, with these 
being legacy routes connecting East and West Germany to Berlin, limited airport 
services, and niche market routes operating where rail provision was poor, 
unlikely to justify investment or where overnight services connected main cities 
(such as Mannheim and Hamburg). Only 86 services were authorised, the 
majority connecting Berlin and operated as a joint venture of four companies, two 
of which were owned by DB with two being true independents (Knorr and Lueg-
Arndt, 2013). 
 
The market for all long-distance travel in 2012, just prior to liberalisation, 
accounted for 62.4bn passengers annually with pre-liberalisation scheduled 
coach only accounting for 1.2bn (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 2013). The same year 
saw only half the kilometres of timetabled service operated as by the end of the 
first year of liberalisation in 2013, and route quantities grew faster still - doubling 
from the number prior to liberalisation in six-months and with passengers 
increasing by 9% in just three-months (Augustin, et al, 2014). 
 
With a large existing market for long-distance travel and over 5,000 small and 
medium sized independent firms (similar in quantity terms relatively to the UK in 
1980) having the opportunity to enter the market there was huge potential for 
success. However, it was felt that many firms were too small and lacked the 
financial and operational resources to enter the market long enough to reach a 
self-sustaining level. But in support of market entry, the core markets for these 
operators such as school and municipal service contracts was starting to shrink 
at liberalisation and it was felt that there were available resources and scope to 
redeploy to the new domestic long-distance market (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 
2013). 
 
Potential barriers to success of liberalisation focused on the size and nature of 
Germany, being polycentric, and the potential for DB to quickly react to 
competition, through both its rail network and its extensive local bus operation 
totalling over 12,000 vehicles nationwide. A lack of good standard coach termini 
also had the potential to limit successful launch of coach services (e.g. Köln). 
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7.2.2 France 
 
The market for domestic coach travel prior to liberalisation was limited. Before 
2011 there were heavy restrictions on inter-regional coach services, designed to 
ensure protection for domestic air and rail modes from road based competition.  
The French rail network focuses on main corridors where frequencies and quality 
are high, however, outside of these regional rail services are thin, creating 
potential for inter-city coach services. Historically rail development started with 
the long-distance network prior to regional connections being developed, the 
latter focused on road based links instead. France are pioneers in high-speed rail 
travel being the first in Europe to invest in this sector, and as a result, of the 
30,000km of rail, over 2,000km is of high-speed configuration. The rail and road 
network has historically focused on Paris and the country is not polycentric like 
Germany. While north-south connections are good with some by-passing (or 
traversing) Paris, the east-west routes are poor, often requiring a connection 
across Paris if travelling by rail (Blayac and Bougette, 2016). This provided scope 
for coach competition success through and direct regional links and the east-west 
corridor is where one consortium, Starshipper, found early success. 
 
However, prior to liberalisation through the ‘Macron Law’ some competition did 
exist using specific articles and legislation: 
 
 Inter-regional services through Articles L. 3111-1 and L. 3111-2 (128 in 
2013); 
 Services set up in place of local area rail services where permitted; and, 
 Three services created as ‘national interest’ routes; two routes from 
Picardy to Roissy airport and one route from Beauvais airport and Paris 
(Porte Maillot). 
 
Following changes to regulations for international coach services in 2009, and 
amendments to Regulation 1073/2009, the market expanded using ‘cabotage’ in 
2011, with European Parliament law being incorporated into French law (Article 
L 3421-2).  
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This allowed international coach operators to open the doors of their services to 
domestic travellers if strict rules were met for the number of travellers carried in 
this way. Domestic travel could occur, but the coach service had to start or end 
at a destination outside of France and the operator had to ensure that at least 
half of all passengers on board where not travelling between two domestic French 
locations.  
 
This stimulated domestic operators to provide international connections with the 
specific aim of cherry-picking key internal markets between popular locations, for 
example, SNCF’s iDBus (now Ouibus) operation running between Paris and 
London but providing a stop at Lille to ensure a Paris-Lille link in competition with 
other road services and providing choice between rail and road modes through 
price differentials. 
 
Like the liberalisation of other markets, French express coach liberalisation was 
a stepped process, starting in 2011 with cabotage and then later in 2015, full 
liberalisation, it was based on fixed limits in distance terms for qualifying routes 
through the ‘Macron Law’.  
 
Prior to 2015 SNCF observed the German liberalisation process; the effects on 
domestic rail and the latent reaction to modal competition by DB. To mitigate 
these errors, SNCF launched iDBus (now Ouibus) in 2012 and were one of 
several operators to make use of the 2011 cabotage opportunities to build brand 
awareness and market share ahead of full-scale liberalisation (the others being 
Isilines and Starshipper). SNCF employed Paul Bunting, a prominent manager 
from the UK express coach industry to establish iDBus and with this pre-emptive 
activity, although across a shorter timescale there are some parallels to the 1970s 
NBC approach with development of National in the UK prior to the 1980 Act. 
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7.3 The rail market 
 
7.3.1 Germany 
 
Rail transport in Germany remains under state control. This is almost exclusively 
the case for the extensive high-speed rail network where DB ICE rail provides 
regular city to city links across the country. The state operates infrastructure and 
rail services; however, the regional networks are increasingly undergoing 
transition into the private sector with lines being tendered by federal state 
authorities progressively and a range of competitor firms winning 10-year and 15-
year rail contracts. National Express became the first non-German operator of 
domestic rail services in 2015, but many contracts have been won by German-
based firms or DB regional subsidiaries. 
 
The rail network across Germany is dense – with most areas seeing some level 
of rail service and connections to mainline stations to access the high-speed 
network. Following the requirements of EC 91/440, like many other European 
state-owned rail networks business restructuring occurred in 1999 which saw five 
business centres (subsidiaries) created to ensure greater future freedoms for 
competition and a decentralisation of market power. Maintenance, property, 
track, infrastructure, and passenger services were all divided with the latter being 
divided into long-distance (high-speed) services and short to medium distance 
(regional) services. It is the latter which has seen significant competition from new 
market entrants with the former, long-distance services, remaining a state-
controlled monopoly and operating feeder road transport services as IC Bus. 
 
As with France (below), there is a contrast in the perception and functionality of 
the high-speed and regional rail network. Significant investment is seen across 
the high-speed network with hundreds of services offered each day and third 
generation trains providing significant levels of speed, comfort, and on-board 
facilities. Contrasting to this is the slower regional network using basic trains and 
low operational speeds. Here there is more scope for coach/rail competition 
between medium to large sized towns and cities. Coach journey times are close 
to regional rail services and fares are more competitive and lower than rail, 
though coach frequencies are also lower in comparison. 
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7.3.2 France 
 
The French rail network is state funded, owned, and operated; this includes all 
rolling stock, stations, track, and supporting infrastructure. All facets of the system 
are combined under one single entity, SNCF, and the current network is split into 
inter-regional and high-speed (TGV) lines providing comprehensive coverage of 
the country. In recent years, there have been concerns over the continued 
viability of some parts of the network, leading to several steps taken: 
 
1. Development of the Transport Express Regional (TER) network – services 
designed and operated by regional councils aimed to better meet local 
needs;  
2. Replacement of some TER services with road transport to better improve 
access to the TGV network. This is at lower cost, and uses more 
intermediate stops (e.g. in the Valence area); 
3. Trials of open-access rail services with Thello – a joint operation between 
SNCF and Trenitalia; and,   
4. Development of legislation to liberalise the inter-city coach market, 
specifically designed to supplement and stimulate wider long-distance 
travel. 
 
With no plans to further devolve state ownership and operation of the rail network 
in France, unlike Scandinavia and more recently Germany, SNCF instead 
entered the inter-city coach market in their own right with Ouibus prior to full 
liberalisation of the market in 2015 using cabotage laws. 
 
7.4 The market since liberalisation 
 
7.4.1 Germany 
 
Following liberalisation, any operator can enter the domestic inter-city coach 
market if it applies to register the service with the correct regional administration. 
Services must operate for at least 50 kilometres (31 miles) in length (like the UK) 
with a gap between passenger stops of not less than one hour between timed 
points. Licenses are required for operation and the application must be adhered 
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to for a minimum three-months, after which time the operator may change the 
schedule without permission (fares are un-regulated) (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 
2013). With these low entry barriers and the scale of the country, the market grew 
intensively during the first 12-months with several firms entering the market and 
attempting to win market share through low fares, on-board facilities / WiFi, 
frequency, internet booking, and some with pan-German networks and 
guaranteed connections.  
 
The size of Germany and its polycentric nature is different to that of the UK (where 
London was a significant hub with important sub-city locations; Bristol, 
Birmingham, and Glasgow used). As a result, Germany has spawned two 
different operational models that have seen success when properly applied; 
firstly, full national networks which need substantive resources to function 
sufficiently to maintain market share (such as FlixBus) and secondly, a focus on 
one corridor between two or three principal locations (such as Hahn to Frankfurt) 
(Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 2013). Of note here is National Express, whose market 
entry failed by trying to cover too many locations (half of Germany) with too few 
resources and seeing long journey times, low frequencies, and heavy fare 
competition occur – in comparison, FlixBus at the same time used almost five-
times as many vehicles to cover all of Germany; National Express using 23 
coaches and FlixBus more than 100 and has remained in the market. 
 
Some markets have seen isolated success; airport to city links are popular and 
sustainable by independents; one operator (Deinbus) has focused significantly 
on the student market (campus to city) transfers; IC Bus (DB) has made headway 
in running complementary and connectional services to the high-speed rail 
network giving price alternatives (for slower road journeys), filling service gaps, 
and extending the reach of the rail network with feeder routes; cross-border 
routes have provided stimulus for in-country and neighbouring-country activity 
(FlixBus spreading to France and Italy); and, overnight services are popular with 
slower journey times helping services to be successful as arrival times meet 
‘wake-up’ times at destinations. 
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In Germany, new market entrants have used brand marketing, akin to 
approaches in the UK and Scandinavia. The imagery developed for new German 
services aligns with their internet presence and firms have set themselves apart 
using bright colours and powerful fare messages to compete for attention in an 
extremely dynamic market. The early days of competition saw market entry from 
up to fifteen new entrants and the main player was MeinFernbus which enjoyed 
a near 40% market share by the end of 2013. However, while initially price was 
the main competing factor this has now subsided in favour of on-board facilities, 
apart from corridors where new firms enter (or try to enter) the market. Critically, 
a continued lack of through ticketing on same operator services is leaving 
passengers without guaranteed connections even though a ‘network’ is operated 
and this has the potential to see ‘savvy’ users swap providers at hub cities (Knorr 
and Lueg-Arndt, 2013). This differs to other markets, including the UK, where the 
market leader provides through ticketing. 
 
The market began with higher success on shorter, 2.5 to 4.5 hour one-way trips 
and aggressive competition based on price, between coach and rail with the 
regional rail network more susceptible to competition due to its lower speeds.  
 
Coaches attracted students and senior citizens with the market demographic 
mirroring that of coach markets across Europe; time-rich and lower income 
segments making the most use of the cheaper but slower services. However, in 
comparison to many regional rail services which often involve connections 
enroute, the speed differential falls, making coach more competitive. This has led 
to a useful marketing boon for inter-city coach operators who run directly through 
principal towns to cities and have seen increases in passengers who 
appreciate the convenience of direct connections compared to changing trains. 
 
Following liberalisation, the number of routes increased significantly from 86 
(2012) to 277 (2015). Passenger numbers grew from 3m in 2012 to 19.6m in 
2014, aided significantly by several rail strikes (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 2013) and 
reminiscent of stimuli for UK express coach development through the decades. 
As early as 2014 industry reports in Germany suggested that a clearly dominant 
operator was emerging; MeinFernbus, with a 45% market share of passenger 
journeys and a pan-German network serving over 120 destinations was leading 
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remaining competition; FlixBus 23%, Berlin Linienbus 22%, and ADAC (Postbus) 
8% with the remainder of the market served by c14 smaller providers, including 
the short lived National Express operation (www.thelocal.de, 2014). 
 
However, in 2015 MeinFernbus and FlixBus merged to form a combined market 
share of at least 68% and taking the FlixBus name. Prior to this National Express 
had left the market in the last quarter of 2014. ADAC then sold its operations to 
FlixBus in 2016 and more recently IC Bus has scaled back operations to around 
12% of the market. Deinbus remains in the market even though the fierce fares 
war brought this firm close to bankruptcy.  
 
It is now estimated that through significant market contraction and the additional 
purchase of Megabus services in 2016, FlixBus now has a market share close to 
90%. The business model used by FlixBus, and many other competitors, is akin 
to National Express. The branded firm acts as an umbrella, overseeing marketing, 
fares, and planning. Diagrams are contracted out with small and medium sized 
local firms bidding for the work. With a shrinking local market, this new source of 
revenue has allowed them to diversify at no revenue risk and work within the new 
sector with the protections offered through the contract model they adopt. This 
has arguably curtailed direct entry into the market by these firms (as in the UK) 
and ensured that umbrella firms act as monopsonists within a highly competitive 
sub-market. 
 
Domestic express coach competition has seen significant competition with the 
rail network. The only two on-rail competitors to DB’s high-speed services have 
left the rail market citing coach competition as the reason. Furthermore, increased 
competition has forced DB to freeze traditional fare increases, ease the 
restrictions on super-advance fares, introduce dedicated low fare inter-city trains, 
and improve on-board facilities including WiFi, at seat power, and media 
entertainment. Recognising the in-roads being made by coach firms in regional 
rail competition DB was slow to react to the threat of competition but is now 
working to ‘re-connect’ many cities and towns to the high-speed network through 
better rail services and IC Bus services. 
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Germany in 2015 was in the early growth stages of market development with 
rapid change occurring through exists, mergers, and acquisitions of smaller 
operators. As such there was a fast contraction in the market place through with 
at best an oligopoly structure reached (Knorr and Lueg-Arndt, 2013) though 
subsequent mergers in 2015/16 have moved this to a current monopoly. 
However, inadequate terminal facilities and driver shortages due to high license 
costs remain as barriers to the market along with continued competition, and state 
ownership of DB. FlixBus, with a near 90% share of the market, can exercise 
market power and advantages of scale in a near monopoly structure. 
 
7.4.2 Germany Summary 
 
Liberalised in 2013, the first three years have shown a cyclical process akin to 
the initial period of deregulation in the UK market. Although no dominant operator 
was in a leading position, unlike the UK, there has been a rapid rise to market 
dominance by one new firm though a mixture of mergers, acquisitions, network 
performance and technology application: 
 
 Following initial rapid expansion, the market is now contracting with one 
dominant firm, FlixBus holding close to 90% market share, and developing 
its model around low fares, yield management, and multi-media channels; 
 
 Germany is unique in being polycentric and the coach market leans 
towards short trips of 2.5 to 4.0 hours, reflecting typical distances between 
German cities and a lower focus on Berlin as a dominant hub for 
operations, unlike the UK where London is pivotal to most networks; 
 
 Competition has fallen away due to aggressive fare pricing and low returns 
for new entrants with higher overhead costs. Mergers have concentrated 
the market (MeinFernbus and FlixBus) and most companies now supply 
the dominant firm rather than compete as it uses a similar contracting 
model to National Express in the UK; 
 
 Rail plays a significant role; high-speed services are state operated but 
there is increasing privatisation of regional services. The regional rail 
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network is slow and expensive, giving opportunity for direct coach services 
to win market share; and, 
 
 Traditional market segments use coaches and benefit from an overall 
increase in quality. No dedicated airport network exists with most served 
as part of city to city connections, the market is important however and 
often the only source of now limited independent activity e.g. Hahn 
(Frankfurt) and Nuremburg. 
 
7.4.3 France 
 
The aim of the French Government through the ‘Macron Law’ liberalising 
domestic express coach travel was to create a low-cost alternative to rail and 
create new demand from passengers who would not otherwise have travelled 
due to cost. However, moves to take a dominant stake in the market began prior 
to liberalisation, with active firms and associations taking advantage of cabotage 
and permissions given for the registration of ‘occasional trips’.  
 
Starshipper, an association of 32 small to medium sized coach operators started 
international services in 2012 providing domestic links as part of their network of 
services to locations such as Turin. Similarly, iDBus (SNCF) began in 2012, 
running from a Paris Hub to London, Brussels, and Amsterdam while including 
domestic links between Paris and Lille; competing directly with Eurolines (coach) 
and Eurostar (rail). The last entrant to the market was Isilines - a subsidiary 
company of Transdev, (60% owned by the French government). Transdev also 
operate as Eurolines across France and provided domestic and international 
destinations. Isilines opened 17 domestic express coach routes ahead of 
liberalisation and used a loop hole in existing regulations to operate domestic 
services as ‘occasional trips’. These approaches showed observation of lessons 
learnt in past processes where incumbents prepared aggressively for changes in 
the market structure using their ability to mobilise early (National Express / 
CoachMAP - late 1970s and NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS - 1997).  
 
 
153 
 
Liberalisation has allowed uncontested opening of new lines over 100 kilometres 
(62 miles) in length with this distance also applying to intermediary stops. This 
threshold distance is higher than Germany and the UK (both 32 miles) but the 
same as Sweden with the limit being set this high to protect subsidised inter-
urban bus routes, more common in France than Germany (Blayac and Bougette, 
2016). Any routes that are less than 100 kilometres between stops must show 
that they will not weaken the case for existing public service obligation (PSO) – 
the test understanding of the likely substitution effect between rail and road 
services.  
 
With three significant entrants, the market share in passenger journeys between 
operators two months after liberalisation in 2015 was; Eurolines / Isilines 59%, 
Starshipper 23%, iDBus 2% with the market being completed by several smaller 
operators including FlixBus (1%) and Stagecoach Megabus (1%) and the 
cabotage operations of ALSA (14%) who provided services between France and 
Spain. Based on these market shares and using the proxy of 17 services 
operated at the time by Isilines it is likely that 31 domestic express services 
operated at the point of liberalisation. 
 
In the first full year 3.4m passenger journeys were achieved and aggressive fares 
competition was used to establish new routes before fares increased after market 
share was established similar to National Express in the UK in the 1990s. 
However, as a mode coach still only counted for 2.5% of the long-distance market 
with rail at 17.3% and air 9.3% by 2016. In operational terms, 193 French cities 
were served by the market and typical load factors stood at 41%, lower than the 
impressive 55% in Germany but still significant (Blayac and Bougette, 2016). The 
move to increase fares once the market has settled may be deemed short sighted 
given the lessons learnt in the UK by National Express. However, market shares 
in 2016 showed consolidation; Eurolines / Isilines 41%, FlixBus 32%, Starshipper 
13% and Ouibus (formerly iDBus) 10% (Buses, October 2016). The article also 
notes the remaining 4% of passenger journeys belonging to Megabus. However, 
two significant mergers occurred in late 2016; FlixBus purchased the mainland 
Europe operations of Megabus, and, the Starshipper consortium and Ouibus 
announced a 10-year contractual agreement to co-operate - seeing the 
‘integration’ of the Starshipper network of 112 departures into the Ouibus 
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business, with consortium members receiving, in total, a 5% stake of Ouibus in 
return. These acquisitions and mergers increased the FlixBus share to c36% and 
the Ouibus share to c23%. 
 
As with the German and UK markets, the operating models of some firms are 
based around the use of a branded umbrella organisation generating competitive 
interest to operate contracted services. FlixBus use this approach with it being 
described as very innovative and ‘Uber-like’ with revenue and risk shared 70/30 
(contractor/FlixBus) and the extensive use of technology lowering operational 
costs to manage fares, capacity, and demand (Blayac and Bougette, 2016). 
 
Most users of coach services are young travellers, with FlixBus reporting 60% of 
passengers aged 20-40 years old. (Blayac and Bougette, 2016). As with 
Germany, coach in France is most competitive with regional rail services which 
are significantly slower than the TGV network of high-speed lines and more 
expensive than coach. However, barriers to market entry remain. Aside from the 
fast contraction of the market seeing an oligopoly structure emerge with dominant 
and well-resourced firms leading on innovation and network development, the 
mode faces considerable competition, not just from rail but also car-pooling – a 
popular alternative mode. Additionally, the French network, in a similar fashion to 
that of Germany and the early 1980s UK market suffers from a lack of good 
terminal facilities for coach services. Ouibus use rail stations owing to their SNCF 
ownership. However, other operators have found city terminals of poor quality 
and located away from central business districts (CBD) (e.g. Isilines in the eastern 
Paris suburbs requiring a metro journey to the city centre). 
 
7.4.4 France Summary 
 
The market was liberalised in August 2015 and has seen considerable expansion 
of passengers and contraction of firms through recent mergers and acquisitions; 
 
 The market was liberalisation in two stages; cabotage from 2011, and the 
Macron Law in 2015. This provided time for existing operators to prepare 
for liberalisation and build market presence and share; 
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 SNCF has remained in state ownership and, through its Ouibus operation 
has become a prominent player in the inter-city coach market. Transdev 
is also active in the market (Isilines) and is 60% state owned; 
 
 The market has grown rapidly from c31 routes to over 100. Passenger 
numbers have grown significantly from the days of cabotage and the 
market has contracted to three firms with Ouibus, FlixBus, and Isilines all 
key players; and, 
 
 A lack of coach termini across the network has hindered progress of a 
market (as has also been seen in Germany) used by time-rich younger 
travellers. Current services operate from kerb side locations, rail station 
forecourts, or open parking areas (akin to early UK experience). While 
good news for modal transfer, it does little to promote the coach to a higher 
status than second fiddle to the far more established and well-resourced 
state rail network. 
 
7.5 Common issues in both markets 
 
In general, both recently liberalised markets have suffered from a lack of usable 
infrastructure. In Germany, city authorities and federal states have been reluctant 
to find suitable space to accommodate competitive coach services, an example 
being Köln where scheduled coach services are banned from the CBD. Going 
forward, the lack of creation of appropriate terminal facilities for coach to coach 
and coach to rail interchange in Germany is a potential barrier to success (Gipp, 
2016). In France, as noted above, some operators have been allowed to use rail 
station facilities but others (FlixBus and Isilines) have been forced to use coach 
parks, out of town car parks, or older peripheral transport interchanges. These 
initial experiences are similar in some respects to issues in the UK where access 
to some key terminals was unavailable to competing operators (e.g. British 
Coachways), due to state control and protection afforded to National Express. 
The UK experience required amended legislation and transfers of ownership to 
resolve the issues and the same is recommended for other markets. However, to 
mitigate this, the passenger market in recent years has moved much more to 
kerb-side stop locations – these being convenient and matching better the 
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demands of typical passenger profiles. Operators, particularly in Germany, have 
been reluctant to adopt this approach apart from FlixBus who is now dominant in 
the market and who serve many university campuses and suburban kerbside 
locations. 
 
Both markets also suffer from a lack of high quality regional rail networks, both 
having focused on developing and maintaining high-speed lines between all 
major cities. The German rail market is now reacting to this situation and opening 
more regional routes to provide better links to nearest cities and high-speed 
interchanges. However, this will take time and has therefore been, and remains 
to be, a source of growth for coach services with much success in both markets 
seen in the provision of direct links to/from regional centres and major cities, often 
along the same rail line of route with very little end to end time penalties.  
 
With considerable growth in demand in each market, and subsequent network 
expansion, a new pressure is growing with respect to driver availability (Gipp, 
2016). With costs and time-lag associated with obtaining licences to drive 
commercial vehicles, the pipeline for drivers is beginning to fall out of step with 
service expansion requirements and this is exacerbated by competition between 
services within the market for both passengers and drivers. This threatens to add 
a further barrier to entry for smaller firms and potentially limits the overall growth 
of the market in an otherwise free-market environment. Issues with driver 
availability is common in all public transport markets and a recommendation 
would be to ensure more efficient licensing processes and more attractive 
employment packages for driving staff including more standardised levels of pay. 
 
Cross-border services are also an area where the coach in both markets building 
significant market share. These integrate well with services in neighbouring 
domestic markets and the flexibility of coach as a mode allows unique corridors 
to be developed where rail links are unlikely to easily exist or develop. Pioneering 
cross-border services, firms such as Public Express led the way in the early 
2000s and were the stimulus for the progressive liberalisation of domestic 
markets when cabotage rules were contested and innovation used to find ways 
to satisfy public demand. 
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Chapter 8 – Conclusion 
 
8.1 Overview 
 
The deregulation (or liberalisation) of inter-city road transport across Europe has 
evolved across more than 35 years and the UK was the first country to pass 
legislation aimed at opening the market to competition (Chapter 3).  
 
In the UK, the 1980 Transport Act allowed the potential for supply and demand 
to be self-balancing through free-market forces creating a platform from which; 
entrepreneurial activity could be stimulated; public choice widened; prices (fares) 
kept low, and profits retained at normal levels. Central to the Act was the theory 
of contestability (Chapter 1). This is not a market structure or state, but instead a 
process used to facilitate a change in market structure and position over time. 
Since 1980, the UK approach has been adopted across Europe in several 
markets, including Sweden (Chapter 5), Norway (Chapter 6), and very recently in 
Germany and France (Chapter 7). In each case local variations have applied, and 
lessons learnt along the way, and all provide the platform for collective review 
and comment on the success of the approaches used.  
 
This is exemplified by SNCF (French State Rail) who learnt from the complacency 
and delayed reaction to liberalisation by DB (German State Rail). Here, SNCF 
set up their own inter-city coach operation (Ouibus) ahead of liberalisation (similar 
to the UK / National Express situation in the 1970s) and developed a simple 
network of services linking cities and connecting with the rail network. In Germany 
DB only reacted to the threat of coach competition some months after 
liberalisation by setting up the IC Bus operation. The result has been that while 
FlixBus dominate the German market with a 90% market share, Ouibus is 
keeping the FlixBus share lower at around 40% in France - as described in 
Chapter 7. 
 
With operational freedoms for domestic inter-city coach services created, the 
level and extent of recorded independent entry has been variable. Entry is defined 
as independent entry (not under the umbrella of an established market brand) 
and it is concerned with all facets of long-distance coach operation. Across the 
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years entry has mainly been physical with branded vehicle and staff assets 
operating a steady state service. However, in the last two years entry has also 
been 'virtual' with e-commerce companies matching customers to available 
resources and running to 'crowd-sourced' demand. Virtual operations are an 
exciting new development and will invariably increase significantly in the short-
term. These new firms have the potential to open inter-city coach travel to new 
markets and transform the landscape for market entry which at present is defined 
at two levels, macro, and micro: 
 
 At the macro (strategic) level market entry with a domestic network product 
has been uncommon and has either been unsustainable in the medium-
term (British Coachways - Chapter 3) or the subject of rapid consolidation 
between smaller competing network products after competitive attrition or 
merger (MeinFernbus and FlixBus - Chapter 7). Where an incumbent 
network pre-dated liberalisation no examples of strategic level entry exist 
today in the studied markets from the point of liberalisation. However, there 
are some examples of later strategic entry in mature / settled markets, 
these seeing greater success and continued longevity; such as Megabus 
UK with an approximate 40% market share and commencing in 
2003(Chapter 4), and TIMEkspressen in Norway (Chapter 6). 
 
 At the micro (corridor) level there is far greater evidence of successful 
independent entry into single corridor and niche markets. Examples 
include the M4 corridor in the UK (sustaining independent entry and 
competition since 1980), city to city routes in southern Scandinavia 
(Chapters 5-6), and, in all markets, airport services have been a success 
story of deregulation due to often poorer rail connections and the rapid 
growth of low cost airline networks at regional airports.  
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The research was stimulated through observations of continued and contrasting 
fortunes between macro and micro level entry in the UK. Set within the 
environment for potential competition (contestability) and posed for the UK and 
using liberalised European markets as comparators the research sought to; 
 
Understand for the UK market that given the freedoms afforded to all 
firms within and outside of the market for long-distance scheduled coach 
services, why is there a lack of continued entry by small to medium sized 
coach firms?  
 
By way of a summary, the research has found that in most cases independent 
market entry has been largely absent from each market on a continual basis, 
however, in Sweden there is a higher proportion of small and independent firm 
activity than in other markets studied; 79% of commercially viable services (90% 
of all inter-city services) operated by three dominant firms and the remaining 21% 
split between 25 smaller operators due mainly to no network provider in place 
prior to liberalisation. Additionally, a common conclusion has been that following 
post-liberalisation settlement of each studied market, a continued demand for the 
operation of contracts awarded by large firms responsible for operating common 
branded networks exists. This in turn has helped maintain a vibrant sub-market 
of smaller private and contract hire firms and the potential for wider competition. 
This has also ensured some niche market independent entry continues and has 
seen larger firms adopting business models that have created monopsonistic 
market structures within their 'home' market to deflect direct entry and competition 
on main corridors through competition, instead, for branded contracts operation.  
 
By way of contrast, Scandinavian markets maintain a theme of co-operative 
operation; NOR-WAY BUSSEKSPRESS remains a significant service provider 
utilising a partnership of around 25 firms and Swebus Express actively partners 
otherwise rival firms to deter otherwise harmful and wasteful competition. In 2013 
one of the partners in Norway's co-operative, Nettbuss, commenced its own 
network, competing directly with the co-operative. It caused a degradation of the 
incumbent’s dominant position and the number of partners has since fallen to 
nine - competition contracting routes and partners. 
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In the UK, the vibrant market for 'third-party' contractors is ensuring two original 
deregulation policy aims continue to be met: 
 
 Entrepreneurship - the development of new 'virtual' service providers, such 
as Sn-ap in the UK requires on-demand private hire opportunities and uses 
the private and contract hire sector for its resources; and, 
 
 Contestability - the scale of the private and contract hire market ensures 
the threat of competition from firms outside the market remains - as seen 
with higher rates of independent market entry into (and out of) the airport 
services market and the resultant focus on low costs and high supply 
levels by incumbents on the national networks. 
 
A major theme of domestic inter-city coach liberalisation, and the observable 
changes in market structure over time, has been the parallel development of 
technologies to support operations. This is particularly the case with e-commerce. 
As markets have opened to competitive freedoms the need to maintain market 
share has pushed the pace of technical development, formerly in vehicle design, 
but more recently in digital systems.  
 
In the early years of UK deregulation, the lack of supporting technology helped 
incumbents, such as National Express, retain dominant positions. However, e-
commerce, utilising internet functionality and low-cost fare sales, has seen new 
competitors emerge. With no requirement for fixed infrastructure costs, firms such 
as Megabus and FlixBus combine internet innovations like yield management 
with social media and ‘Uber-style’ mobile technology to enter markets rapidly. 
Coupled with low cost fares and standardised service products they quickly win 
market share and challenge incumbents who are predominantly slow to react 
(Chapter 4). 
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8.2 Generic lessons learnt from case study markets 
 
Following the study of the UK market and case study material gathered for 
Sweden, Norway, Germany, and France there are several metrics than can be 
used to compare markets and highlight generic lessons that assist in answering 
the research hypothesis. Figure 23 shows the metrics for the processes applied 
in the lead up to, and liberalisation of, each studied market. 
 
Figure 23: Comparable key metrics for studied markets 
 
Process UK Sweden Norway Germany France 
Date of coach market 
liberalisation (final if 
two stages) 
1980 1999 2003 2013 2015 
Single or multiple 
stage liberalisation 
process 
Single Two-stage Two-stage Single Two-stage 
Strong operator / 
network in place at 
liberalisation 
Yes No Yes No Yes 
Rail ownership at time 
of coach liberalisation  Public Public Public Public Public 
Date of rail service 
privatisation (final if 
multi-stage) 
1997 1999 Remains Public 
Remains 
Public 
Remains 
Public 
Minimum 
Requirements for 
market entry in 
operational terms  
Operator License (UK) or equivalent required in all countries 
No notice / 
30 miles 
62 miles / 
cross 1 
border 
No Notice / 
distance 
Notify 
schedule / 
31 miles 
No notice / 
62 miles 
Estimated speed of 
operator quantity 
consolidation 
5-8 years 4-6 years 3-5 years 2-3 years 2 years 
Level of technology in 
the market at 
liberalisation 
Low Medium Medium High High 
Number of primary 
firms in the current 
market place 
2 3 3 1 3 
Estimated market 
structure in the 
current state 
Dominant 
firm 
oligopoly 
Oligopoly Oligopoly 
Non-
coercive 
Monopoly 
Oligopoly 
Reference Chapter(s) 3 and 4 5 6 7 7 
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In answering the research hypothesis, the summary of metrics in Figure 23 sheds 
light onto the relative performance of each market and why success for 
independent operation appears to remain unsuccessful. Two metrics emerge as 
leading reasons; the level of technology in the market, and; the existence of a 
network provider at liberalisation. 
 
Only two markets, Sweden, and Germany, had no existing domestic network 
providers in place at the time of liberalisation and both have seen differing 
outcomes primarily due to the level of digital technology available; 
  
 Sweden liberalised at a point in time where digital technology was still to 
be developed and was not widely available - instead more traditional 
competition resulted in higher levels of long-term success by smaller firms, 
around 25 providing 21% of all services, and an oligopoly market structure 
(see Chapter 2 and 5). This result was also aided by the geography and 
poorer rail network of Sweden compared to the UK. 
 
 Germany liberalised in 2013 when digital technology was well developed 
and a common tool for potential travellers. The use of e-commerce and 
social media played a significant role in rapidly condensing the market to 
a near monopoly. While at liberalisation a large number of firms of various 
sizes entered the market place in Germany, two major firms emerged 
using sophisticated digital technology and aggressive fares competition to 
secure market share. These firms have since merged into one clearly 
dominant provider and forced a market structure best described as a non-
coercive monopoly (see Chapter 4).  
 
In contrast, where a domestic provider already existed at liberalisation, the long-
term effect has seen the market move from a controlled monopoly to an oligopoly, 
or a variant of this traditional market structure such as the UK (dominant firm 
oligopoly), regardless of the availability of digital technology.  
 
In the UK and Norway, the existing provider was an 'umbrella' operation, with a 
single brand providing a cohesive network but using sub-contractors ('third party' 
firms) to provide vehicle and driver resources needed to fulfil services. In Norway 
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this was achieved through a co-operative and revenue share basis (like 
Associated Motorways (UK) - see Chapter 3). In contrast, in the UK third party 
firms were paid on a 'rate per mile' basis with no revenue share or vested interest 
in the success of the brand or network. The situation in France is slightly different 
- the operator at liberalisation was a subsidiary of French state railway firm 
(SNCF) and provided all resources, continuing to this day as such. Uniquely the 
UK approach has seen National Express create a monopsony market. Smaller 
firms see less risk in bidding for and working within this private structure than 
providing own-brand competitive services. 
 
In all markets ownership of domestic rail services has arguably had little effect on 
the resting inter-city coach market structure. However, rail, as a mode regardless 
of ownership has created significant inter-modal competition, primarily based on 
fares. The rail industry has particularly used lower off-peak period pricing to fill 
underutilised rolling stock and move price sensitive travellers away from peak 
services - providing capacity for time conscious and higher yield commuters. With 
coach uncompetitive in most cases regarding journey time, it’s one advantage 
can be cost, therefore significant off-peak fares competition has been damaging 
to coach services who are unable to offer peak differentials to cross-subsidise off 
peak offers. As a result, without significant financial resources to whether such 
competition smaller firms have struggled to remain on trunk corridors and larger 
firms rarely see abnormal profit levels unless the rail offer is not substantively 
better in journey time, such as Oxford/London where a unique duopoly market is 
sustained.  
 
Figure 24 draws the key lessons learnt across the studied markets and identified 
metrics. These lessons point to reasons for the likelihood of limited small and 
medium sized firm success in liberalised markets, particularly the UK. As such, 
these lessons may provide a market 'pulse-check' for countries still looking to 
liberalise domestic inter-city coach markets;  
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Figure 24: Comparable key metrics for studied markets 
 
Liberalisation Issue Lesson 
Structure prior to liberalisation - there is a need to define if the 
market is a controlled monopoly at the macro or micro level. The 
former favours dominant operator existence prior to liberalisation, 
whereas the latter may see routes divided among multiple firms. 
Define the market 
structure at each 
affected level. 
Existence of pre-liberalisation monopolists - where these exist, 
then long-term small and medium firm success may be limited if 
incumbents remain active. Even where no pre-liberalisation 
supplier exists, (Germany), small firms will still struggle to survive 
if consolidation sees an agile and aggressive monopolist emerge. 
Remove monopolies 
before liberalisation 
and use competition 
policy to limit firm 
size by total turnover 
in markets where 
competition will 
benefit travellers. 
Network effect - Where an existing network or brand exists pre-
liberalisation the success of entry by small and medium sized firms 
on individual routes is limited due to the recognition, reach, and 
power of the network firm. When smaller firms have entered the 
market with a network, success has been limited due to a lack of 
brand awareness and customer accessibility; e-commerce has 
removed some of these barriers as seen by Megabus and FlixBus. 
Ensure equitable 
access for all firms to 
network access 
points; these include 
stations (hubs), 
interchanges, 
kerbside stops. the 
internet is readily 
accessible and has 
mitigated issues with 
fixed stop locations. 
Financial resources - 'deep pockets' are required to sustain entry 
into post-liberalisation markets. Where niche markets are identified 
long-term resources are required to deflect interest from large 
firms. In some cases, small firms partner with large firms (Trathens 
/ National Express). Megabus' entry to profit was only possible 
with 3-years loss-leading support by parent firm Stagecoach. 
Consider liberalising 
in stages - through 
gradual legislation to 
give new competition 
or on a corridor by 
corridor basis. This 
may help small and 
medium sized firms 
to spread costs. 
Intra-modal competition - the number of potential market entrants 
is key. A vibrant sub-market of small firms allows contestability to 
function. While this helps policy objectives it may fail to realise 
independent entry into market by these firms, more often providing 
a pool of available resources to help major firms adapt their 
business model to maintain and grow their own market presence. 
National Express (UK) and FlixBus (Germany) being examples. 
Ensure support for 
sub-markets and 
removal of 
monopolists prior to 
liberalisation. 
Inter-modal competition - the level of activity in the rail market is 
important while the type of ownership has not had a negative 
effect on the coach market. The process of rail franchising has led 
to mixed abilities for rail to compete on price in some markets - 
being dependent on commitments made during the franchise. 
Where rail is state owned some have created their own inter-city 
coach arm. This has exacerbated issues for smaller firm entry into 
the market due to parent rail (state) firm. subsidies (e.g. Ouibus) 
Ensure rail as a 
mode is unable to 
use public funds to 
repel competition, 
provide equitable 
access to operational 
facilities, and remove 
the need for rail to 
object to the 
development of road 
routes. 
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Further to the lessons outlined, one further lesson of note concerns Co-
operatives. These partnerships between multiple firms have enjoyed mixed 
success - mainly affected by the availability of technology and residual post-
liberalisation barriers to market entry.  
 
British Coachways is a high profile industry example of a deregulation stage co-
operative (see Chapter 3). The consortium was short lived due to; a lack of 
adequate terminal facilities (of high customer importance in the 1980s); 
competition based solely on low-fares; a smaller network of ticket sales agents, 
and; a lack of brand awareness in comparison to pre-deregulation incumbent, 
National Express. Given the focus on low-fares, it is the author's view that had e-
commerce have been significant at this time the long-term outcome may have 
been different and this is demonstrated to a large extend by the later success of 
Megabus who have used e-commerce to successfully enter the market with few 
fixed overhead costs and with a core network of services mirroring that of the 
British Coachways' network in 1980. 
  
In comparison the Norway co-operative formed ahead of liberalisation and with 
little technological assistance remains today, demonstrating the effect of a pre-
liberalisation incumbent. Its continued survival is also due to the limited nature of 
rail competition (a bi-product of Norwegian geography) as well as the staged 
process in removing restrictive criteria for inter-city express operation. This 
allowed a slower pace of market development, lessening competition between 
coach and rail routes where this could occur and supporting collaboration 
between independent firms (see Chapter 6). A more recent example of co-
operative activity is seen in France. The Starshipper co-operative used e-
commerce and exploitation of niche market opportunities to create a foothold a 
year prior to full liberalisation of the market using legal cabotage practices in 
France at the time (see Chapter 7). However, they have since entered into a 
commercial agreement with the dominant operator Ouibus, securing the co-
operative's long-term future and partner profit return. The increased reliance on 
digital technology may make co-operatives less likely in the future - Norway's is 
smaller and France's has gone, both giving way to larger firms with resources for 
competition based on e-commerce. 
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8.3 Concluding remarks 
 
Every market has its unique mitigating factors that affect the application and 
success of a legislative processes. However, in general terms the same macro 
level factors exist in each market that define medium to long term success; 
network spread and performance; continued financial resources, and; a firm's 
business model structure. Each has had an observable bearing on the success 
of legislation in each market to deliver its objectives. Arguably, the continued 
availability of financial resources has played the largest role in the consequential 
success of free-market economics and the use of contestability as a process. 
 
8.3.1 Why deregulate a market? 
 
There are two observable reasons for changes in legislative approach to 
deregulate a chosen market. Firstly, to provide the means to remedy an 
underperforming market operating with restrictive conditions and/or failing to be 
economically or operationally efficient. Secondly, a response to calls to widen the 
choice within the market and break the monopoly control on this sector by state 
entities which, through their own inefficiencies, fail to deliver adequate choice, 
price, or quality competition. In both cases the primary political goal will be to 
increase social welfare for the electorate as well as lower the financial burden to 
both the electorate through taxation. 
 
Although some critics claim lower social welfare levels are created through free-
market economics due to case studies showing resources being pulled to areas 
where they can most profitably be applied (in essence lessening the reach of the 
market) the net result in all studied markets is an increase in social welfare 
through new (or more frequent) journey opportunities, lower fares (at least at 
'entry' level for customers), greater choice in provider (less pronounced in most 
studied markets over the long-term), and improved travel standards (both on and 
off board) – with these benefits also feeding through to parallel rail networks by 
virtue of the competitive environment. 
 
In all studied markets the rail network has had an impact on market structure and 
performance, albeit at a low-level. As a substitute product in terms of point to 
point travel it has an important role to play in the consideration of inter-city coach 
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deregulation, as any substitute market does when considering deregulating a 
similar market. In the UK significant competition, even under state control, saw 
coach and rail passengers benefit from deregulation in general terms, but with an 
undercurrent of reduction in social welfare in less densely populated areas, for 
example in Cornwall. In most European markets rail has remained in state 
control, providing less immediate competition, and allowing domestic inter-city 
coach networks to develop, and markets to expand and contract. Consequently, 
entry of small and medium sized firms has been generally more sustained, such 
as in Sweden and Norway due to rail’s latent reactions, poorer regional networks, 
and the emergence of niche market services to regional airports. However, in 
France and Germany, small and medium sized firm operations have fallen away 
quickly in most cases. 
 
8.3.2 Are we left with a contestable market? 
 
Government policy aims for deregulation across all the studied markets have 
focused on creating a competitive market place for domestic inter-city coach 
travel within a continually contestable environment. Legislation has been 
designed to allow each market to perform and react freely to opportunities. The 
removal, or considerable reduction, of entry and exit restrictions and processes 
that formerly protected rail has resulted in environments which meet the 
requirements for contestable market theory to be functional.  
 
A contestable environment provides the potential for competition by allowing a 
threat of market entry to exist and be easily acted upon. A market may not appear 
highly competitive to buyers, but, in the background potential suppliers may be 
present and ready to enter the market with ease to take advantage of increased 
demand or complacent incumbent activity. Each of the markets studied is 
contestable, at least by the spirit of the legislation applied, and often in the 
observed operation of the market.  
 
In each studied market relatively free entry and exit restrictions are bolstered by 
significant private and contract hire sub-markets, with potential suppliers having 
knowledge, skills, and available equipment.  
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This underpins conclusions regarding contestability, and is supported by Figure 
25 which shows examples of market entry (and exit) following incumbents action; 
 
Figure 25: Examples of market entry and exit across studied markets 
 
Entry stimulus Market example 
Entry due to inflated 
prices 
Megabus entry to the UK long-distance airport market - a near 
monopoly for National Express. Fares on airport services are 
higher than other routes due to lower rail competition at the UK's 
main airports and the higher levels of service needed to meet 24-
hour airport operations. Megabus entered the Manchester, and 
London airport market with low fares and low frequencies.  
Entry due to observable 
customer and profit 
gains 
In all studied markets new entry has been significant on regional 
airport corridors where low-cost airlines proliferate. Customer 
loyalty is low and access to a domestic network less important. 
Fares and services are tailored to one-off use and these 
operational metrics encourage competition by all firms. Stansted 
Airport (UK) sees competition on the airport-London corridor 
between National Express and several firms. Entry has focused 
on fares and frequency. Aggressive competition has seen the 
airport authority licence space within its coach terminal - meaning 
competition for access instead of 'on-road'. The UK has also seen 
competition for commuter coaching. The Kent-London corridor 
remains highly competitive (coach/coach and coach/rail). The 
dominant national firms have had little impact entering the market 
only through acquisition.   
Entry due to abnormal 
profits 
First Group entered the coach market in the UK using the iconic 
American Greyhound brand. They chose already high frequency 
corridors with high loadings and profit levels on which to compete 
with the monopolist, National Express. Greyhound's entry forced 
the incumbent to re-align services and fares ahead of the launch 
to protect their position. However, long-term entry failed, and 
Greyhound left the market in 2013. This demonstrates the 
success of the freedoms allowed by contestability but also the 
flaws, with incumbents able to react ahead of new competition to 
deflect it and return to a monopoly. 
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Although examples exist of the success of the contestable environment there 
have also been instances where competition policy and contestability has 
potentially failed in the UK; 
  
 firstly, the lack of market entry by independent operators in the late 
1980s/90s when National Express consistently raised fares. This 
stimulated no new entry. Instead, National's revenue remained stable in 
real terms (rather than growing) due to high elasticity. Also, the reduced 
demand enabled capacity cuts which reduced total costs and offset this 
falling use and stable revenue position (White, 1999). At the same time 
intensive rail competition also deterred entry by new firms. 
 
 secondly, even when quantity restrictions remain in place (such as 
Stansted and Luton Airports where the airport has decided which 
operator(s) to admit to the terminal area) survival is not assured. Stansted 
CityLink recently left the market even though its route was unique, 
demonstrating the fragility of the market and the need to ensure robust 
pre-entry financial models are developed. 
 
 thirdly, some less tangible barriers remain; financial (sunk costs), and 
others such as innovation which have forced changes to the traditional 
methods of customer access and service delivery, have affected small and 
medium sized firms. Larger firms can be more dynamic and gain 
momentum through innovation, operational flexibility, and technology (e-
commerce). For example, Megabus and their business plan allowing for 
three-years of decreasing losses.  
 
While niche service entry (and survival) remains observed at a low level by 
smaller operators (for example New Bharat Midlands/Slough and Swanbrook 
Cheltenham/Oxford) it is unlikely to result in high revenue earning potential or a 
significant impact on the market. Most studied markets have settled to an 
oligopoly structure with potential for new entry but few realistic opportunities for 
this to be sustained.  
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Further exacerbating the situation and depleting the pool of potential entrants, 
are the business models used by large firms. These divert the attention of smaller 
firms away from the open market as they instead compete for branded service 
contracts. These opportunities represent potentially lower risk operation for these 
firms, dependent on the contract terms and the firm's appetite for financial risk. 
While these firms must still get their base costs 'right', contracts widely exist, 
ranging from very low risk (cost per mile contracts) through to high risk revenue-
share arrangements. This has seen large firms such as National Express (who 
use over 30 third-party contractors in the UK) and FlixBus (who has over 300 
partners across Europe and six in North America (Bus & Coach Buyer, 25 May 
2018) become monopsonists, leveraging the quality available in the private 
sector. Swebus Express has reduced the threat of competition by partnering with 
firms who would otherwise compete with them - this widens their network and 
sees customers benefit from increased connectivity. In France, Starshipper has 
chosen to merge with Ouibus, becoming part of the its network and agreeing long-
term profit return agreements for each co-operative partner. With competition 
quelled in this way, large firms focus on wider network innovation, fare levels (in 
competition with each other and rail), capacity management, and new forms of 
service delivery and customer access. In turn, this moves the market further out 
of reach for smaller firms with their potential to enter in their own right lessened. 
However, it does see the market meet original policy objectives for choice, quality, 
and low costs. 
 
However, there are grounds to conclude that contestable behaviour plays a 
continuing role in shaping markets. The continued threat of entry has ensured 
that incumbents focus on fares, service levels and quality. In France, prior 
knowledge of liberalisation saw SNCF develop Ouibus. In the UK, expansion by 
Megabus into the airport market has shown contestability to work and the 
dominance of National Express in a sizeable and growing market challenged by 
Megabus who have found National Express potentially complacent. Regardless 
of the activity of smaller firms there does perpetuate a contestable market, and 
this continues to enable new expansion, development and innovation in areas 
critical to the latest trend in 'real-time' consumer values. 
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8.3.3 Has deregulation created innovation? 
 
Deregulation in each market has created significant and progressive innovation. 
This has had mixed fortunes for small and medium sized firms with recent 
innovations potentially isolating them further from direct entry.  
 
It was the smaller firm market sector in the UK that innovated significantly at 
deregulation. Prior to the Act, the domestic national network was in decline, 
services and coaches were basic, and fares high. However, network coverage 
was significant and justified state control. At deregulation, National Express was 
afforded freedoms to reconfigure the network, moving resources to corridors with 
more profit potential and defending its position on others by fares competition. 
Where small and medium sized firms entered the market on the back of low fares, 
fierce competition quickly saw the entrants removed. But, where firms entered 
the market with a different product proposition, much higher success was seen. 
Examples include Cotters of Glasgow (Anglo-Scottish), Trathens (West Country 
to London), and in later years Armstrong Galley (North-East to London). In each 
case, increased levels of in-service quality and commensurately higher fares saw 
longer-term success. This worked well for these operators, who originating from 
the private-hire market, were used to delivering customer centric services. In 
some cases, National Express partnered or absorbed the higher quality services 
into their own network (Trathens), while other entrants eventually succumbed to 
increased competition through a new level of quality developed by National 
Express (Rapide) but coupled to continued low fares. 
 
While physical service improvements secured immediate market share the 
impacts lessened over time. Many new facilities became standard and the 
'customer' also changed. These are now focused on digital accessibility and 
convenience with speed and price remaining important amongst a broadly similar 
demographic. With the move to digital and e-commerce platforms coupled with a 
change in customer expectations, new barriers have been created for smaller 
firms.  
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However, physical innovation in this way has also restarted the market structure 
cycle. The new opportunities observed as occurring, stimulating not only new 
facilities but new operators, are below; 
 
 Stagecoach Gold - an experiment in offering increased quality over 
standard services and, for a short period, dedicated sleeper coaches on 
Anglo-Scottish services. The latter services have been discontinued for 
cost reasons though day-time Gold services remain within Scotland. 
 
 In the UK, a new form of virtual service provider, Sn-ap, has emerged, 
harnessing the latest digital technology, and using crowd sourcing 
techniques to understand demand and match people with journey 
opportunities. Sn-ap is drawing on the private hire market as sub-
contractors and although the services are in their infancy this proposition 
shows the room still available for innovation in the market. 
 
 In response to changing customer priorities National Express are currently 
rolling out three innovations; seat reservations, premium seating areas 
(double deck coaches only), and extra legroom seats. These are designed 
to segment customer groups, drive additional profit on popular routes, and 
provide a new proposition on highly contested corridors such as Bristol - 
London. 
 
Above all other innovations technology (and e-commerce) has been the main 
enabler. It has removed barriers for entry, managed passengers, and created 
brand awareness – but it has also created new barriers which independents 
struggle to overcome (e.g. skills and financial resources) to run e-commerce 
systems. As markets have opened to competitive freedoms technology has 
developed - this having a significant effect on the way markets evolve. The lack 
of technology helped National Express retain its dominant position in the 1980s, 
however, more recently FlixBus has used social media, e-commerce, and yield 
management to operate with few overheads, entering new markets at low cost, 
quickly winning market share and becoming a significant player. 
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Technology, therefore, has become a significant enabler in recent years. The 
advent of e-commerce as a reliable platform from which to launch and operate 
businesses of nearly every type has seen transport providers turn to digital 
technology as a low-cost model of market entry with the potential for near 
maximum product exposure. Developments of this nature in the inter-city coach 
market followed those of low-cost airlines in the United States of America and 
across Europe. At a stroke technology of this kind changed the market place for 
coach travel, with the need for on-street and call-centre based ticket sales 
eliminated together with the sunk and ongoing costs associated with them. Entry 
of Megabus into the UK market in 2003 demonstrated the success of this 
approach, and in more recent years it has been tech-savvy giants such as FlixBus 
with their 'Uber style' operations that have captured market share and the 
imagination of a new type of coach customer. However, FlixBus is an umbrella 
firm - a single brand operation that is reliant on smaller firms to operate the 
branded network it sells. FlixBus, like National Express, has in this way provided 
an attractive sub-market for small firms to operate within, removing the direct risks 
of revenue and competition from these firms in return for their complicity and 
acceptance of a set contract price. Safety in this form has seen many smaller 
firms reject opportunities for own-branded market entry and the next generation 
of 'crowd-sourced' virtual operators such as Sn-ap will only exacerbate this 
situation as they look to smaller firms to resource these new services. 
 
8.3.4 Cost structure within the industry 
 
E-commerce has stimulated cost structure change since the early 2000s. This 
period saw entry by Megabus into the UK domestic inter-city market (2003) and 
a shift towards kerb-side boarding and alighting - a contrast to the traditional use 
of dedicated terminals. These changes effected fixed overhead costs of operation 
as well as the derivation of fares and were highly popular with the largest 
passenger group - students. 
 
At deregulation in the UK market one strength of National Express was its large 
network of national ticket sales agents and its use of bus stations, including 
exclusive access to London's coach hub Victoria Coach Station. This became a 
significant barrier to entry for many firms, both independent or as part of the 
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British Coachways consortium. At this time the industry saw significant fixed costs 
linked to ticketing systems, facilities, and terminal use together with sunk costs 
for market entry including brand awareness, marketing, communications, and 
new ticket sales networks. 
 
E-commerce has removed many of these barriers to entry, such as fixed ticket 
agents and issuing costs. Using the internet as a sales and marketing platform 
all firms had the ability to reach a large audience quickly and cheaply. Learning 
from the low-cost airline industry, e-commerce also supported yield management 
systems and allowed much faster changes to price levels within the market - 
something that was only realistically achieved in unison with the internet as a 
sales and marketing platform. With significant barriers to market entry removed 
and lower costs of the internet as a business platform realised it should follow 
that smaller firms would find it easier to enter the market. However, while older 
barriers and fixed costs were removed, new barriers emerged in terms of time 
and skills costs to develop and manage e-commerce channels, and this has only 
ensured easier market entry for well resourced and larger firms. 
 
Economies of scale are linked to cost structures and are a potential long-term 
outcome of liberalisation. Referenced throughout the research, the conclusions 
that can be drawn from the studied markets are that potential economies of scale 
(or at best advantages of scale) within operations may exist due to the presence 
of a few, large firms in each market instead of numerous single corridor operators. 
Critical to this outcome is the 'network effect'. Not only does this allow centralised 
fixed overheads to be spread across many more services, helping the revenue 
impact of these to be lessened, it also allows operational cost efficiencies for crew 
and vehicle movements. In the UK, National Express increases the utilisation of 
crew and vehicles by creating two or three-day cycles that work a contractor 
across the network on routes not always linked to their home location. This 
minimises unproductive time and maximises resource efficiency but is only 
possible due to the wide range of routes operated. This saves costs for additional 
resources and means a significant network of services can be maintained with 
fewer vehicles. In terms of costs, there is little evidence to support economies of 
scale with regard to lower costs per vehicle mile as third-party contractors 
currently offer few, if any, cost savings based on the quantity of work they 
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undertake for the umbrella brand. However, it is arguable that economies are 
found in terms of higher load factors leading to lower costs per passenger mile 
(effect is due to higher occupancy at a given vehicle-mile unit cost) due to the 
significant brand awareness (attracting many passengers) and market power 
(through aggressive use of yield managed fares) that the large firms exhibit. 
Where firms have invested significantly in larger vehicles further reductions in 
cost per seat mile can be found using equivalent crew and vehicle resources 
being spread over ten or more additional seats. 
 
Cost efficiency is an important product of the contestable environment. In the UK, 
the threat of entry by FlixBus is affecting Megabus and National Express. Both 
are rationalising their operations and focusing on fares and innovation. The term 
'fortress UK' has been used - an indication that the threat of entry is forcing the 
market to remain lean and efficient with spin-off customer benefits. 
 
8.3.5 The impact of market structure changes within the industry 
 
Deregulation (liberalisation) in all studied markets has seen varying degrees of 
structure change dependent on the time that has been available for the market to 
mature.  Each market has been observed to pass through more than one 
structure and in nearly all cases the markets have settled into an oligopoly 
(Sweden, Norway, France) or a variant of this market structure (UK; Dominant 
Firm Oligopoly, and Germany; Non-coercive Monopoly) after starting out as a 
controlled monopoly and at liberalisation being close to an imperfectly 
competitive market in the short-term. 
 
An oligopoly is by default a structure that sees choice provided by a small number 
of large firms, allows product differentiation and innovation, and sees profits tend 
to normal. The market is typically settled, however, if abnormal profits or 
movement into a new supply area occurs this will be challenged by existing firms 
or new market entry (where legislation allows a contestable environment to 
prevail). The danger, however, is the potential for 'hit and run' entry - where the 
market is shocked back to equilibrium by sudden entry (and often exit) of a new 
supplier even where this may create difficulties for buyers - particularly in public 
facing markets. 
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The type of market structure has a direct effect on the level of small and medium 
sized firms that operate within it. A perfectly competitive market is the utopian 
form and a structure that contestability pushes any market towards. Where a 
market can operate near perfectly, it supports many small suppliers - the UK road 
haulage market being a close approximation (Nash, 1982). However, sustained 
entry into the inter-city coach market requires a number of factors which favour 
larger operations to ensure profitability. As such, while pockets of niche market 
success with small and medium sized firms are evidenced (Berry's 
Somerset/London operation) the market structure that ensures an inter-city 
market survives in the long-term does not suit multiple smaller firms playing a 
direct supply role on all corridors.  
 
The impact of some market structure forms regarding small and medium sized 
firms can be obstructive in terms of their ability to enter the market in their own 
right and juxtaposed to past policy aims. For small numbers of large firms to 
operate, the liberalisation process has seen the use of business models that reply 
on sub-contractors to supply the market as a bi-product of the process and this 
in turn has provided lower risk entry into the market for these firms (as seen with 
National Express and FlixBus). In contrast, Megabus uses a majority of internally 
sourced vehicle and driver resources and its financial strength sees small and 
medium sized firms unable to directly compete alongside its operations. 
Megabus' low fares policy further excludes new entrant activity and allows only 
established operators to compete and deter moves to a monopoly position. 
 
The inter-city coach market contrasts with the local bus market in the UK where 
a structure more akin to imperfect competition is widespread. This supports a 
larger number of small and medium sized firms, primarily due to the localised 
nature of the operations, the level of supporting sub-markets for local contract 
work (public and private) and lower financial resources needed to offset lower 
revenues achieved. The inter-city market stretches operators significantly. The 
lower seat turn-over requires a wider network and more efficient capacity 
management to ensure revenues meet financial resources outlaid. The closest 
approximation to the local bus market is the commuter coach sector - for example 
the Kent/London market. 
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8.3.6 The ongoing nature of competition within the industry 
 
Open and ongoing competition has been the primary goal of policies pursued by 
governments in each market. In all cases competition has been present following 
liberalisation - this at first being intensive before settling to fewer firms but 
continued active competition and an underlying competitive threat. This is 
highlighted in Figure 26 below which has been created through the research to 
show the cyclical nature of market structure change in a liberalised market. 
 
In all markets competition has focused on price, with other forms of competition 
being more sporadic. Firms have remained price makers as each market is not 
perfectly competitive, instead settling to an oligopoly. However, with new 'virtual' 
providers emerging there is a potential that buyers may move closer to price 
makers, forcing a shift in structure towards perfect competition - Sn-ap (UK) is 
already founded on buyers dictating journey time, the routes taken and 
influencing fares charged by trip utilisation. In Figure 26 this next potential phase 
is depicted by the upward trending (red) line after 'stimulus for market change' 
following initial settlement to an oligopoly. 
 
E-commerce and observations of the low-cost airline sector have seen coach 
firms offer more standardised services in terms of vehicles, on-board facilities, 
and frequencies. Innovation instead focuses on customer accessibility and the 
real-time reaction of the seller to the flow of buyer demand - stimulating new 
entrants like Sn-ap. These techniques are a more dynamic form of competition, 
requiring considerable financial and time resource by each operator to push for 
market leadership. However, passenger reactions have remained highly price-
elastic, close to -1.0, in the long-run meaning that any entrepreneurial activity 
needs to be price focused for long-term sustainability and this, in some cases 
makes entry short lived in the market - for example EasyBus' entry into the airport 
market and shown by the blue line in Figure 26.  
 
These two outcomes from competitive activity show that market structure 
changes can be cyclical. Figure 26 seeks to capture the movements over time for 
a newly liberalised market based on observations from researched markets. 
Figure 26 shows the process for the initial cycle following liberalisation (starting 
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at (state) monopoly) and moving to oligopoly (as seen in each studied market 
except Germany). Critically, the cycle restarts at the point of oligopoly with 
suitable stimuli, and the process can then be viewed as a recurring cycle - the 
length varying dependent to the success of the stimuli causing the cycle to restart. 
 
Figure 26: Proposed cyclical nature of deregulated market structures 
 
 
 
While two examples of competition have been described, further examples of 
potential stimuli exist; 
 
 firstly, a sudden rise in profits in the market may stimulate short-term 'hit 
and run' competition, quickly returning the market to equilibrium and an 
oligopoly state; or, 
 
 secondly, the stimulus may be more complex, involving a significant 
legislation change and prolonging the cycle time before seeing the market 
move back to an oligopoly, or a new market structure. 
 
Germany is a notable exception to the process followed by all other studied 
markets. Its rapid move back to a monopolistic market is an example of the 
downward trending (green) line shown in Figure 26. In Germany the market 
moved quickly to oligopoly and further mergers (Chapter 7) saw the market 
stabilise as a monopoly. However, this was not a return to an original state as 
there was no pre-liberalisation network. In contrast France, who liberalised after 
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Germany, has not followed the same path. Despite significant market activity by 
FlixBus and heavy use of e-commerce by all entrants France has benefited from 
the faster reactions to competitive threat by state rail who put in place a small 
network ahead of liberalisation firm, albeit young compared to pre-liberalisation 
examples seen in the UK and Norway.  
 
For newly liberalising markets, the cycle in Figure 26 will be observed where a 
competitive environment persists. The final resting position of these markets (and 
already liberalised ones) will be determined by future advances in automotive and 
management technology. The success of large providers in entering newly 
liberalised markets will depend on efficiencies through scale and brand 
knowledge being realised. Each represents stimuli for cycle change and as seen 
in the studied markets, stimulus has already caused market states to alter (in 
most cases only slightly) but with the potential for further change and a movement 
to an imperfectly competitive state if sustainability can be attained in the face of 
incumbent reaction to new 'virtual' competition. 
 
8.3.7 Concluding Remarks 
 
By reviewing the UK market across 35 years it is apparent that the market has 
seen cyclical movement through two structures; monopoly and imperfect 
competition, before settling to a third - the dominant firm variant of oligopoly. 
Stimulus through e-commerce restarted the cycle and has seen the market move 
to a more competitive standard form of oligopoly with two firms largely sharing 
the market. With this regard, entry for smaller firms is unlikely with such dominant 
networks and predatory pricing employed on most corridors. Entry is restricted to 
niche markets, opportunities made available by licensing authorities (such as 
airports), and contractual work for network operators.  
 
The market structure outcomes of the studied markets have, in all but one case, 
seen the process of liberalisation also result in an oligopoly - providing passenger 
choice and market stability. In Germany a non-coercive monopoly structure has 
emerged with one operator controlling 90% of the market. However, market 
contraction has been increasingly intensive as years have passed, this being 
aided by significant advances in digital technology.  
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In all markets contestability is in evidence. It has enabled each market to move 
through different structures and has remained in place to counter excessive 
profits and deter monopoly formation. In Germany, the market remains 
contestable even with the 90% market share of FlixBus, and though new entry is 
harder it is still observable on isolated corridors, such as the airport market (like 
opportunities still exploited in the UK market). In France, FlixBus has not been 
allowed to expand rapidly due to competition from state supported Ouibus 
(SNCF). In the UK incumbent firms (all plcs) have used cost efficiencies to ensure 
a 'fortress UK' approach is used against FlixBus.  
 
The process of deregulation in the UK market, and across all studied markets has 
seen several economic effects. In concluding on the primary research question, 
the following points affecting the relationship between small and medium sized 
firms and these economic effects are notable: 
 
1. Within each market advantages of scale have been observed with 
potentially lower cost per passenger-km due to higher occupancy. Scale 
has helped larger firms to strengthen and expand networks, making non-
linear revenue gains vis-ὰ-vis additional resources outlaid aided by 
‘network effect’ and brand recognition. Smaller firms have been unable to 
use scale to achieve entry. Instead most use seasonal spare resource for 
experimental entry – e.g. UK deregulation in October 1980 which saw 
entry in the winter followed by significant exit by the following spring. 
 
2. CMT sees the relationship between price, normal profit and cost closely 
related, with excessive profits being deterred by the threat of new entry. 
All incumbent firms seek efficiencies, exploit scale to ensure low prices on 
core corridors, and use price discrimination on corridors where monopoly 
supply exists and where scope extends to cases other than monopoly (e.g. 
exploiting lower elasticities for travel at certain times, such as holiday 
peaks). Contestability creates freedom for these actions, however, such 
actions may then create new barriers to entry for smaller firms who then 
only have the opportunity for entry at the micro level where higher prices 
and monopolistic activity prevails. It is arguable then, that assumptions 
within CMT that barriers can be made very small may be unrealistic. 
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3. Deregulation has caused churn at route and passenger level – akin to the 
US airline market (Kahn, 1988) with significant and ongoing churn coupled 
to coach passengers’ high price-elasticity leading to high inter and intra 
modal shift. Technology through yield management has seen fare 
differentials and predatory pricing by large firms sustain passenger churn, 
lower brand loyalty and mode shift. At the same time, to minimise churn 
and retain passengers some firms (and modes) have used measures such 
as discount cards for target groups that are only valid on their services. 
However, route level churn falls as the market matures although fewer new 
links are made. For smaller firms, these economic effects make entry into 
core markets difficult but do present opportunity for entry where monopoly 
activity occurs, and the new entrant can find a niche. 
 
4. Deregulation needs the economic effect of the contestability process to 
function effectively. It creates the potential for; competition to exist; barriers 
to entry (and exit) to be lowered (or removed); and, hit and run competition 
(one of the safeguards against abnormal profits and monopoly operation). 
 
5. Lack of success of CMT can be measured by the level of abnormal profits. 
A perfectly competitive market has normal economic profits (total revenue 
= total cost including opportunity cost where it is accepted that this is seen 
as a normal return on capital – arguments regarding this are notable within 
the UK Competition Commission enquiry into local bus services, 2011). 
However, the accounting definition (which takes no account of opportunity 
cost) allows for revenues to be greater than costs. While contestable each 
coach market is perfect - and while data for National Express (Figure 17) 
shows accounting level profits are made (super normal (or abnormal) 
economic profit) the level of abnormality is low due to contestability. 
However, while current National Express return on sales (ROS) margins 
are good but not abnormal (c10%), there is post-deregulation evidence of 
very high return on investments (ROI). This is not a failure of CMT but due 
to historic differences in asset management. In the early years National 
Express owned and operated very few vehicles, contracting in around 80% 
from third-parties (Robbins & White, 2012). As a result, a high rate of return 
on revenue achieved was generated (c30% in 2000). However, a move 
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towards standardised vehicles, increased ownership of vehicles by the firm 
and a mix of owned operation and vehicle leasing to third-parties (to 
maintain standard vehicles) has seen ROI fall. The data also shows a step-
change in profit after 2003 (entry of Megabus) and a new steady state 
thereafter with margins unaffected by competition (Robbins & White, 
2012). This is likely due to an expanded passenger market (increased 
demand) driven by competition and continued focus on operational 
efficiency and price. As a result, few opportunities for smaller firms exist 
due to intense competition and use of yield management but contestability 
has not failed even though the threat of smaller firm entry is reduced. 
 
6. Social welfare may also be a measure of CMT success. Maximised social 
welfare, a principle aim of deregulation seeks to; increase choice; lower 
cost and price; and, increase efficiency. While markets have seen falling 
fares and service increases, few have seen the multi-operator environment 
develop - instead each has contracted to at best oligopoly. Fewer firms 
are, arguably, better for social welfare due to the network effect and 
stability they create. There is potential for better spread of costs over 
resources and the ability to better compete with all modes. However, 
deregulation can see diversion of resources to core corridors and vacuums 
left in provincial areas. This occurred in the UK, with main corridors 
benefiting (an increase in welfare), but lower density areas (e.g. Cornwall) 
suffering from fewer services and a decrease in welfare. However, an 
argument exists for wider benefits of these actions with lower fares seen 
by rail users in response from coach competition – seen as a user benefit 
and social welfare increase (Douglas, 1987). Policy makers must plan for 
this, and while the UK did not, there is evidence other markets have (e.g. 
Norway retaining subsidies for some routes and Germany’s state 
ownership of rail seeing regional network improvements). 
 
7. Resultant market structure models have settled broadly to oligopoly. This 
has seen fewer suppliers to the market than envisaged but is beneficial in 
terms of; better likelihood of economies of scale; increased allocative 
efficiency; lower prices; and, benefits driven through ‘network effects’ and 
a maximisation of social welfare. 
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8. Market concentration has been hastened in recent years through 
technology advances that have better enabled allocative efficiency and 
price competition. Revenue management systems and yield management 
techniques have been coupled with internet and social media platforms to 
maximise passenger loads, profits, and customer satisfaction. Smaller 
firms have struggled to keep pace with the application and cost of this 
technology even though its presence in the market has significantly 
reduced physical barriers for entry. 
 
 
9. Deregulation has created competition. However, if competitive attrition 
sees one firm exit the market, remaining operators benefit through latent 
demand (the additional demand created by competition). However, this is 
more likely to be consumed by existing firms than new entrants due to 
advantages of scale and therefore competition, over time may mean 
market contraction (e.g. Cheltenham/London where Megabus has left the 
market and National Express increased their service level to meet latent 
demand and become the monopolist again). 
 
10. Monopsony markets have been created by large ‘umbrella-brand’ firms to 
provide protection from competition - but this can bring diseconomies of 
scale. When monopsony firms create self-imposed entry barriers (as they 
strive to increase technology within the business, create a consistent 
brand image, and use standard equipment) the situation may turn to a 
negative position as successful suppliers become ‘super-size’ and use 
their own advantages of scale to win increasing levels of work, often at 
less competitive prices (not passing on scale advantages) to the ‘umbrella-
brand’ firm. These super-suppliers may also enter the market in their own 
right and with lower costs due to investments made (and paid for) through 
contract work. Furthermore, barriers to entry become higher for new and 
smaller firms aiming to work for ‘umbrella-brand’ firms - a paradox given 
the desire of these firms to operate within a free-market and create a 
controlled competitive private market for their services that is keenly priced 
through multiple compliant firms bidding at the contract stage - not so 
common now owing to super-supplier presence. 
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In answering the primary research question, several policy recommendations 
have emerged that may assist future market liberalisations and currently 
liberalised markets mature further. These recommendations are summarised as: 
 
 The removal of protective financial structures (ahead of liberalisation);  
 The removal of rail protectionism; 
 Ensuring equitable access to facilities; and,  
 The development of efficient route networks that maximise social welfare. 
 
Finally, Figure 27 provides a summarised response to the research hypothesis 
and each additional sub-hypothesis that has emerged during the work with 
summary material drawn from the wider research (Chapters 1-7) and conclusion 
(Chapter 8); 
 
Figure 27: Research hypothesis testing and conclusions summary 
 
Hypothesis / Sub-hypothesis Commentary 
Given the freedoms allowed for 
market entry and exit through the 
1980 Transport Act why is there 
little or no activity within the UK 
inter-city coach market by small and 
medium sized coach operators? 
Advancing technology has provided new opportunities 
as well as barriers. The market is still highly price-
elastic, revenue yields are low, operating (fuel and 
labour) are high, and competition remains focused on 
price. Two large, low-cost, networks split the market. 
One of these firms has created a monopsony market 
that attracts smaller firms to work under contract 
instead of competing directly. Sunk cost and 
knowledge barriers remain and market entry is only 
possible on well researched niche corridors or where 
access remains licensed (e.g. some regional airports).  
Is the UK market a demonstrable 
success of contestable market 
theory but also a failing of 
Government objectives regarding 
choice and quantity? 
The market is contestable as demonstrated throughout 
the 35-year period of deregulation and most recently 
with the entry of Sn-ap. Free market economics rather 
than policy have dictated the shape and quantity in the 
market and as such Government objectives have not 
failed. However, in hindsight more should have been 
done at deregulation to lower entry barriers and limit 
the immediate power of the incumbent (pre-
liberalisation) network operator. 
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In conclusion, the role of the small and medium sized operator remains largely at 
odds with the original aims of deregulation. While all studied markets are clearly 
contestable with smaller firms providing the theoretical competitive threat to help 
the market stay in equilibrium, there still exist significant entry barriers for such 
firms. Success of market entry for smaller firms is seen on niche market corridors 
and where a level of quantity (licensed) restriction still exists - such as access to 
airports operated by private companies.  
Hypothesis / Sub-hypothesis Commentary 
Has the resultant UK market 
structure led to an internal 
monopsonistic market structure 
within a wider external monopoly or 
oligopoly market structure? 
Yes, the business model used by the largest operator 
in the market, National Express, has led to a private 
monopsony market forming and with 30 contractors 
operating across the network. FlixBus have used the 
same model in Europe, enabling it to move very quickly 
into new markets and roll out consistent services and 
brand - this lowers the lead time for market entry (no 
vehicle purchasing and staff recruitment) and makes it 
harder for smaller firm entry. 
What critical factors are required to; 
exist; remain, or; be delivered with, 
liberalisation to enable long-term 
competition to exist? 
Equitable access to technology and terminals are the 
main critical factors that need to exist throughout the 
liberalisation process. Ideally, the removal of pre-
existing networks and large firms should occur, 
however Germany may suggest otherwise. Rail 
ownership is less important but of note are those 
examples where state rail funding has aided fares 
based competition, even if indirectly. 
Following sequential liberalisations 
across Europe what similarities 
exist and what lessons can be 
drawn from each process?  
In most cases some form of network has existed prior 
to liberalisation - even in Germany with routes radiating 
from Berlin. As a result, all markets have settled as an 
oligopoly except for Germany where mergers have 
seen a dominant network emerge and a 90/10 split of 
market control. In all cases the ownership of rail has 
had no real bearing on the success of inter-city coach. 
However, the increasing role of technology and 
changes in customer expectations and mobility have 
seen differing speeds of consolidation and a common 
barrier to entry for smaller firms. Lessons remain linked 
to financial resources, market composition prior to 
liberalisation and the application of equitable customer 
interfaces after liberalisation laws are passed. 
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The current role of smaller firms can be defined as providing; a pool of resource 
for larger firms (pre-existing or new to the market); theoretical threat of entry to 
maintain market equilibrium; niche market services where they can enter the 
market on equitable terms, and; innovation in traditional in-service delivery where 
this is sustainable at higher fares and/or due to 'home' market loyalty (Berrys 
Superfast or New Bharat, the latter serving specific ethic communities). The 
future of smaller firms in the scheduled long-distance market remains uncertain - 
the internet is a low-cost entry platform and increasingly customers are looking 
for real-time 'crowd sourced' travel opportunities, However, technology to co-
ordinate this is currently prohibitive and would require wider and lower cost 
availability for smaller firms to independently enter the market at volumes 
sustainable to long term survival. 
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